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This study analyses and compares the theories relating to adver- 
tising and competition in economics literature with their operation in 
the market-place, and with the attitudes and pronouncements of public 
policy towards advertising and competition. 
A survey of the main literature in economic theory concerned with 
advertising and competition includes the theory of value, the theory of 
the firm, and theories and empirical studies on the effects of advertising 
and imperfect competition on prices, profits, barriers to entry and 
product differentiation. Since no general agreement exists on these 
theories and research, the review is interspersed with criticisms which 
have been made about specific features of them, and also a short outline 
of alternative theories which are considered to give a more accurate 
account of the behaviour of firms in the real world. 
Consumer behaviour in the market is then studied from three view- 
points: a summary of the major academic theories of consumer behaviour; 
the results of some empirical research into consumer behaviour; and 
eight case histories of products and services which show how products 
are developed and introduced on the market. 
Finally, the economic theories are compared with the results of 
the empirical research and the case histories. The theory and practice 
of advertising and competition is then compared with extracts from the 
reports of public bodies to illustrate the attitude of public policy 
towards advertising and competition. 
The conclusions draw attention to the major discrepancies which 
appear to exist between theory and practice, and the implications that 
follow for public policy which seems to be predominantly based on the 
theory of the firm and the need to eliminate imperfections in the market 
such as product differentiation, advertising and non-price competition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study analyses and compares the theories relating to advertising 
and competition in economics literature with their operation in the 
market-place. The divergences which are found to occur between theory 
and practice are then compared with the attitudes and pronouncements of 
public policy towards advertising and competition. The thesis is 
divided into three parts. 
Part-1 reviews the main literature in economic theory concerned 
with advertising and competition, i. e. the theory of value, concept of 
consumer sovereignty, theory of the firm - perfect and imperfect 
competition, and theories and empirical studies on, the effects of adver- 
tising and imperfect competition, in particular, oligopoly, on prices, 
profits, barriers to entry and product differentiation. There is also 
a short review of the economics of information which analyses the benefits 
which buyers of advertised products gain from advertising as opposed to 
the traditional approach of considering advertising almost entirely from 
the viewpoint of the sellers of advertised products. Since there is by 
no means general agreement on these theories and studies, the review is 
interspersed with criticisms which have been made about specific features 
of them. 
This survey is followed by an outline of three alternative theories 
which are considered to give a more accurate account of the behaviour 
of firms in the real world: managerial economics; management of demand; 
and competition as a process and not as a situation. However, many of 
the criticisms of the theory of the firm have been rejected as being 
misconceived for a variety of reasons, viz. (1) since the theory was only 
ever intended as an abstract model conceived for theoretical reasoning, it 
is not surprising that it should diverge from reality, and should not 
therefore be taken at its face value; (2) that it provides a limiting 
case against which real situations can be compared and evaluated and 
I 
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(3) that the major decisions of firms in the real world are dealt with 
in the literature of the economics of industrial structure and organisation. 
Finally, Part 1 outlines the concept of 'workable' competition which has 
developed parallel with the traditional theory of the firm to explain 
how under conditions of oligopoly and imperfect competition, it is 
nevertheless possible for competition to flourish. 
Part 2 studies the consumer in the market from three points of view. 
First, by a brief survey of the major academic theories of consumer 
behaviour, which is followed by examples of empirical research into 
consumer behaviour including brand loyalty and brand share prediction. 
Finally, eight case histories illustrate how products are developed and 
introduced on the market, how firms compete, and the different forms 
that competition can take. 
Part 3 compares the economic theories on advertising and competition 
as outlined in the mainstream of economics literature in Part 1 with 
examples taken from the case histories and the empirical research in 
Part 2. In turn the theory and practice of advertising and competition 
is compared with examples taken from the Reports of such bodies as the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the Price Commission and the Office 
of Fair Trading which illustrate the attitude of public policy towards 
advertising and competition. 
The conclusions draw attention to the major discrepancies which 
appear to exist between theory and practice, and the implications that 
follow for public policy which is predominantly based on the theory of 
the firm and the need to eliminate imperfections in the market such as 
product differentiation, advertising and non-price competition. 
t- 
\. 
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PART 1 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC THEORIES 
OF ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION 
1. Traditional Neo-classical Economic Theory 
(a) Theory of Value 
The factors which determine demand, supply and price comprise the 
theory of value and distribution. This forms the core of orthodox 
economic theory and is based on the "principle of equal net advantage", 
i. e. that under the stimulus of prices-and profits resources move from 
one occupation to another, and from the production of one type of product 
or service to another. 
Adam Smith and his concept of "effective demand" contains the germ 
of the modern theory of demand and supply, (Chapters 7&9, Book 1). 
Briefly, Smith put forward that producers sought to earn the largest 
possible profit, but in order to do so they had to produce goods desired 
by the community. Further, they must produce them in the right quantities, 
otherwise too much would cause a low price and a low profit, while too 
small a supply would cause an increase in price. The delicate mechanism 
of the "invisible hand" was also at work in the markets for the factors 
of production - capital, 'land and labour - providing harmony as long as 
factors sought the largest possible earnings. This was one part of the 
system of social harmony in an economic society which was dependent on 
the delicate balance of man's conflicting motives. 
Ricardo's main achievements in-the theory of value and distribution 
are set out in The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817, 
3rd edition, 1821). His theory of value was a quantity-of-labour theory. 
He dismissed 'scarce' (i. e. irreproducible) commodities; he concentrated 
\ 
on the mass of goods that may be 'increased by human industry'-and tried 
to demonstrate that the exchange values of commodities will be proportional' 
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to the quantities of labour embodied in them (included 'stored-up' labour 
in the form of machines etc. ). The simplicity of this proposition was 
stretched in later sections of the book on production requiring the use 
of proportions of capital and labour of varying qualities, but Ricardo 
retained it as a fundamental element in his theory. 
After Ricardo, most of the energies of the Classical school were 
devoted to the labour theory of value, vaguely formulated by Adam Smith 
and developed by Ricardo. It was widely criticised but not replaced 
until the 'full cost' theory ofJohn Stuart Mill that the value of a 
commodity depended on the amount of all the factors used to produce it. 
The modern theory of value and distribution dates from the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. The beginnings of the 'Marginal Utility 
School' developed simultaneously around Jevons in England, Carl Menger in 
Austria and Walras in Switzerland which approached the problem of value 
from the side of demand and produced the theory that the value of a com- 
modity depended on the 'utility' or satisfaction of a final marginal unit. 
This led to the exposition of the utility analysis as the foundation of 
both demand and supply, and as a general theory of choice. Much of what 
the marginal utility school proclaimed is implicit in the classical 
economists, but now, for the first time, the dependence of value on 
scarcity, in relation to demand, and the dependence of scarcity on cost 
of production was made explicit. The shift in emphasis away from cost 
of production towards demand and final consumption caused the change to 
be described in terms of a shift to a Subjective Theory of Value. 
Although this theory was refined and developed by Wieser and Bohm- 
Bawerk in Austria, it met'with opposition in this country and was not 
finally accepted until the publication of Alfred Marshall's Principles 
of Economics in 1890. Marshall's contribution was to bring together 
what had formerly been two competing theories into a single theory of 
value and distribution. His basic proposition is that any price tends 
to be that at which the quantity of the commodity demanded is equal'to 
ý. 
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the quantity supplied. Marshall showed how the demand curve depended 
on the underlying utility relationships, and how the supply curve was 
related to costs. Man's economic behaviour was based upon a balance 
between the search for satisfaction (utility) and the avoidance of 
sacrifice; this approach enabled Marshall to treat utility and costs as 
the joint determinants of value. They were like the blades of a pair 
of scissors, neither cutting solely by its own action. 
He applied this general scheme to the whole field of economic 
activity. The individual consumer obtained income by balancing the dis- 
utility of effort with the utility derived from spending the income derived 
from it. Likewise, the pattern of his expenditure was determined by the 
utility to be obtained from a commodity at the expense of the utility 
foregone in not buying others. 
The two'principles underlying this theory are (1) that price tends 
to reflect opportunity costs, i. e. the sacrifice of the alternatives 
foregone in producing a'commodity or service, and (2) that consumers 
spend their incomes in the ways they prefer, i. e. there is consumer 
sovereignty. (Consumer sovereignty in its simplest form, signifies 
that it is the preferences of consumers, as shown by the ways in which 
they spend their money, that determine what merchandise is produced and 
which services supplied. ) 
This proposition would naturally be easier to accept if all goods 
were produced to order. The direction of economic activity would then 
be determined by consumers' orders. Retailers would pass them on to 
wholesalers, wholesalers to manufacturers, manufacturers to producers of 
intermediate products, and so on. In practice, of course, the vast 
majority of merchandise is manufactured in anticipation of consumers' 
demands. Nevertheless, even under round-about methods of production, 
which are continually lengthening as technical processes become more 
complex, consumer sovereignty implies that businessmen whose anticipations 
are correct, earn a larger money return than if they are wrong. ý If they 
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are shown by events to be wrong, businessmen are-compelled sooner or 
later to change their plans, and to bring them more closely in line with 
the wishes of consumers. In this way, it is still possible to maintain 
that production is controlled by demand, or rather for the most part by 
expected demand. Broadly, consumer sovereignty is more effective the 
more competitive the market, and less effective where there is an element 
of monopoly. 
The theory of consumer sovereignty is subject to three limitations. 
First, the amount of available resources and the state of-technical know- 
ledge imposes an inherent limitation on the power of consumers to determine 
what shall be produced. Secondly, the distortion implicit in inequality, 
of income permits the pull on the market exerted by-the, rich man to be 
disproportionately stronger than that exerted by the less wealthy. 
Thirdly, there are the limitations imposed by the State: the sale of 
some goods, such as certain drugs, may be prohibited; the consumption of 
others, such as alcoholic drink before driving, is effectively restricted. 
The first limitation is inherent; - the second can be alleviated by the 
State through progressive taxation; the third is generally believed to 
be beneficial. 
In several important respects Marshall's concept of the theory of 
value differed from that of the Marginal Utility School: 
1. In contrast to the concept of 'timeless equilibrium' Marshall 
stressed continually the importance of the time element in determining 
price and value: 
... the margin, which must be studied 
in reference to long 
periods and enduring results, differs in character as well 
as in extent from that which must be studied in reference 
to short periods and to passing fluctuations. ' 
(Preface xvi, 1920) 
As a consequence, he considered the factors influencing the determination 
of value under three time periods relevant to supply: the momentary 
' 
period in which equilibrium conditions relate to the disposal of a given 
stock of a commodity; the short-run in which the equilibrium output 
is 
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related to a given number of producers operating with given stocks of 
equipment; and the long-run in which the number of producers and the scale 
of equipment at their disposal are assumed to be variable. Finally, it 
was necessary for value to be considered in the 'non static' period when 
all economic data such as tastes, technology, population, etc. are likely 
to change. The importance of making these time distinctions was to 
clarify that the influence of utility on value predominates during short 
periods, but that of cost of production in the long run. 
2. The Marginal Utility School considered the supply of factors 
of production as given because it was taking just the immediate, i. e. 
timeless period. On the other hand, Marshall did not take the factors 
of production as given but as having a supply price; there is a certain 
rate of return which it is necessary for a factor to receive to call forth 
a certain quantity of it. The price is not a cost, but it measures cost. 
3. The implicit assumption of the 'Marginal Utility School' that 
wants are fixed was not accepted by Marshall: 
'... although it is man's wants in the earliest stages of 
his development that give'rise to his activities, yet 
afterwards each new step upwards is to be regarded as the 
development of new activities giving rise to new wants, 
rather than of new wants giving rise to new activities. ' 
(1890, p. 89) 
Furthermore, Marshall pointed out the 'high theme of economic progress' 
and was anxious to distance himself from the idea of treating economic 
problems in terms of 'statical equilibrium' which he maintained was not 
only an imperfect introduction, but 'barely even an introduction to the 
study of the progress and development of industries which show a tendency 
to increasing returns. ' Since Marshall was well aware of the intricate 
nature of economic rivalries in the real world, his comment was presumably 
intended as a rebuke to those who had taken the analogy of Jevons 
seriously (Statical Mechanics) so that economic analysis became pre- 
occupied with equilibrium positions under conditions of competition., A 
second consequence followed from this preoccupation, as Dobb pointedlout: 
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'following from this, dynamic considerations tend to be 
ignored ... could not deal with the stability or 
instability 
of paths of movement, and hence with fluctuations or with 
change as a process. ' (1973, p. 173) 
The differences between the two views of the neo-classical doctrine were 
synthesised by Pigou by placing it in a setting of stationary equilibrium 
which turned it into a neat logical system, but which also neglected some 
of the Marshallian concepts on time, wants, and competition. 
(b) The Theory of the Firm: Perfect and Imperfect Competition 
The essence of the theory of the firm as it has become familiar in 
economic textbooks is as follows: 
The theory is only applicable under the assumptions of perfect com- 
petition. For an industry to be perfectly competitive two conditions 
must be met. 
1. The product must be homogeneous so that the products of one firm 
will be perfectly substitutable in the minds of the buyers for the product 
of any other firm in the industry. 
2. The most profitable output of the individual firm must be small 
relative to the total output coming onto the market. The latter con- 
dition will be fulfilled only if the average cost of production in each 
individual firm reaches its minimum at a relatively small output. It 
will also be fulfilled only if the commodity is readily transportable and 
if the buyers and sellers are in close physical proximity. 
Perfect competition is then an analytical 'model' of the pure form 
that a market would take if: 
(a) there were many sellers of absolutely identical products in 
relation to their total sales so that none could influence market price 
by varying the quantity he was prepared to market, i. e. every seller is 
faced by a horizontal demand curve. It follows that a firm with perfect 
markets will not have any selling costs; there is no point in trying to 
NI 
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increase the amount that can be sold at the market price when any amount 
within, the limits of the firm's capacity is saleable. 
(b) buyers and sellers were aware with complete certainty of prices 
and opportunities available everywhere in this and other markets, i. e. 
there is perfect knowledge and therefore the absence of advertising and 
other marketing costs; 
(c) significant economies of scale were absent so that no one seller 
could grow to dominate the market (i. e. producers would remain relatively 
small-scale); and 
(d) there were no barriers of-any kind to the movement of land, labour, 
and capital or of entrepreneurs from or to the rest of the economy. 
The assumption is also made-in this static. theory-. that in the short 
run incomes and tastes remain the same, and the state of technology is 
given. 
Under these circumstances competition among producers would in the 
long run ensure that every producer was operating with the most efficient 
size of plant and equipment, producing the most efficient (low cost) out- 
put, and was earning only the minimum amount of profit necessary to 
maintain the minimum necessary number of producers in the industry. 
Equilibrium is reached when prices are such that supply of every 
commodity equals the demand for it, and no factors of. production have. any, 
incentive to move into-another industry or occupation. It is true that 
the prices of products are related to the prices of the factors of 
production employed in producing them. But it is also true that the 
prices of those factors depend on the value of, their products both in the 
industry under consideration and in other industries. 
The prices of products in one industry are affected by the prices of 
the possible substitutes produced by other industries. Everything 
depends on everything else. The price system is a system; all prices 
are mutually dependent on one another. 
The model of perfect competition yields an 'ideal' output in the 
ý'ý"ý""°ý. ý o. r 
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sense that the price consumers would have to pay to obtain additional 
supplies of a commodity produced under these conditions would, in both 
the short run and the long run, be just sufficient to bid the necessary 
productive resources away from alternative uses. If production were 
everywhere organised in this ideal manner the price system would thus 
secure an optimum distribution of economic resources to reflect consumers' 
preferences in the most efficient way. The model thus provides a yard- 
stick of economic efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
In the exposition of perfect competition, pure monopoly is treated 
asa special case, and consists of'the opposite of the three essential 
elements of, perfect competition, i. e. (1) one firm in the industry; 
(2) producing a product wholly unlike the product of any other firm; 
and (3) no possibility for new firms to enter the industry. Then it is 
traditionally assumed that a single producer will be able to raise his 
price and thereby earn a monopoly profit, depending upon the shape of his 
demand curve. 
Although both perfect competition and monopoly were seen to be 
operating in the economy (many agricultural products and commodities 
operate under conditions close to perfect competition; "public utilities" 
operate under conditions close to pure monopoly) the bulk of economic" 
activity clearly operated between the extremes of perfect competition and 
pure monopoly. Consequently, there were several attempts made to replace 
or supplement the model of perfect competition. Most notable were the 
concepts of monopolistic and imperfect competition developed during the 
1930s by, respectively, E. H. Chamberlin and Joan Robinson. As she pointed, 
out in 1969: 
'... by showing that perfect competition cannot obtain in 
manufacturing industry (imperfect competition) undermines 
the complex of ideas erected on the slogan of "price equals 
marginal cost". ' (Preface xi) 
Imperfect competition covers the economic models of market forms used 
in economic analysis other than perfect competition, i. e. monopolistic 
I 
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competition, oligipoly, duopoly through to monopoly. In all cases of 
competition, whether perfect or imperfect, freedom of entry of firms or 
of other resources into the industry is assumed. The different types 
of competition are then defined by ringing the changes on two fundamental 
conditions: the homogeneity of the product and the number of firms. 
Perfect competition assumes many firms and a homogeneous product, but 
many firms producing products which are similar but not identical is 
monopolistic competition. When a few firms are selling a homogeneous 
product there is perfect oligopoly, whereas when a few firms are selling 
heterogeneous products imperfect oligopoly exists. 
Thus imperfect competition depictsa market situation which does not 
fulfil all the conditions necessary for perfect competition and is 
characterised by one or more of the following features: the ability of 
sellers to influence demand by persuading consumers that their product is 
different from others of the same kind and thus generate some degree of 
monopoly by such practices as product differentiation, branding, 
advertising; restraints on the entry of competitors into any line of 
production either because of the large scale of initial investment 
-required or because of restrictive and collusive practices; the existence 
of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge about prices and profits elsewhere; 
the absence of price competition. There is a clear distinction drawn 
between restrictive practices employed by a group to convert an otherwise 
competitive situation into a monopoly and an individual monopoly or near- 
monopoly which arises from the economies of large-scale production. 
The distinctive contribution of Chamberlin and Robinson was to show 
that in contrast to neo-classical economics it is more appropriate to set 
out the analysis of monopoly, and treat perfect competition as a special 
case. Then the condition noticed under perfect competition that the 
most profitable output occurs where price equals marginal cost is only a 
special case of the general proposition that all firms are most profitable 
at the output where the marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
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If the simplifying assumption is then adopted, as it is, that the 
monopolist or the producer in an imperfectly competitive market will 
produce such an output as will maximise his profits, output will tend to 
be smaller other things being equal (e. g. costs) than it would be in a 
more competitive market. Whereas under perfect competition sellers are 
price takers because the price is constant for all outputs, under all 
degrees of imperfect competition the supplier is a price searcher because 
he is faced by a declining demand curve so that an additional quantity 
can be sold only if the price of all output is lowered. However, -just 
as with perfect competition, imperfect competition is also a static 
theory which takes demand as given, and does not inquire how consumer 
preferences are formed: 
As Lady Robinson (1969) put it: 
'The whole analysis, which in reality consists of 
comparisons of static equilibrium positions, is dressed 
up to appear to represent a process going on through time. 
To put the argument into a dynamic setting-it is necessary 
to distinguish between the short-period aspect of com- 
petition ... and the long period aspect. 
' (Preface vi-vii) 
Under the imperfect competition analysis, the more markets are imperfect 
the smaller the output because the higher the price has to be in order to 
maximise profits; since the high price may attract new competitors, out- 
put may remain below the optimum level. 
It is therefore only under perfect competition, with perfect mobility 
of resources, that private interest and social interest coincide. 
Imperfect competition does not yield the best results in terms of' economic 
welfare because it does not conform to the premise that consumers should 
get the goods that they value more highly, and should go on getting them. 
Thus in traditional theory the firm has been regarded mainly as a 
vehicle for maximising profits and allocating resources or, where it was 
admitted that, in the presence of imperfect competition, this might no 
longer be possible, the alternative behaviour of the firm has been con- 
sidered almost entirely in terms of price theory. Traditional theory, 
ýý 
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too, has been concerned predominantly with whether profits are normal or 
contain an element of monopoly profit. 
Finally, the simplifying assumptions made in the theory of the firm 
for purposes of analysis have the effect of confining the entrepreneur 
to a straitjacket, and thereby reducing his role in the words of Benson 
to a- 
'... creature that moves 
In predestinate grooves 
He is not even a bus; he's a tram. ' 
(c) Advertising and Economic Theory 
The adjective 'perfect' is a technical term used in economic analysis; 
it has no necessary moral implication. An equivalent in the physical 
sciences is 'perfect' vacuum which means complete not necessarily best. 
Nevertheless, imperfect competition is often regarded as less desirable 
competition, in particular the 'imperfection' of the market brought about 
first, by advertising and other selling techniques, and secondly, by a 
market structure characterised by seller concentration - oligopoly. 
Since discussions on advertising and oligopoly are inextricably linked, 
before proceeding to the relationship between advertising and competition, 
the concept of oligopoly - the domination of an industry by a few firms - 
requires elucidation. 
The theory of the firm predicts that industries in which output is 
produced by a few dominant firms may in the long run earn higher rates of 
return. For this to occur, the assumptions are made (1) that collusion 
rather than competition increases with concentration; and (2) that there 
are barriers to entry. Without these conditions monopoly profits will 
not arise. 
The other major feature of oligopoly under this theory is a diminution 
of price competition among firms as a direct result of their mutual 
interdependence. It is argued that there will be a general unwillingness 
16 
to lower prices because this action will'cause competitors to follow 
suit, and since market shares will remain unchanged, all the firms will 
suffer a fall in profits. Conversely no firm will readily raise its 
prices, because if others refuse to do likewise, the company which raises 
its prices will lose share of the market. This will lead to a stagnant 
situation in which prices will change only very slowly even when costs 
are changing, and the market shares of the few large companies will remain 
fairly stable. The appreciation among oligopolists of the interdependence 
of their market behaviour leads them to forego independent price 
initiatives in favour cf co-ordinating pricing (tacit or overt). More 
commonly, oligopolistic markets are characterised by non-price competition 
in the form of advertising and sales promotion activities aimed at product 
differentiation and the development of brand loyalty, and these factors 
rather than price competition will determine market shares. 
The absence of independent pricing under an oligopolistic market 
structure therefore leads to the prevalence of parallel prices and price 
leadership. A distinction is, however, made between disciplined and 
barometric price leadership. The major conditions contributing towards 
disciplined price leadership include not only high seller concentration 
but also security against the entry into, the market of new competitors, 
similarity of products, the degree of elasticity of demand, and similarity 
of cost levels and cost structures. The greater the discipline and the 
more unresponsive the demand, the higher, other things being equal, are 
prices and profits likely to be. 
Barometric price leadership comprises a much looser form of price 
leadership where in the presence of frequent changes and differences in 
cost and demand, products and production methods, and competitive 
conditions, it is much more difficult for firms to sustain highly co- 
ordinated pricing. In this more volatile situation'the price leader will 
only be followed immediately if his decisions are felt to be an accurate 
reflection of, changes in cost and market conditions. According to 
-. 
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Stigler, in barometric pricing the price leader: 
IC ands adherence of rivals to his price only because and 
to the extent that, his price reflects market conditions 
with tolerable promptness. ' (1947,446) 
It has been further argued (Markham, 1951) that the factors responsible 
for barometric price leadership result in a less orderly form of price 
parallelism and a type of behaviour closer to that expected in an industry 
composed of a larger number of sellers. As a result, the levels of 
prices and profits are likely to diverge less from the competitive norm 
than with the disciplined forms of parallel pricing. 
The position of economic theory on the place of advertising in the 
theory of the firm has been the subject of considerable debate and con- 
troversy among economists. 
If, as is assumed under perfect competition buyers and sellers have 
perfect knowledge advertising would be superfluous and represent a waste 
of resources. If, on the other hand, there was not always perfect 
knowledge, advertising could perform a useful function. It has been 
generally accepted that in the, real world some selling techniques are 
necessary because information is-not perfect, or because indivisibilities 
in production techniques require markets to be expanded. 
A Nevertheless in the provision of information advertising 
expenditure has been deemed for two reasons to be excessive and wasteful, 
and therefore with undesirable effects on welfare: 
1. Many advertisements are persuasive and not informative. 
Persuasive advertisements stimulate product differentiation and brand 
loyalty, and hence imperfect competition; 
2. Advertising is jointly supplied with the commodity (Kaldor) in 
the sense that the buyer must pay for both even though he only wishes to 
purchase the latter, and would buy less advertising than he does under 
this arrangement if advertising were separated from the product. I 
This line of reasoning has led to proposals that advertising should 
be-taxed to provide an incentive for firms to, reduce prices; that'adver- 
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tising expenditure would be reduced if large-scale retailers dominated 
the distributive system; and that comparative testing of products by 
public or private bodies would be more economic than advertising in 
providing information. 
B Most recent discussion of advertising in relation to the 
theory of the firm, and in the branch of economics dealing with industrial 
structure/organisation has, however, concentrated on the welfare impli- 
cations of the effect of advertising on competition, and particularly on 
market structure: 
1. The association of advertising with product differentiation in 
building up brand loyalty, and thus causing imperfections in the market, 
excess capacity and higher prices; 
2. The significance of advertising as an important cause of 
industrial concentration (an increase in the market share of the three or 
four largest firms); 
3. The role of advertising as a barrier to entry, which re-inforces 
concentration and enables firms to earn monopoly profits. 
C In a comparatively recent sector of economics - the economics 
of information - advertising has been considered from the point of view 
of buyers of advertised products as opposed to the sellers of these 
products which has been the traditional approach. 
These issues of advertising and economic theory are closely related, 
but will be dealt with separately as far as possible for ease of exposition. 
Al Advertising and Information 
The first major economist to acknowledge advertising as a subject 
for economic analysis was Alfred Marshall; he distinguished between 
'constructive' advertising, designed to inform people about products 
offered for sale, which he thought was beneficial, and 'combative' 
advertising which was primarily not informative but repetitive and 
persuasive, and which was wasteful, even if it raised output and lowered 
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costs, because such economies could have been reaped without it. 
(1919, p. 305). 
Marshall's separation of advertising content into two kinds was 
adopted by Pigou during the 1920s, and he drew a similar but more extreme 
distinction between 'informative' and 'competitive' advertising. The 
latter advertising had 
'... the sole purpose of transferring the demand for a 
given commodity from one source of supply to another. ' 
(1932,196-200) 
He considered that most advertising was 'competitive' and therefore 
undesirable. Advertising could lead to arrangements between formerly 
independent firms and therefore to monopoly; it could be self-defeating 
because the advertising efforts of competing firms cancelled one another 
out; and it could merely substitute the products of one firm for those 
of another and more efficient firm. Pigou suggested that the wasteful 
element in advertising might be prevented by taxing or even prohibiting 
tcompetitive' advertising. 
The distinction of advertising into two kinds continued with 
apparently little empirical investigation. Stuart Chase 
'Nine-tenths and more of advertising is largely competitive 
wrangling as to the relative merits of two indistinguishable 
compounds'. (1925,113) 
The distinction between informative and other advertising was considered 
logical and impracticable by Braithwaite (1932). She judged, however, 
that most advertising was not informative. If advertising increased 
output by facilitating standardisation and mass production, and reduced 
costs per unit and therefore prices, then it could be considered bene- 
ficial. On the other hand, if it merely redistributed demand for 
different commodities, resources were used in a less desirable pattern 
from the community's point of view. 
It seemed to be implicit in the distinction made between 'informative' 
and 'competitive' advertising that it was the function of the latter to 
differentiate products. Braithwaite, for instance, propounded that 
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advertising could restrict competition because price and quality lost 
their powers as instruments of competition and were replaced by the power 
of producers to win markets by creating 'reputation'. This process of 
creating 'reputation' monopolies then became cumulative and a vicious 
advertising circle was set in motion. 
In the 1930s Chamberlin and Robinson developed Braithwaite's notion 
of reputation monopolies by claiming that advertising could be used to 
'differentiate' products from one another by emphasising the less important 
advantages and so create 'loyalty' for each brand; this gave each adver- 
tiser a pocket of monopoly and he could then charge a higher price for his 
product, but his output was lower than it would be in perfect competition. 
Later Robinson (1969) put this view more forthrightly: 
'... non-price competition, such as artificial product 
differentiation, advertising and sales promotion ... 
accounts for the greatest part of the wastefulness of 
imperfect markets. ' (Preface, ix) 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) also seemed to imply that advertising was the 
essential ingredient required for the introduction of product 
differentiation: 
'... advertising in this analysis acts as a proxy for product 
differentiation, or, more specifically, for the product and 
market characteristics that permit heavy advertising expenditures 
to differentiate effectively and the products of a firm from 
those of its rivals. Although these product and market ( 
characteristics are not easily measured, they are typically 
characterized by heavy advertising expenditures. ' (130-31) 
The commonly-accepted distinction between 'informative' and*'ccxnbative' 
advertising was applied by Lewis (1945,1949) to retailers' and manu- 
facturers' advertising respectively. He argued that consumers are better 
guided by retailers into buying (standardised or mass produced) goods 
I they 
have chosen on the basis of their expert knowledge and experience 
than by manufacturers each of whom is intent on pushing his own brand or 
variety on ill-informed purchasers. 
'It should not be on the manufacturer's strident claims 
that the public has to rely for information ... much 
advertising by manufacturers is wasteful (because buyers 
and sellers already know the facts, or when it is false or 
misleading). (1945,218-220) 
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In this view, therefore, retail advertising is distinguished as 'desirable' 
because it is informative; manufacturer advertising is considered 
'undesirable' because it is mainly combative or persuasive. 
The thesis that advertising was one way of conveying information to 
consumers about a product they knew existed, but to mix information with 
persuasion seemed undesirable, and the amount of resources devoted to 
advertising seemed excessive persisted through the 1920s and 30s to the 
50s and 60s. Harbury (1958) for instance, explains that most advertising 
is 'largely persuasive in character and the information supplied is 
selective'. 
There were, however, economists who questioned the belief that it 
was possible to isolate 'informative' from'competitive' advertising, and 
that one component of the content of advertisements could manipulate 
demand against consumers' interests. 
1. It has been pointed out, for instance (Harris & Seldon, p. 74, 
1962; Economists Advisory Group (1967,79)) that the ability of 
'persuasive' advertising to manipulate demand contrary to the consumer's 
interest is at variance with economic theory in which consumers' 
preferences are given and changes in them are largely ignored. Moreover, 
conventional demand theory does not enquire, into how consumers' prefer- 
ences are formed in the first place. 
2. It has been argued that the distinction drawn between 'informative' 
and "competitive' advertising is. a matter of semantics, and one which in 
practice it is impossible to draw. Consequently, advertising per se 
should be considered as providing some kind of information, e. g. Hicks: 
`The attention of the consumer has to be attracted and his 
attention aroused. In order to perform its social function, 
advertising has to be attractive and (let us not be afraid 
to. say) persuasive. ' (1962, p. 257) 
and Alderson: 
'All effective communication is persuasive ... both 
information and recommendation must be presented per- 
suasively if they are to have any effect on purchasing 
decisions. ' (1968,582) 
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3. The artificial distinction drawn between 'informative' and 
'persuasive' advertising is based on a misunderstanding of the nature, 
purpose and rationale of advertising which is wider than conveying 
information to the consumer about products which are already in existence 
(new products; continually changing consumers - baby products; new 
uses of an established product; changes in the product itself: Telser; 
Ozga; Marris), e. g. Kirzner: 
'The entrepreneur's task is not completed when he makes 
information available to the consumer. He must also get 
the consumer to notice and absorb the information ... It 
is not so much perhaps that effective communication needs 
to be persuasive as that it needs to be eye-catching, mind- 
catching, and re-inforced by constant repetition'. (1973,162) 
Despite these counter-arguments to the conventional distinction 
between 'informative' and 'persuasive' advertising, the traditional view 
persisted. Together with Kaldor's contrast of the higher cost of 
advertising compared with that of an independent information service 
plus his contention that advertising is biased, these views led to the 
proposal that a more efficient and unbiased method of spreading necessary 
information might be reports by independent consumer advisory units. 
Thus Meade: 
'Consumers are ignorant and gullible. It is, therefore, 
desirable for the State to discourage private commercial. 
advertisement and to foster disinterested consumer research 
and information services. ' (1964,12). 
More recently, Meade expanded this proposal: 
'Of course much advertisement of an informative nature is 
necessary and desirable. But much advertisement is not of 
this kind. A tax on advertisement would increase the 
incentive for firms to seek markets by cutting prices rather 
than by persuasive bamboozlement ... Measures might be taken 
to replace much interested persuasive advertisement with 
impartial information through the promotion by the State of 
bodies for consumers' research and education. The provision 
and widespread dissemination by a number of independent semi- 
public bodies of information about the-real qualities of 
different products would increase the forces of the market 
mechanism to which the producers would have to submit. ' 
(1975,49-50) 
A more extreme view that even an independent consumer; advice system 
might not be adequate to counterbalance the power of advertising was put 
forward by Lady Robinson: 
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'... consumer sovereignty can never be established as long 
as the initiative lies with the producer. For the general 
run of consumer goods, the buyer is necessarily an amateur 
while the seller is a professional ... The great chain 
stores exercise some monopsonistic influence in imposing a 
kind of synthetic perfect market on small-scale producers, 
but they cannot offer a counterweight to the great 
oligopolists. ' (1969, xii) 
That independent information services for consumers are necessary 
because the information provided by advertisements is designed by the 
sellers of goods and is consequently biased was also propounded by the 
Economists Advisory Group (1967,78); while Reekie agrees with their 
view that there is 'too little information in particular' and suggests 
'establishing some sort of rival to the Consumers' Association' (L977,86-88). - 
B1 Advertising and Competition 
The view of many economists regarding the relationship between 
advertising and competition is summed up by H. C. Simons: 
'A major barrier to really competitive enterprise and 
efficient service to consumers. ' (1948, p. 95) 
The major criticism of advertising in the post-war period has been Kaldox's 
'The Economic Aspects of Advertising', (Rev. of Econ. Studies, Vol. XVII, 
1950/51). 
His criticisms are set out in some detail because they highlight the 
major aspects of advertising and economic theory which have been the 
subject of controversial debate and empirical investigation for the past 
twenty-five years. 
Kaldor accepts the view that although the primary 'direct' function 
of advertising is to provide information, it does not do this efficiently 
for three reasons: 
(a) Advertising is a waste of resources because advertisers buy more 
advertising than the public require with the result that there are 
socially undesirable effects on welfare. This contention is expounded 
from the classical economist's viewpoint of consumer sovereignty. For 
example, Kaldor defines advertising as a subsidised commodity which is 
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offered by the manufacturer to the consumer at nil cost in the expectation 
that there will be a consequential increase in the demand for his products. 
In other words, the manufacturer is the seller of the, advertising and the 
consumer is the buyer. Therefore, because advertising is not bought sep- 
arately, but is purchased as an integral part of the product, consumers 
cannot. easily evaluate whether or not they want it, and therefore its 
true cost is not known, nor whether resources are economically used for 
supplying it. 
(b) Kaldor claims that advertising fails to provide enough unbiased 
information. 
(c) It is costly. Whereas advertising in 1938 cost £68 m, the information 
supplied by advertising could be provided more cheaply-by an independent 
information service, i. e. around £14 m. 
In addition, Kaldor claimed that advertising has three 'indirect' 
effects: first, it may stimulate the introduction of new products which 
is undesirable. Secondly, it encourages spending at the expense of saving, 
which is desirable in slumps and undesirable in booms. Thirdly, that it 
switches demand from some products to others which is undesirable, i. e. 
advertising shifts demand from smaller to larger firms, so reducing the 
number of firms until the whole output of a commodity is produced by a 
small number-oligopoly-so that competition no longer takes place by 
means of prices, but by means of packaging, samples, coupons, gifts and 
other attractions that might-be considered secondary. This method of 
competition has advantages and disadvantages compared with more perfect 
competition, i. e. economies of large-scale production, finance, long- 
term research and more risk-taking. Disadvantages include higher costs 
of management, high selling costs (including advertising), higher prices, 
barrier to entry to new firms with new ideas and methods because of the 
high cost of breaking into the market, and a possibly dangerous concen- 
tration of economic power. 
Thus Lord Kaldor concluded that there are monopolistic and oligopo- 
l 
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listic tendencies inherent in advertising, which lead to a progressive 
concentration of market power in the hands of large firms, so that this 
concentration leads in turn to a reduction in the degree of freedom of 
entry into the market for newcomers, and that consequently it is possible 
for existing firms to enjoy a higher level of profit without attracting 
new competitors than would be possible if there were no advertising. 
As a means of reducing advertising expenditure and other selling 
costs Kaldor, like Lewis (op. cit. p. 20) maintained that the distributive 
system should be dominated by the retailer, and by retailer brands rather 
than those of manufacturers. The manufacturers would supply large 
retailers (chain stores, co-operative societies) who would tell them what 
consumers wanted. It was also envisaged by both Lewis and Kaldor that 
the pressure of retailer-domination would lead to a reduction in the 
variety of products. 
A2 Advertising Joint Supply 
The joint supply argument that advertising expenditure is excessive 
because consumers cannot purchase advertising separately from the product 
has been criticised on several counts. The basis of the attacks has 
usually been to question the various economic assumptions behind Kaldor's 
hypothesis. Telser (1966), for instance, dissents from Kaldor's reasoning 
because (1) existing economies of joint production would be lost with a 
separate market for advertising messages; and (2) as long as there are 
unadvertised or lightly advertised goods available in the market, the 
price differential between these and advertised goods cannot exceed the 
amount consumers are willing to pay for the extra advertising involved. 
This last point has also been made by Stigler who further commented: 
'The assimilation of information is not an easy or pleasant 
task for most people, and they may well be willing to pay 
more for the information when supplied-in an enjoyable' form. 
In principle this complementary demand for information and 
entertainment is exactly analogous to the complementary 
demand of consumers for commodities and delivery service or 
air-conditioned stores'. (1961,213-225) 
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1', It has been argued by Ozga (1960) that real consumer demand for 
advertising is a great deal higher than Kaldor suggests because it forms 
part of consumers' continual learning and remembering process. All 
these criticisms assume that the argument is essentially whether the 
consumer demand curve and the media supply curve are as far apart as 
Kaldor suggests. 
Lind (1975) on the other hand has pointed out that it is the manu- 
facturer rather than the consumer who demands and buys the advertising,, 
and it is the media rather than the manufacturer who supply it. -It is 
illogical, therefore, to consider advertising as a separate entity from 
the product, as much as it would be illogical to consider delivery vans, 
for example, as separate from the product. On Lind's analysis advertising 
is an input to business, the amount of which is determined on exactly 
similar lines and with a roughly similar possibility of error, to those 
of any other capital, labour or marketing input. 
B2. Advertising, Concentration and Profits 
Kaldor put the case most strongly that advertising is important in 
promoting seller concentration: 
'The economic effects of advertising must be judged there- 
fore in terms of the advantages of the manufacturers', 
oligopoly (as against the polypoly under wholesalers' 
domination) which it helped to create and maintain ... 
after advertising has been generally adopted ... sales 
will have been concentrated among a smaller number of 
firms and the size of the representative firm will have 
increased. ' (1950,13) 
This view that seller concentration is higher than it would be if firms 
advertised less has stimulated a series of empirical investigations 
which have tried to ascertain, first, whether there is a systematic 
association between advertising intensity and industry concentration, 
and secondly, the relationship between advertising intensity and prof it- 
ability. The assumptions underlying the argument that advertising 
: increases monopoly power is that it leads to an increase in the minimum 
i 
efficient size of firm, and that there are increasing returns to 
advertising. 
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Concentration: increasing or decreasing? 
Before discussing the specific relationship that is claimed to exist 
between advertising and concentration, it is necessary to point out that 
no general agreement exists on whether the degree of concentration in , 
industry has been increasing or decreasing in the economy as a whole, 
nor into the factors which increase, decrease, and maintain concentration 
in particular industries, viz. 
In the USA in the 1930s and 40s there was'a general consensus 
(Berle & Means (1932); Burns (1936); Galbraith (1948)) that increasing 
concentration had been evident since the beginning of the century and 
that its continuing increase was inevitable. In the 1950s as a result 
of empirical and theoretical research these views were contested (Adelman 
(1951); Penrose (1959)), and their conclusions were confirmed by official 
statistics which showed a very stable structure of industry between 
1954-72, and investigations into concentration ratio (the proportion of 
total industry output accounted for by the largest three/four firms in 
industry) which did not show a diminution in competition because the 
firms do not remain the same. 
In the 1970s the view that industrial concentration had been growing 
in the UK was put forward (Aaronvitch & Sawyer (1974); Bannock (1971); 
Marris (1964) and in particular by Prais (1976)). The dangers of this 
development were emphasised as well as its implications for industrial 
policy. 
Jewkes (1977) has however pointed out that Prais has frequently 
revised downwards the percentage of output he attributes to the'100 
largest companies for the year 1970 from 52 per cent to 40/41 per cent, 
while the Department of Industry in an official study gave the figure 
for 1970 at 37.7 per cent. He concludes: _ 
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'The stability (around 33 per cent) of the corresponding 
percentage in American industry is now accepted by all 
informed observers. It may be that in the UK we too are 
reaching a stability around 38 per cent, the higher figure 
for the UK perhaps being accounted for by our smaller 
economy than the American ... ' (1977,24) 
Other economists (Parkin (1972; Hart (1965)) have pointed out some 
i 
of the limitations in Prais' Gibrat's Law. Jewkes further maintains 
that other mathematical economists have sought to understand the process 
of industrial concentration by taking into account the entry and exist 
of firms into and out of the market and that the conclusion of Adelman 
was the opposite of Prais, namely, that a tendency towards deconcentration 
could be expected and a growth in the size of the median firm. 
Extensive analysis by Telser failed to find a correlation between 
advertising expenditures and market structure when he compared market 
concentration data with advertising intensity for forty-two industries: 
'... There is little empirical support for an adverse 
association between advertising and competition, despite 
some plausible theorizing to the contrary. ' (1964,558) 
His general findings were that initial injections of advertising in an 
industry are not decisive, and that it is not the case that a given firm 
can take a major advertising initiative, which then gives it a monopoly 
which persists. On the contrary, Telser suggests that industries tend 
towards equilibria without being determined by historical advertising events. 
A study by Mann et al. of fourteen industries, however, found a 
positive correlation between four-firm concentration ratios and average 
advertising-sales ratios (the simple correlation coefficients range from 
. 41 to . 72 among their several regressions) and concluded that: 
'enough of the variance in concentration is explained by' 
advertising intensity to raise an issue for public policy. 
(1967,38) 
These findings sparked off considerable controversy. Ekelund & 
Maurice (1969), Telser (1969) and Ekelund & Gramm (1970,1971) have argued 
that no correlation between advertising intensity and concentration exists 
in the USA. Doyle (1968), Reekie (1970) and Schnabel (1970) report 
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similar negative findings with UK data. Conversely, Marcus (1969), 
Mann et al. (1969) and Mann & Meehan (1971) have contended that there is 
a significant correlation. 
In a critical review of the literature J. L. Simon was less convinced 
of the causal relationship between advertising and concentration: 
'... it is the structural features of an industry rather 
than decisions by single firms which determine the intensity 
of advertising on the industry', and added '... in any case 
the existing data are not well suited to a test of causality 
from advertising to concentration because it is not very 
reasonable to think of advertising as exogenous. ' (1975,169) 
Thus the empirical data and the interpretation of them conflict about 
whether or not there is a correlation between advertising and concentration. 
It has been argued, however, that higher concentration alone does not lead 
to higher profits, but that conditions of entry are an equally important 
determinant. 
The association between profitability and advertising intensity was 
first noted by Comanor & Wilson (1967). Their paper which used similar 
data to Telser, supplied empirical support for implications precisely the 
opposite to his conclusions. (This contradiction is primarily a 
reflection of differences in the conceptual and statistical approaches 
adopted rather than differences in data or sample): 
'... advertising has a statistically significant and 
quantitatively important impact upon profit rates which 
provide a measure of market performance as well as 
indicate the existence of market power. ' (1967,423) 
Their findings showed that industries with high advertising outlays had 
a profit rate that exceeded that of other industries by nearly four per- 
centage points, i. e. nearly half as high again as the other industries in 
the sample. Their findings were confirmed by Guth (1970) whose 
investigations showed that advertising affects the distribution of firm 
sizes in an industry; and that advertising increases the industry average 
profit level. Furthermore, while a study by Lambin (1975) covering eight 
different Western European countries found no significant association 
between measures of market concentration and advertising intensity, it did 
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find some support for the contention that advertising intensity increases 
the capacity of the firm to charge higher prices and did find that 
advertising could be an entry barrier for new firms, though this was 
neither general nor systematic of the countries and markets studied. 
However, Telser has commented on investigations which show this 
causal link between advertising and profits: 
'... were matters so simple it would be hard to explain 
why all companies do not travel the same road to riches. ' 
(1968,169) 
In a critical assessment of the available evidence Schmalensee (1972) 
analysed the impact of advertising on a firm's ability to earn monopoly 
profits. He concluded that a correlation between advertising' intensity 
and profitability is to be expected even in the absence of a causal flow 
from advertising to profits. He can find no evidence that advertising 
increases the minimum efficient firm size, or that there are increasing 
returns to advertising, or that advertising creates durable preference 
changes that serve as entry barriers to new firms. He therefore con- 
cludes that nothing is really known about the impact of advertising on 
monopoly profits. 
Ferguson (1974), when he examined the limited evidence, could also 
find no support for the contention that there are increasing returns to 
advertising. He also pointed out the formidable econometric and measure- 
ment problems present in the single-equation, multiple-regression tests 
of the hypothesis that advertising decreases competition which are used 
in most studies. 
B3 Advertising as a Barrier to Entry 
Stigler defines a barrier to entry as 
'a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which 
must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter a business but 
is not borne by firms already in the industry'. (1968,67) 
A high level of expenditure on advertising in association with product 
differentiation has been seen as an effective method of discouraging new 
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entrants. This is contended to result from higher penetration costs 
of new firms, consumer inertia, and the economies of scale in advertising 
available to larger extant firms. Advertising has been criticised, 
therefore, as a source of monopoly power through its impact on conditions 
of entry, e. g. R. E. Cave: ` 
'... research in the USA has revealed that "heavy 
advertising" worsens industry performance by raising 
barriers to entry and increases market power. ' (1968,312) 
However, there has by no means been a unanimity of view resulting from 
the continuous debate and empirical investigations which have taken place. 
The pioneering work in this field is that of Bain (1956) who measured 
the influence of barriers to entry - classified as very high, substantial 
and moderate to low - on the profit rates of the leading firms in a 
sample of oligopolistic industries for the periods 1936-40 and 1947-51. 
He found 
'product differentiation is of at least the same general 
order of importance as an impediment to entry as are 
economies of large-scale production and distribution'. (Ch. 4) 
This investigation was followed üp by Mann (1966) who undertook research 
into the relationship between seller concentration, barriers to entry,, 
and profit rates for 1950-60 to determine whether the pattern Bain had 
discovered was compatible with a period of time that was not part of the 
Great Depression or of rapid post-war inflation. His findings supported 
Bain's results. Furthermore, Bain (1968) has asserted that advertising 
does inhibit entry: 
'The product differentiation advantages of established firms 
loam larger than any other sources of barriers to entry, and 
especially large as a source of high and very high barriers 
... This superiority of established firms in turn typically 
hinges in important or major degree upon the susceptibility 
of buyers to persuasion through heavy advertising or other 
sales promotion effort. ' (1968,281-282) 
Schmalensee (1972,243) however could find no evidence in support of 
Bain's conclusion. He further criticised the original Bain (1956) 
investigation on the grounds that it performed no tests of hypotheses; 
advertising was held to be a major source of entry barrier mainly when it 
I- 
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was intensive or when industry sources voiced the opinion that it limited 
entry possibilities. Stigler (1968) has also passed critical judgment 
on the Bain concept of limit pricing which is deployed to determine the 
heights of his barriers. 
In'Bain`s 1936-40 study based on forty-two US industries, in the 
group of highly concentrated industries where the eight largest firms 
accounted for 70 per cent or more of value added, the average profit rate 
was significantly higher than in the less concentrated industries. A 
re-examination of these industries by Brozen (1971) showed that even if 
concentration had facilitated collusion initially this had been a short- 
term phenomenon because fifteen years later the high and low profit rates 
in these industries had moved back towards the average. Brozen's later 
work (1971) also showed that Bain's results were biased by a statistical 
error resulting from the incorrect assumption that industries were in 
long-run equilibrium. 
There is an alternative view to that of Bain regarding concentration 
which does not rest on economies of scale and which', therefore, does not 
state that barriers to entry increase with concentration. McGee (1971), 
Demsetz (1973) and Brozen (1971) have all concluded that concentration is 
a measure of the relative efficiency of large firms. The higher industry 
concentration, the greater is the relative efficiency of the largest firms. 
In Demsetz's analysis profits do not arise due to output restriction or 
collusion, but to superior performance resulting from uncertainty plus 
luck or extraordinary insight by management. 
'Since information is costly to obtain and techniques 
difficult to duplicate, the firm may enjoy growth and a 
superior rate of return for some time. ' (1973,3) 
Ferguson concludes that if this view of concentration as a measure 
of the relative efficiency of large firms is correct: 
'... finding advertising expenditure positively related to 
concentration (and rates of return) does not indicate that 
advertising is a barrier to entry or a source of monopoly 
power. ' (1974,61) 
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Ferguson has also made some fundamental criticisms of the studies linking 
advertising with monopoly power: that these investigations have been 
conducted within an incomplete theoretical framework of the model of 
structure-conduct-performance, e. g. it has been questioned whether market 
structure is a good indicator or- determinant of monopoly power; it is 
possible to question the economic significance of concentration-ratios 
because of shortcomings and inaccuracies in the data; there are serious 
doubts concerning the assumption of one-way causality of market structure 
and conduct; there is no-generally agreed theory of collusion; there 
is no measure of the conditions of entry - the extent to which established 
firms can raise prices above marginal cost without attracting entry. 
Since a theoretical basis on which to draw practical conclusions on 
the relationship between advertising and monopoly power does not appear 
to exist, and the variety of studies undertaken to assess the effects of 
advertising on monopoly and industrial concentration have either been 
inconclusive, or have been shown by later studies to have reached un- 
justified conclusions, some economists have suggested that there is no 
theoretical cr empirical basis for any public policy based on the 
presumption that advertising decreases competition (Needham, 1971; 
Ferguson, 1974). 
C. Advertising and the Theory of the Economics of Information 
As has been seen (Marshall, et al. ) it has been conceded grudgingly 
that advertising may fulfil a useful role in providing information where 
buyers and sellers do not have perfect knowledge - even if the concept of 
what constitutes information is somewhat ambiguous. On the other hand, 
the assumption of perfect knowledge which is made in the conventional 
theory of the firm means that the acquisition of knowledge of prices or 
exchange opportunities in a perfect market is costless, so that knowledge 
is, as it were, a free good. 
Since in the real world information about available products is not 
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a free good automatically available to anyone and everyone, a different 
way of considering advertising has emerged comparatively recently in the 
economics of information by concentrating on analysing the benefits which 
buyers of advertised products gain from advertisements as opposed to the 
traditional approach of considering advertising almost entirely from the 
viewpoint of the sellers of advertised products. 
The seminal article by Stigler criticised the neglect in economic 
theory of the cost of search for information: 
'... information ... occupies a slum dwelling in the town 
of economics ... Mostly it is ignored ... And one of the information-producing industries, advertising, is treated 
with a hostility that economists normally reserve for 
tariffs or monopolists. ' (1961,213) 
He illustrated his criticism by analysing one important role of advertising 
for buyers: the identification of sellers and the ascertainment of market 
price. The expansion of recruitment advertising over the past two 
decades has been an important factor, for example, in bringing job 
opportunities and current wages and salaries to the attention of job 
seekers, thus reducing the cost and time of search for employees. (Fulop, 
1971,65). In the absence of advertising, buyers must acquire infor- 
mation in other ways, or make decisions without it. In certain circum- 
stances this may be more costly for buyers than the cost of resources 
devoted to advertising. 
Furthermore, once there is an awareness of the cost of the search 
for information, it becomes possible to explain why buyers attach 
importance to 'reputation'; it economises on search because it denotes 
the persistence of quality. As Stigler points out: 
'When economists deplore the reliance of the consumer 
on reputation ... they implicitly assume that the 
consumer has a large laboratory, ready to deliver 
current information quickly and gratuitously, ' (1961,224) 
Johnson has also emphasised that information is not a free good, and 
maintains that this misconception arises as a result of the basic 
assumption of perfect knowledge in the theory of the firm: 
i 
'The approach of politicians and the general public to 
advertising, like that of economic theory, is still 
dominated by the idea that everyone knows what he wants. ' 
(1967,14 ) 
Consequently, Johnson maintains that: 
'... Information is important, worth spending resources 
on acquiring, and advertising is only one of the many ways 
of providing information. ' (1967,14) 
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II Alternative Theories to the Theory of the Firm 
In the neo-classical theory of the firm it has been seen that 
competition is used in a technical sense to classify market conditions 
according to the degree of control over prices exercised by producers or 
consumers. In this technical meaning of market situations, competition 
embraces only impersonal adaptations to given conditions, and it is 
assumed that the most wanted products, and the least cost methods and 
scales of production are known. Despite adaptations and modifications 
which have been incorporated in the theory to explain a variety of market 
conditions such as oligopoly, etc. the raison d'etre of the theory has 
remained unchanged -a method of specifying the mechanisms by which 
resources are allocated in the market-place. 
There are three major criticisms of the theory: 
1. That its basic assumptions that the objective of the firm is 
to maximise net revenue, and that decision behaviour is guided by the 
precepts of utility maximisations do not accord with the behaviour of 
firms in the real world where the motives underlying behaviour are more 
complex and multi-dimensional, and where perfect maximisation would be 
too expensive and time-consuming to achieve in a world of imperfect know- 
ledge for firms and consumers. 
2. That the theory is inadequate because insufficient attention has 
been paid to the behaviour of the large corporation or firm which has 
become the norm over wide areas of industry as a consequence of techno- 
logical developments, economies of scale, and the separation of ownership 
and control which stems from the growth of the joint stock company. These 
claimed defects have been tackled from two different viewpoints. First, 
the school of managerial economics (J. Downie, The Competitive Process, 
London, 1958; William Baumol, Business Behaviour Value and Growth, 1959; 
Robin Marris, The Economic Theory of 'Managerial' Capitalism, 1964). 
Secondly, by Kenneth Galbraith (1958,1963,1969) who adopted Marris' 
basic proposition that it was more accurate to regard the economy as 
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operating entirely on a managerial basis than the common practice of 
treating it as operating in the traditional manner of the theory of the 
firm. Concomitant with this tenet was the implication for public policy 
that attempts should not be made to revive artificially traditional forms 
of competition. 
Galbraith, however, departed significantly from managerial economics 
with his assertion that the large corporation utilises advertising to 
control consumer demand, and thereby nullifies consumer sovereignty 
(there is, for example, a fundamental difference between Marris' explanation 
of how a new product is introduced to the market, and the assumptions made 
by Galbraith), and his doctrine that the 'countervailing power' of dis- 
tributors should be utilised to control the power of the large corporation 
rather than legislation. 
3. That the factors which are taken for granted in traditional 
theory, i. e. that there is perfect knowledge, that the shape of the demand 
curve is known, that consumer preferences are known - these are precisely 
the uncertainties which exist continuously in the real world, and which 
provide opportunities for firms and create competition. This theory of 
competition as a process rather than a situation has been expounded most 
fully by Kirzner (1973), but many of its components have been put forward 
by other economists as well. 
(a) Managerial Economics - 
Managerial economics which describes and predicts the internal 
decision-making process of a firm is based on propositions which are 
directly related to two major criticisms of traditional theory. First, 
firms do not decide how much to produce by equating marginal cost with 
marginal revenue. As evidence, the difference between the economic 
concept of cost in the theory has been contrasted with the accounting 
I 
concept of cost used in actual business firms. 
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Secondly, it is argued that traditional theory fails to view the 
firm as an organisation, and hence ignores the existence of such factors 
as management planning, budgets, standard operating'procedures, and the 
cost of other components which should be included in the theory of a firm's 
decision-making process. (A. Papandreou 'Same Basic Problems in the 
Theory of the Firm', in B. F. Haley (ed. ) A Survey of Contemporary 
Economics, Vol. 2,183-219, Homewood, Ill. ). 
These and other criticisms of managerial econcmists reflect the 
emphasis placed in the neo-classical theory to explain, at a general level, 
the behaviour of firms within a given market, and not the behaviour of 
individuals within a particular firm. 
The first major revision of neo-classical theory to incorporate these 
criticisms was put forward by Baucool who concluded that firms do not 
devote all their energies to maximising profits but rather that as long 
as a 'satisfactory level' of profit is maintained a company will seek to 
maximise its sales revenue. In this theory, therefore, 'total sales 
revenue has been substituted for profits, and two decision criteria or 
objectives have been introduced - namely, a satisfactory level of profit 
and the maximum sales turnover. In other words, the firm is no longer 
viewed as working towards one objective alone, but is portrayed as 
trying to balance two competing and not necessarily consistent goals. 
From this hypothesis Baumol drew important conclusions which it is 
claimed are more consistent with observed behaviour than those drawn from 
conventional theory: ' 
1. Firms faced with an increase in fixed costs will either pass 
on these costs directly to the consumer in the form of higher prices or 
will try to reduce an expense over which they have some control, e. g. 
advertising expenditures. Conventional theory, on the other hand, asserts 
that changes in fixed costs should not lead a firm to alter either its 
output or its prices. 
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2. Baumol also maintained that: 
'Sales maximization makes far greater presumption that 
businessmen will consider non-price competition to be 
the more advantageous alternative. ' (1959,76) 
This conclusion is in contrast to neo-classical theory which asserts that 
businessmen will consider price cuts or increases as the primary mechanism 
for increasing profits; whereas observations of business behaviour do not 
support this view. On the contrary, firms appear to go to great lengths 
to set their prices at the same levels as their competitors, while 
devoting their competitive energies-towards advertising, product 
differentiation, servicing, etc. 
Although Baumol's theory appears more consistent with observed 
behaviour, it focusses primarily upon the behaviour of firms in the market- 
place. It did not consider the analysis and prediction of a firm's 
decision-making behaviour on price, output, internal resource allocation, 
and so on. As a consequence, market theories of the firm have been 
supplemented by Behavioural theories of the firm which seek to show how 
an organisation makes decisions on the basis of the information that is 
available at any given point in time. It is a theory of decision-making 
behaviour which has substituted the notion of a satisfactory level of 
performance for the neo-classical principle of maximisation. By abandoning 
maximising for the behavioural principle of satisficing, it is possible to 
add as many goals or objectives to the theory as is consistent with 
observed behaviour. (See R. M. Cyert, A. E. "Feigenbaum and J. G. March (1959) 
'Models in a Behavioural Theory of the Firm', Behavioural Sci., 4,81; 95). 
A third strand in managerial economics is heuristic programming which 
seeks to incorporate into the theoretical model the selective, rule of 
thumb processes that humans employ in solving complex problems. 
The theories of individual or organisational decision-making 
behaviour reveal a different working of the price mechanism in observed 
practice than those portrayed in traditional theory. If firms only 
maximise sales revenue subject to a satisfactory-profit constraint, or 
p 
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behavioural theory of the firm, then firms no longer maximise any 
criterion function. Similarly, such theories are at variance'with con- 
ventional theory that firms or individuals make decisions by maximising 
a clearly-defined decision function. Evidence collected, however, 
supports the hypothesis that individuals and organisations make decisions 
by paying attention to a limited number of objectives and by doing what 
they can to see that they meet these goals most of the time. Under'this 
hypothesis the setting of prices is only one of a number of organisational 
objectives. As a result, a firm will only consider price alterations as 
one of the possible alternatives facing it at any point in time. A 
corollary of this conclusion is that changes in the prices of a firm's 
inputs will also not have the effects on their decision processes that 
are asserted by conventional theory. 
These theories of complex organisations trying to satisfy many 
competing goals also have repercussions on the theories of market 
behaviour, e. g. oligopolists consider non-price competition to be the 
more advantageous. The behavioural'theory of the firm also suggests 
that large firms, whether oligopolists or not, prefer to operate in a 
stable environment. One way to achieve this is to avoid price competition. 
on this premise, such a theory is unlikely to represent the market as a 
place where firms struggle fiercely to meet price competition. It would 
however provide a more accurate picture of the nature of competitive 
markets and of the forces that influence the behaviour of individual firms. 
Managerial economics thus has different implications for economic 
policy than conventional theory which asserts that competitive pricing is 
the most efficient way to keep the prices of finished products as low as 
possible. 
As Clarkson summed it up: 
'When competitive pricing appears to have vanished and one 
or two companies dominate an industry, antitrust measures 
are invoked with the intent of restoring competitive pricing'I 
to that particular market. But if, as investigations of 
business behaviour suggest, the pricing decision is only 
41 
one of a firm's decision problems, then increasing the 
number of firms in the market may not have the desired 
effect. In other words, unless it can be shown that 
the number of firms in the industry. has a direct effect 
on the prices that are set,: it does not make much sense 
to invoke antitrust measures whose purpose is to increase 
the number of competing firms. ' (1968,66) 
Marris put forward a more comprehensive account of the basic micro-theory 
of managerial economics developed by Baumol and Downie; in particular, 
he considered the ways in which corporate organisations develop quasi- 
higher objectives of their own and the means by which they pursue them. 
Marris questioned one of the major assumptions of conventional theory - 
that the firm faces a static demand curve, the shape of which is determined 
over time by external factors, e. g. changes in tastes, changes 
in income. 
On this assumption price becomes the only decision-variable capable of 
influencing the quantity sold, although at a later date neo-classical 
writers added other variables such as advertising expenditure and/or 
quality variation. Marris concluded that. none of these factors provide 
a satisfactory explanation of the existence and growth of the firm over a 
long period of time. 
Harris started from an opposite premise to the assumption of the 
conventional theory, i. e. that the distinctive feature of the managerial 
capitalist corporation is its capacity to initiate its own growth. 
Furthermore, although growth of demand is created by the individual firm, 
it is subject to restraints arising from demand, from the need for 
finance, and from restraints which are not directly economic, e. g. staff 
training. According to this theory, the rate at which demand expands 
is dependent on policy decisions relating to diversification, prices and 
marketing expenditure. These factors, given the production techniques 
employed and the general level of internal efficiency, affect profitability. 
On the other hand, profitability is an essential element in determining 
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growth, because there is a close relationship. between the'rate of return 
and the maximum sustainable growth rate of capacity. 
The Marris model for growth is divided into two: problems of 
management, and problems of economics. The former include making 
decisions on how the diversification rate, price policy, and other 
variables affecting demand should be set. The second part of the model 
deals exclusively with terms of growth rate and profit rate and valuation 
ratio. This model provides an explanation of why demand can be con- 
tinued at differential rates indefinitely-between individual firms. It 
also seeks to provide an explanation of why, even if internal efficiency 
varies between firms, the less efficient may continue in business for a 
very long time indeed. 
(b) Management of Demand (Galbraith) 
Although Galbraith agreed with the basic propositions of the economic 
theory of managerial behaviour he criticisedthe. theory for its continued 
acceptance of the consumer sovereignty assumption of conventional theory, 
i. e. that firms were still subject to the constraints of the market, 
particularly the influence of the consumer. He contended that if those 
who put forward the economic theory of managerial behaviour had been 
prepared to accept the full significance of the abandonment by the modern 
corporation of the principle of profit maximisation, then they would also 
have realised that it was no longer subordinate to market influences, and 
consequently, that the concept of consumer sovereignty has become invalid. 
Galbraith's main thesis is that since the modern corporation is no 
longer subordinate to market influences, the concept of consumer 
sovereignty is no longer a valid assumption in determining the behaviour 
of the large corporation. 'Consumer sovereignty as a pure case will not 
do'. 
'... the theory of the firm and how it maximises its revenue 
in the market has undergone endless refinement in recent 
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decades. This theory assumes that the man who maximises 
the revenue gets the revenue or a compelling share. So he 
goes on a Wisconsin dairy farm. But this is not so in the 
modern large corporation where the management is on a salary 
and the beneficiaries are stockholders whom the managers 
have never seen. Although the large corporation, like the 
union, is far from new, it has never been assimilated into 
the main body of economics. ' (1969,410) 
According to Galbraith the changed situation has been caused by the demands 
of technology, economies of scale, and the long gestation time of pro- 
duction which have led to the demise of the market; while the separation 
of ownership from control has caused control in most cases to pass from 
from the entrepreneur to the technostructure. As a consequence, the 
'accepted sequence' of traditional economic theory, the flow of instructions 
by means of purchases from individual consumer via the market to the 
producer, is no longer valid. The mature corporation has the means to 
control prices, both of its raw materials and of its products. The 
producer reaches forward and controls the market and also the behaviour 
of the consumer, whom he purports to serve. This is what Galbraith 
calls the 'revised sequence'. 
Galbraith, as a result of the above analysis, puts forward three 
major propositions: 
1. The main purpose of large firms is to make themselves larger; 
2. Once they have achieved a great size their security is assured; 
3. Firms must have sufficient control over their markets in order 
to reap rewards. 
Freedom from risk is ensured by planning, by control of prices, and control 
of the amount sold. In particular large size allows advertising, a well- 
nurtured sales organisation and careful management of product design which 
can help to ensure the needed customer response. By the deployment of 
these weapons: 
'Means can always be found to keep exercise of consumer 
discretion within workable limits. ' (1969,212) 
By these means, it has become possible for large firms to be autonomous 
planning units with sufficient control over their markets to avoid the 
vagaries of consumer demand and the entry of potential competitors. 
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It is unrealistic, according to Galbraith, to attempt to break the 
autonomy of such firms by policies designed to restore competition because 
these firms operate in industries in which the economies of scale are 
decisive and where size is a condition for innovation. The strength of 
such concerns depends ultimately on the advantages to be derived from 
advanced technology and from the expenditure on research and development 
needed to promote it. These advantages can be. secured only if operations 
are conducted on a large scale and if there is freedom from risk. Where 
large distributors confront large manufacturers, we have an illustration 
of the doctrine of 'countervailing power'. For the defence of the public 
interest rather than trying to restore old forms of competition in 
industries one must rely in such circumstances on the bargaining power 
of large customers. 
In the Galbraith model advertising is a major factor in managing 
consumer demand, and thus in nullifying consumer sovereignty. He believes 
this situation developed because the industrial system requires a mechanism 
for making men want what it provides. However, this mechanism would not 
work - wants would not be subject to manipulation - had not these wants 
been dulled by sufficiency. In other words, advertising is so effective 
because the basic needs of consumers have been met. 
(c) Competition as a Process Not a Situation 
A fundamental attack on the neo-classical theory of the firm has 
been expounded by Kirzner (1973) for its mechanistic and therefore 
inaccurate analysis of competition. 
In this view, the major weakness of traditional theory is the concept 
of competition as a market situation which means that there is a 
mechanistic allocation of resources in the market-place. In particular, 
it is argued that the attempts in traditional theory to incorporate mon- 
opolistic and, imperfect competition in an equilibrium theory has led to 
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a misleading view of these forms of organisation, as well as of adver- 
tising. In perfect and imperfect competition, and oligopoly, all three 
theories focus on the short-run and examine static competition in which 
incomes, tastes, technology are assumed unchanged. Kirzner believes 
that a more accurate picture of economic activity can be obtained by 
regarding competition as a market process 
'which depends on the freedom of those with better ideas or 
with greater willingness to serve the market to offer better 
opportunities'. (1973,98) 
In this alternative view of competition as a market process the 
chief departure from conventional theory is in the role of the entrepreneur: 
'His [the entrepreneur's] role only become somehow 
identified with movements from one equilibrium position 
to another with "innovations" and with dynamic changes, 
but not with the dynamics of the equilibrating process 
itself... [Students of price theory] have completely 
overlooked the role of the entrepreneur in exploiting 
superior awareness of price discrepancies within the 
economic system. ' (1973,27) 
This omission arises, according to Kirzner, because conventional theory 
deals with equilibrium in which there is no room for the entrepreneur. 
When the decisions of all market participants dovetail completely, so 
that each plan correctly assumes the corresponding plans of the other 
participants and no possibility exists for any altered plans that would 
be simultaneously preferred by the relevant participants, there is 
nothing left for the entrepreneur to do. 
This view of entrepreneurship and competition has a close similarity 
with that of another 'Austrian' economist, Schumpeter (see also p. 50). 
Schumpeter has defined the role of the entrepreneur as: 
'... to reform or revolutionise the pattern of production 
by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried 
technological possibility for producing a new commodity 
or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new 
source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, 
by reorganising an industry. ' (1967, p. 132). 
Although Kirzner acknowledges the similarity between his views on the 
role of the entrepreneur with those of Schumpeter, he also stresses the 
important difference between them: 
_ 
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'For Schumpeter the entrepreneur is the disruptive dis- 
equilibrating force that dislodges the market from the 
somnolence of equilibrium; for us the entrepreneur is 
the equilibrating force whose activity responds to the 
existing tensions and provides those corrections for 
which the unexploited opportunities have been crying out. 
(1973, p. 127) 
Kirzner's major criticism of conventional theory is, however, reserved 
for the theories of monopolistic and imperfect competition which emerged 
as a result of extensive dissatisfaction with the theory of price as it 
had developed until the 1920s, and its apparent failure to correspond 
with characteristics of the real world. For Kirzner, the major weakness 
of these theories is that they incorporate only minor modifications of 
perfect competition: they still depict an equilibrium situation, they 
are still based on given and known demand and supply curves, and they only 
differ from the theory of perfect competition in the shapes attributed to 
these curves. 
'Thus replacing the old equilibrium theory by a new 
equilibrium theory preserved the theoretical dissatisfaction 
of the old theory while failing to offer the simplest ex- 
planation of thse real-world phenomena it left unaccounted 
for. ' (1973, p. 114) 
It has been this failure to change fundamentally the basic assumptions of 
imperfect competition from those of perfect competition which has led, 
according to Kirzner, such phenomena as advertising and product differ- 
entiation to be invariably identified as monopolistic elements to the 
market. 
'whereas if competition is looked at as a process they would 
be seen as strategic weapons in the competitive arsenal of 
rival entrepreneurs. ' (1973, p. 210) 
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(III) Replies to the Critics of Conventional Theory 
(a) Conventional Theory of the Firm -a Technical Model Only 
The main response of economists who believe that the theory of the 
firm has an important role in economic analysis to the criticism that 
it is divorced from reality is to point out that it is intended as a 
technical model designed to explain competition, price and the allocation 
of resources. Consequently, as an abstract model of industry conceived 
by economists for theoretical reasoning, it is not surprising that it 
should diverge from reality, and should not therefore, be taken at its 
face value. 
As Johnson put it: 
'Some of the things economists talk to each other about 
are not suitable for airing in public. ' (1967, p. 9) 
Hallett has pointed out: 
'An economic model should not be confused with the reality 
it seeks to explain. ' (1967, p. 8) 
And Allen has commented: 
'Yet no one believes nowadays in that proposition (consumer 
sovereignty) in its extreme form except as an analytical 
device. ' (1969, p. 30) 
It is also widely recognised that since the only form of competition 
analysed in perfect competition is price competition, other forms of 
competition such as sales promotion are automatically excluded from the 
analysis. It would not however be concluded that these other forms of 
competition are necessarily against the interests of consumers unless 
perfect competition is a practical alternative. 
On the other hand, many supporters of the neo-classical theory of 
the firm would not regard criticism of the model of perfect competition 
as damaging, but would argue that it provides a limiting case against 
which real situations can be compared and evaluated. Thus it could be 
argued that in a certain industry at a certain time the situation is 
.. more competitive 
(i. e. closer to perfect competition) than in another. 
Further, it can be said that certain industrial practices are or are not 
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1 1, conducive 
to approaching perfect competition. On such an analysis 
advertising, for example, would be regarded as 'second best' and, only to 
be tolerated because of imperfections in the market, i. e. imperfect 
knowledge. Similarly, the emphasis in perfect competition on price 
competition has led to the conclusion that any other type of competition 
can only be a poor substitute. It has been argued, for instance, that 
many types of non-type competition were introduced as a result of resale 
price maintenance, and that once this was abolished other forms of 
competition, apart from price, would tend to disappear. An example of 
this view is that put by Lewis (1949): 
'Coupon trading is just an adjunct to non-price competition 
between manufacturers and to manufacturers' advertisements; 
and the trading stamp is primarily the product of resale 
price maintenance. If these sources of market imperfection 
were removed most of this form of trading would disappear. ' 
(149) 
" In other words, although the model of perfect competition has been devised 
for theoretical reasoning only it has often been regarded as a goal 
towards which firms should aim. Yet as Wilson has commented. 
'Perfect competition is not a norm, and the fact that it 
has been taken for one is a remarkable example of the way 
in which we can mislead ourselves with our own emotive 
terminology. Indeed the expression 'perfect competition' 
has probably done more to darken counsel than any other in 
modern economic literature ... '. (1962, p. 119) 
(b) Organisation of the Firm Included in the Economics of Industry 
Perhaps rather surprisingly, the literature on the economics of 
industrial structure and organisation which studies the behaviour of the 
firm in the real world has made little attempt to integrate the main 
areas of the subject - size, entry conditions, concentration, vertical 
integration and diversification, and decision-making processes - with 
conventional theory. The reason may be that decisions as to the nature 
and extent of vertical integration and diversification are among the key 
strategic decisions taken by firms, as are those relating to total size 
ýt 
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and to rate of growth, whereas these decisions are relatively unimportant 
in conventional theory because the firm is limited to a single product, 
and the abstraction introduced into the theory provide it with little 
room for manoeuvre. 
Yamey has pointed out how the conventional theory of the firm and 
the economics of industrial structure co-exist: 
'The omission of strategic decisions from the scope of 
theoretical formulations is not necessarily a defect from 
the point of view of the uses to which the theories are 
put. But the omission has meant that the body of knowledge 
and analysis about these decisions has had to find a home 
in the more applied branch of economics known variously by 
such names as the economics of industry, the structure of 
industry, or industrial organisation. ' (1973,8) 
Despite this separation of the theory of the firm from the economics of 
industrial organisation, when investigations are made into the relation- 
ship between advertising and competition (pp. 23-5 they start from the 
premises of conventional theory. 
(c) Concept=of 'Workable' Competition 
Some specialists in the economics of industrial structure (Yamey, 
(1973), p. 9; Allen (1969), p. 92; Johnson (1970), p. 5) relate the 
strategic decisions made by firms to explain their actions to the concept 
of 'workable' competition. This concept of competition has developed 
parallel with the traditional theory of the firm to explain how under 
conditions of oligopoly and imperfect competition it is possible for 
competition to flourish. 
The concept of 'workable' competition is based on the following 
precepts: 
1. That oligopoly is unavoidable in many industries. It should 
not therefore be regarded ipso facto as inferior competition because some 
elements of imperfect competition are inevitable such as large-scale 
production, variations in consumer preferences and spatial monopolies; 
1.; 
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while other elements such as product improvements, and sales promotion 
I and advertising designed to inform or persuade consumers to try new 
commodities or services may be considered desirable. 
2. There is no necessary relationship between a large firm and 
monopoly. There can be large size without monopoly; there can be 
monopoly without large size. 
3. Competition is wider and more pervasive than those who try to 
apply the models of perfect and imperfect competition are prepared to 
concede. This mistake arises from considering competition as existing 
only between firms in an industry and neglecting the competition between 
the products of near monopolists; and from taking a short-term view of 
the economy rather than a dynamic view over time in which monopolies are 
sooner or later broken up by new competition. 
4. Criticisms of oligopoly and other forms of imperfect competition 
should be reserved for the avoidable elements, and these should be dis- 
tinguished clearly from the inevitable elements. 
The concept of 'workable' competition was first propounded at the 
beginning of the century by Clark who believed that trusts were efficient 
and inevitable and also that potential rivals were an efficient check upon 
them: 
'When prices are unduly high, owing to the grasping policy of 
some trust, what happens? New competition usually appears 
in the field. Capital is seeking outlets, but it has become 
hard to find them ... The mill that has never been built is 
already a power in the market: for if it will surely be built 
under certain conditions, the effect of this certainty is to 
keep prices down. ' (1901, p. 13) 
Thus potential competition lurking in the background is seen as the chief 
constraint on the policies and prices of firms. Clark's fear was that 
restrictive practices (selective price-cutting, pre-emption of dealers, 
etc. ) would stop potential competition, and he wished to restrict public 
policy to eliminating such practices. 
Half-a-century later Schumpeter stressed that the competition 
'which counts' is not traditional price competition but the importance of 
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widening consumer choice and the response to changing consumer 
preferences by competing firms. 
'... the competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organisation ... competition which commands a decisive 
cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the 
margins of the profits and the output of existing firms 
but at their foundations and at their very lives. ' 
(1950, p. 84) 
Hence, according to Schumpeter, the market was characterised by a 
'perennial gale of creative destruction' which a monopoly of the original 
product could not withstand. 
According to Mason the essence of 'workable' competition is 
'... the availability to both buyer and seller of 
alternative courses of action. ' (1957, pp. 178-9) 
To this definition of an imprecise concept, Jewkes has enumerated a 
number of conditions, which provide a means of measuring the degree of 
competitiveness in the industrial system: 
'If firms, otherwise independent, do not make agreements on 
prices, investment, output or the allocation of markets; if 
there is an ever-widening range of goods and services to the 
consumer; if for most products there is a close substitute 
and fresh substitutes constantly make their appearance; if 
the consumer is actively exercising his choices, and thereby 
encouraging the growth of the more efficient suppliers; if 
in every industry there are enough producers to make it 
difficult for them to arrange not to compete, but few enough 
producers to make it clear to each that he has rivals on his 
tail; and if the firms that lose money decline and those 
that make profits grow. ' (1977, pp. 40/41) 
Furthermore, Jewkes maintains that there are two supporting statistical 
tests which may be applied to determine whether 'workable' competition 
exists in an oligopolistic industry. First, whether prices are fluid 
and flexible or 'administered' and rigid, and thus unresponsive to 
changing demand and supply. Secondly, whether the market shares of the 
firms remain unchanged. 
The processes by which a form of 'workable' competition may come 
about in practice has been described by Allen: 
'A monopolistic or oligopolistic organisation may be 
destroyed by the cheapening of communications, the 
a' 
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reduction in barriers to international trade, the 
standardisation of the product, or the appearance of new 
sources of supply within the former market area. More 
generally, with the proliferation of products that 
accompanies economic progress, the gaps in the chain of 
substitutes are narrowed, and competition between 
industries may become keener even if competition within 
particular industries wanes ... ' (1970, p. 92) 
Thus in this broader and more dynamic concept of competition there 
is the presumption that imperfect competition does not automatically lead 
to weak competition, higher prices, and higher profits. (Where there 
are so many alternative choices open to consumers, the concept is also 
at variance with Galbraithian view that consumer demand can be managed 
through advertising. ) 
Furthermore, this concept of competition leads to. a, rejection of 
the presumption underlying much public policy that monopolist behaviour 
automatically leads to a misallocation of resources. 
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Part 2: THE CONSUMER IN THE 14ARKET 
(1) The Theory of the Firm and Consumer Behaviour 
Consumer behaviour has been defined by Engel, Blackwell and KoW[Ictt . 
as: 
'Those acts of individuals directly involved in obtaining and 
using economic goods and services, including the decision 
processes that precede and determine these acts'. (1978,3) 
In many respects the study of the consumer in the market begins 
where the conventional theory of the firm ends: 
'1. Static economic theory assumes for the purposes of analysis that 
tastes and preferences are given. The traditional theory of the 
tb. rm therefore ignores the fundamental question of how product and 
brand preferences are formed which is the major problem facing firms 
in the real world. Furthermore, theory provides little guidance on 
how consumers will react to new products and to quality variation. 
As Lancaster (117)) has pointed out: 
'Traditional theory is forever being forced to interpret quite 
common real-life happenings, such as the effects of advertising 
in terms of 'change of taste', an entirely non-operational 
concept since t2:. -re is r'. j way of predicting the relationship 
between the preference before and after the change. ' (344) 
and goes on to assert: 
'Perhaps the most difficult thing to do with traditional 
consumer theory is'to introduce a new commodity.... in consumer 
theory we have traditionally had to throw away our n-dimensional 
preference functions'and to replace them by totally new-n+l 
dimensional functions, with no predictable consequences. ' (360) 
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2. In conventional theory price is a dominant variable, and the way 
demand reacts to price is determined by the degree of elasticity. 
In the real world, many other factors apart fron price influence 
demand. Price has achieved a pre-eminent position in economic 
theory for two reasons: First, prices are relatively quantitative 
and unambiguous, whereas other non-price variables are less amenable 
to measurement. Secondly, the theory of the firm is a comprehensive 
theory of consumer welfare whereby in an economy characterised by 
flexible prices maximum economic efficiency and welfare may be 
achieved. 
Not only are non-price variables important to consumers and therefore 
. influence 
demand, butýin addition, the effect of price on demand has 
proved difficult to measure; prices are not always flexible; price 
is not an unambiguous indicator of value for money; and price changes 
can cause changes in consumer expectations of product and quality. 
3. In perfect competition the implicit assumption is made that 
products are homogeneous, and when product differentiation occurs 
as under imperfect competition it is assumed to have been caused 
unnecessarily by advertising and branding. Although more sophistic- 
ated economic theory recognises product differentiation as a compet- 
itive variable, the multi-dimensional complexity of products 
precludes viable analysis, and economists have found it necessary 
to suppress such variables in developing theories of competition. In 
theory therefore the product is usually viewed as a homogeneous 
entity. In practice, products may be differentiated by any one of a 
multiplicity of variables as indicated by the following definition of 
Chamberlin (1957): 
i 
,ý 
'Those aspects of the good or service exchanged whether arising 
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from materials, or ingredients, mechanical construction, design 
durability, taste, peculiarity of package or container or service. 
... all products beyond the raw material stages are highly-variable 
for the most part on a continuous scale'. 
Stevenson (1968) emphasised this point by defining a product as: 
'Everything the purchaser gets in exchange for his money. ' 
l 
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(TI) Consumer Behaviour Theories 
That there are many other variables besides price which affect 
demand is the starting point of the study of consumer behaviour. 
The study of these influences has led to the emergence of a 
' relatively new discipline - consumer behaviour - which has drawn on 
a variety of sources, especially the behavioural sciences in order tc 
develop specific theories of its own. 
A major purpose of buyer behaviour theory is to increase our under- 
standing of the consumer. Over the last few years emphasis has been 
placed on consumer decision processes: the problem is to understand 
" what happens in the buyer's mind from the time he first rzceives 
impressions about products until he makes his purchasing decisions. 
Almost all the literature on consumer behaviour dates from the post- 
war period. Because consumer behaviour is still a relatively young 
discipline, all the models so far developed contain considerable 
scope for revision and development. For the most part buyer, 
behaviour has been studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives 
ý+. 
iýý '^ 
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which have resulted in a number of interesting but partial explana- 
tions. e. g. Lunn: 
" 'No single theory or model should be expected to be fully compre- 
hensive at this state of our knowledge. ' (1971,54) 
There exists not only a lack of comprehensive laws on consumer 
behaviour which are generally accepted, but also a great diversity 
in the concepts used to describe consumer behaviour which She*!. 
has summed up: 
'What we really have, then, is a set of insular hypothetical 
concepts and a set of peninsular intervening variables reflecting 
a lack of formal science. What is more, they have lived an inde- 
pendent existence. Indeed, this reviewer has more than once felt 
that the situation resembles the seven blind men touching N 
different parts of an elephant and making inferences about the 
animal wnich differ and occasionally contradict one another. ' 
(1967,13) 
"Research into buyer behaviour theory or consumer models has taken I 
three main forms: a priori; empirical; and eclectic, each of 
which has contributed in some degree tö a greater understanding of 
consumer behaviour, but each of which has limitations and is the 
subject of considerable controversy. 
c1 Oýýp- KSew1ýý1 
.. 'ý. In the a priori approach concepts and theories have been intro- 
duced from three other disciplines, mainly the behavioural 
sciences, and explored for their value in understanding the 
consumer. Since consumer behaviour is a particular aspect of 
general human behaviour, the strength of the*a priori approach 
I 
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lies in its attempt to harness existing knowledge and insights from 
other disciplines, and thus to seek explanations by attempting to 
fit consumer behaviour to previously developed theoretical frameworks. 
As Kotler has commented: 
I' Depending upon one's scientific predliection there is the 
Marshallian buyer, Pavlovian buyer, Freudian buyer, Veblenian 
buyer and Hobbesian buyer. Less grandiose but equally interest- 
ing new breeds of buyers can be formulated, such as the Festinger 
buyer (Festinger, 1957), Riesman buyer (Riesman, Glazer and 
Denney, 1956) and Rogerian buyer (Rogers 1951). It should be 
recognised that all thes models of buyer behaviour are true to 
some extent, and yet it"is incomplete. Buyer behaviour is so 
complex that theory develops in connection with particular 
aspects. of the phenomena. ' (11: 10,197). 
N 
Other well-known examples of the intensive borrowing from the 
behavioural sciences include Howard's(earning theory, Bauer's 
perceived risk theory and attitude theories such as those of 
Festinger and Fishbein and several personality theories. To take 
two examples: 
(a) the theory of 'cognitive dissonance' put forward by Festinger 
states that two elements of knowledge are dissonant if they are 
contradictory and that dissonance is uncomfortable with the : result 
that an individual will actively avoid situations and information 
which might increase dissonance. 
Some experiments carried out by Festinger and others refer to the 
exposure to information and attitudes held after a decision. For 
example, it was pointed out that most decisions involve dissonance, 
t 
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in that the alternative will have had some attractive features, and 
the 'alternative actually chosen will have had some unattractive 
features. It was therefore predicted that after a decision is made 
the attractiveness of the chosen alternative will increase, and the 
individual will also seek information justifying the choice. This 
was borne out by the example of car owners who were found to notice 
and read advertisements about the cars they had recently purchased 
more than advertisements about other cars. 
This 'reassurance' theory has however been criticised on several 
counts, e. g. Lowe Watson (1969): 
... Such an explanation seems plausible in a case such as the 
purchase of a motor car (the example quoted by Festinger). A 
motor car iz an important possession to most people and the role 
of ownership is one in which they may take some pride. So it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that the purchaser might actively 
seek evidence and reassurance to justify so important a choice. 
But can we so readily assume that the houswife is equally anxious 
to justify her choice of a brand in a hundred and one relatively 
unimportant household products? ' (197', 322) 
(b) A number of alternative personality theorie. have b nn advanced 
based on psychological concepts: neo-Freudian theory; stimulus- 
response theory; field theory; and trait theory. These have also 
been strongly criticised for their weak association with consumer 
behaviour. But this approach has been strongly criticised, e. g. 
Foxall (1976): 
" 'The notion that people reject information or behaviour patterns 
which conflict with their current preceptions also promised some, - 
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years ago to assist marketing decision making. Festinger's 
cognitive dissonance theozy (produced) only the assertion that 
" it is frequently necessary to reassure purchaser of expensive, 
occasionally-bought items that they have made the right decision 
...... and even that has been questioned. No method of generating 
dissonance that leads to a purchase being made has been put for- 
ward to date. ' (1976,6) 
" 
Although the behavioural sciences have helped to shed valuable light 
on the question of why consumers behave as they do, the evidence 
suggests that they are. far from perfect even for that purpose. 
Some of the limitations of the a priori approach have been summed up 
" by Lunn (1974). 
'Many of the concepts adopted are still somewhat speculative.. 
They haue often been developed in contexts remote from consumer 
behaviour.... Moreover, they have usually been developed to 
account for restricted aspects of human behaviour, e. g. learning. 
and perception. ' (197]t, 5O). 
B Empirical approach 
While a priori researchers have sought. explanations by attempting to 
fit consumer behaviour to previously developed theoretical frame- 
works, empirical research has taken consumer behaviour as its main 
0C Tý cl 
focus of study. This approach has to derive laws from obser- 
vations of patterns and regularities in this behaviour, for the most 
part by using consumer panel data. 
The following are two well-known examples of empirical research, viz: 
,* 
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a. Brand loyalty, and b. Brand share prediction. 
Brand Loyalty 
There is the widespread assumption in economic theory that advertis- 
ing can build up durable brand loyalty towards a product, although 
with no specification of the time element. In marketing, it had 
until comparatively recently been assumed that advertising could 
convert users from one brand to another, although the concept of 
'brand loyalty' has been imprecise, e. g. it has been variously 
defined in terms of brand choice sequences, proportion of purchasers, 
1. es 
-repeat purchase probabilit and brand* preference:, over time. 
Brand loyalty has been extensively investigated (Achenbaum (1972), 
McDonald (19? Di, Ts sure (1973), Joyce (191 , King (19$0) , and in 
, articular by Ehrenberg et al (1966,1969,1972)) and the general 
conclusion reached that with many frequeitly purchased consumer 
goods most people have a short list of brands which they find 
acceptable, and they buy the individual brands from this short list 
" in an irregular way at different frequencies. 
Ehrenberg's analysis of consumer buying behaviour in a number of 
stable but heavily advertised markets has produced results which are 
not consistent with the theory that advertising converts users from 
one brand to another. He has shown that in such markets people tend 
" to have a very stable multiple brand pattern of purchasing, i. e. 
they regularly buy a number of brands with different frequencies, 
and these purchasing patterns are systematic and predictable. This 
evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that each buyer has 
a pattern of brand preferences reflected in the frequency with which 
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he or she buys each brand, and that these preferences change rela- 
tively slowly over time. 
Lowe Watson found support for this brand preference hypothesis in 
one of the markets studied by Ehrenberg, viz. the petrol market. He 
suggests that while studies of consumer behaviour in relation to 
major purchases, e. g. central heating installation show that the 
period of 'search' may be quite prölongedj with relatively unimport- 
ant and frequently purchase consumer items 'trial' may take place 
(either deliberately or fortuitously, - as a result of limited 
availability of alternatives perhaps) without the . relationship ever 
reaching the state of 'preferred brand. ' This leads him to conclude: 
'We can interpret Ehrenberg's description of multiple brand 
purchasing in terms of a series of relationships with the 
available brands, some frankly experimental, others reflecting 
varying degrees of acceptance in term: of the purchaser's needs. 
This would lead to the situation of varying pre-disposition or 
probabilities of purchase observed by Ehrenburg. ' (197/, 329) 
However, the validity of Ehrenberg's conclusions have been questioned 
on'the grounds (1) that it does not sufficiently employ the behav- 
ioural sciences; (2) that it deals with consumers in genctal rather 
than the individual consumer, i. e. do not know if the consumers who 
bought certain products in one of his 4-week periods are the same 
consumers who are buying in a later period; and (3) one of the 
major drawbacks of using consumer panel data is that it cannot be 
considered valid for a period longer than-a year because of the 
changing composition of the panel. 
/ 
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Joyce (1967) points out that, there are products where the multi- 
brand hypothesis may not apply, and where the consumer generally 
1 
only hays one brand, unless or until' there is a definite 'switch' 
to another brand. Where only one function is to be performed by the 
product the consumer is more likely to find a favourite brand and 
continue to buy it until given good reasons to change. e. g. probably 
cigarettes, toothpaste and razor blates. 
In the view of Joyce: 
'Multi-brand purchasing is more likely to be found where the 
products are physically somewhat different and where they are 
used to perform different functions (e. g. washing powders, for 
T'. 
different types of wash), or where the consumer buys different 
brands to 'et variety (e. g. food and drink). ' (197( 219) 
With these types of products Joyce concludes that advertising can 
work just as much by persuading people already buying a brand to 
devote a higher proportion of their total purchase to that brand, 
than simply converting non-buyers into buyers. 
Treasure (1975) uses data from the British Market Research Bureau's 
Target Group Index (, a continuous survey of 50 product fields which 
include food and drink, washing powders, cosmetics, razor glades 
and analgesics, but exclude durable consumer products, and some 
25,000 interviews a year asking people about the brands they use 
over a six-month period) to illustrate that the buying of several 
brands is common in most of these product fields and in many it is, 
the general rule. The results of the survey indicate that 
products where less than abort 40 per cent of users buy more than, 
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one brand is exceptional. 
From this evidence Treasure concludes: 
'... In the kind of markets in which advertising money is spent, 
consumers typically buy more than one product... Purchases made 
by a person for personal consumption for that reason, are more 
likely to be single brand than multi-brand, but such purchasing 
behaviour is relatively uncommon. ' (1976, '266) 
Treasure, therefore, believes that the most useful picture one can 
have of a housewife's purchasing behaviour is that she carries 
-around with her not a passionate devotiön to a singltt brand, but a 
mental list of several 'purchaseable' brands which meet her require- 
mnnts. (This is similar to the 'evoked set' hypothesis put forward 
by Howard and Sheth (1969) which is a subset of a few brands from a 
product field which a consumer has available in her mental luggage 
and from which she makes her choice of purchases. ) The housewife. 
buys several brands over a period of time (6 - 12 months) for three 
main reasons. First, because she has to meet differing requirements 
from within her family; secondly, because the brands though similar 
are used in slightly different ways; and thirdly, because she likes 
to have a choice of brands in stock. 
Furthermore, analyses over periods of 6v , 
J2 months of consumers 
patterns of brand use collected either from sources such as the 
Target Group Index or from records of actual purchases overltime in 
consumer diary panels confirm that most alterations in sales turnover 
occur through changes in the frequency of purchasing of those who 
have bought before in the preceding period of time, and only a small 
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part through purchases by people buying for the first time. Analysis 
of data from the Target Group Index also revealed that, in general, 
brands with a major share of a market differ from those with a 
smaller share not primarily because the buyers of the former are 
heavier buyers of the product per se, but because these buyers tend 
to devote a greater share of their purchases in the product field to 
that brand rather than to others. 
Like Joyce, Treasure therefore concluded that sales of a given brand 
may be increased not only by 'converting' new consumers to the brand, 
but by trying to persuade existing users - those who use it at least 
occasionally - to use it more frequently. This does not require 
them to increase their total purchases of the product, but to 
.; persuade 
thein to devote a larger share of their purchases to this 
particular brand. According to Treasure, it follows that from this 
analysis of consumer behaviour in many product fields, that the 
advertising of such products is being seen by housewives who already 
have personal and recent experience of using or consuming the product 
being advertised. 
In a survey undertaken by McDonald (1970) into the relationship 
" between purchasing patterns and exposure, to advertising, similar 
findings about consumer purchasing behaviour emerged. There was, 
for example, a high degree of regularity in buying behaviour. 
Previous evidence that most buyers tend to buy only a few brands 
and repeat them was strongly confirmed; most housewives tended to 
have one favourite brand and a number of other brands which they ' 
bought less frequently; brands of varying size within the product 
field show similar, frequency of purchase distributions; the'buyers 
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who buy at the most common frequency for a product-field are the 
regular buyers who buy only one or two brands, 
In a further study King (1980) has demonstrated from a survey of 250 
households the relatively small degree to which housewives remain 
loyal to one brand over the short period of three months - even'in 
what is regarded as a conservative market, that of tea. 
Table 1 
'Brand Loyalty' Over Three Months ý" 
Product Percentage of purchasing households who bought: 
1 brand only 2 brands only 3 or more brands 
Tea 50 26 24 
Toilet paper 41 26 33 
Washing powder 32 33 35 
Breakfast cereals 19 33 48 
Source: JWT diary study, MEAL, Mintel 
In order to assess whether the degree of brand loyalty was related 
directly to advertising expenditure, the advertising/sale: ratios for 
these 4 products in 1977 were ascertained, viz: tea 2i per cent; 
toilet paper 2z per cent; washing powder 4 per cent; breakfast cereals 
4i per cent. At least for these four products there appears to be no 
particular positive relationship between the advertising/sales ratio 
and 'brand loyalty'; in these particular examples there appears to be 
an inverse relationship which depends on the characteristics of the 
product category. 
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-King further maintains that it is rare for just one brand to be 
purchased over a long period. Over a lryear: 'period some 10 per cent 
of the buyers of a brand buy that brand alone; and they tend to be 
particularly light buyers of the particular product. 
Brand share prediction 
A feature of test marketing research on new products is that consumer 
purchases'of the new product generally build up to a peak and then 
decline before reaching an equilibrium positi. n. This typical pattern 
of consumer buying of a new brand has been investigated to achieve 
better understanding of the reaction of consumers to a new product, 
and to help firms be in a better position to predict at an early stage 
the *potential sales of a product. This is necessary because of the 
" high failure rate of new products, viz some 60-70 per cent. tzat are 
tried out in test markets are never introduced nationally, and of 
those which are many survive only for a short time, e. g. of 400 new 
food products introduced nationally in 1965,49 per cent had dis- 
appeared from the shops by 1969; 69 per cent by 1973, and 78 per cei. c 
by 1975. a 5L r, ili 
&i js o. 
4 
Fassie) 
Davis (1964) showed that in the test marketing of 44 packaged products 
- groceries and chemists goods - the typical pattern of co'sumer sales 
for new brands could be divided into three time-periods. 
In the first three months, particularly as a result of the growth of 
distribution as well as advertising and sales promotion, sales rise 
rapidly as consumers try out the product. During the second : _-" `: _;: e 
period - from approximately the third to the sixth month. -sales decline 
from their initial peak, this decline depending on the degree to which 
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the new brand satisfies buyers. The evidence is that the percentage 
drop in sales is directly related to the brand itself, e. g. it is 
approximately the same in each area of the country, irrespective of 
weight of advertising. In the third period, after the sixth month, 
sales remain more or less stable. Davis derived two 'rule of thumb' 
guides from his research: 
1. If at any stage during the initial build-up sales exceed a rate 
twice as high as the stable sales target level, the probability is 
about 3: 1 in favour of the target being met or exceeded. 
2. Unless peak sales exceed the target level for stable sales by at 
least 50 per cent, the probability is about 3: 1 that the product will 
fail to maintain target-sales on a long-term basis. 
The results of this research wcre derived from aggregated sales 
curves. Consumer panel data which records individual patterns of 
behaviour provide similar results. 
Parfitt & Collins (1971; ) used data from analyses of the Attwood 
Consumer Panel results in Great Britain after 1960. When the progress 
of .:: two new brands A and B- gas, measured, in their first two 
months on the market many households were prepared to'try them (in 
these two examples 3 million he. )useholds); then the rate of gaining new 
triers slows down; finally, after about 6 months, it becomes a very 
gradual process, with gains of only about 1-2 per cent of households 
per year. 
I 
With these two brands, A was successful, while B was a failure. Ini- 
" tially, the launch of the two brands was almost equally successful 
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'because after three months 19 per cent of households had bought 
Brand A and 15 per cent had bought Brand B. However, between the 
. third and sixth month only about 2 per cent more households were pre- 
pared to try Brand B, compared with an extra 6 per cent prepared to 
try Brand A. 
However, the factor which determined the eventual success of Brand A 
and the failure of Brand B was in their respective repeat-buying rates. 
Sixteen weeks after the average household which had tried Brand B had 
bought it, it represented only 6 per cent of that household's 
purchases of the product type. The figure for Brand A was at 16 per 
cent, nearly three times as high. Enough households try it initially 
to make it a potential success, but they do not go on buying it often 
enough. The permanent success of ä brand depends on-. the willingness 
" of. consumers, once having tried it, to continue purchasing its' 
Pýcýý. ýa eotlý Az: 
.... it should be recognised that a substantial proportion of 
brands do not reach satisfactory share levels and are withdrawn. ' 
(1974,88) 
Thus studies of the development of the purchases of new brands show 
that the ability to sustain repeat buying among those who have tried 
the brand is often the critical feature in the success or failure of 
the launch. 
The evidence from the study of brand failures from many different 
sources (e. g. J. H. Davidson (19761; Nielsen (1965) (1973)) is that 
the two factors which distinguish success from failure because this is 
what determines the repeat buying rate are a product with better 
,, 
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performance and distinctiveness, while price is 
, 
not. of such crucial 
importance. 
King (1980) : 
'Very few new brands are actually disliked; the problem is far 
more often one of indifference. ' (1980,20) 
Furthermore, the relative importance of distribution and"word-of- 
mouth as channels of communication which contribute to the success of 
a new product compared with advertising may be seen in the results of 
a survey which asked housewives how they had found out about new 
products they had recently tried. 
Table 'X 
" How Young Housewives Found Out About Nre Products Recently Tried 
% of married women 
between 16-43 saying: 
Saw in shop 43 
Recommended 25 
Advertising 18 
Free sample 9 
Other answers 8 
Source: JWr New Housewife Survey 1967 
,C 
Eclectic Research 
Until the middle of the sixties a priori and empirical research 
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formed the basis of consumer behaviour theory. More recently, there 
has been the emergence of comprehensive theories of buyer behaviour. 
Basically, this attempts to incorporate the strengths of a priori and 
empirical research but to avoid their weaknesses. The cornerstone of 
the eclectic approach is that psychological and sociological concepts 
'should be brought together in a co riori framework. Its' distinguishing 
feature, therefore, is that it attempts to. synthesise those 
theories, concepts and findings in the various behavioural sciences 
which appear relevant to consumer behaviour with market research 
findings, practical ants academic. (Andreasen, 1965; Engel, Kollat 
" 51n e t1,, 
and Blackwell, 1968; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Nicosia, 1966; 
4972 
and 
1974). The strength of this approach lies in the comprehensiveness 
of its perspective, but brings with it the danger of undue complexity 
i. e. dealing with too many variables and inter-relationships. 
A characteristic feature of the eclectic approach is the emphasis 
given. to decision processes which both precede and follow the 
purchasing act itself. Nicosia is one of the pioneers of the 
eclectic approach, and is typical in representing the consumer as: 
purposive, seeking to fulfil certain goals. through purchasing 
behaviour, and going through various decision processes which help 
him to at least approximate to some optimum solution; secondly,, he 
uses the notion of the funn-l, i. e. that the consumer's predisposi- 
tions move from generality through the search and-evaluation of 
alternative products, and culminate in. the selection of one 
particular brand. Thirdly, he stresses the importance of the 
concept of feedback, i. e. the effect of the experience of purchase 
and use upon consumer predispositions towards particular products. 
ýý 
', 
'. 
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This work has been criticised on the grounds that the search and 
evaluation process as represented is over-rational and whilst it 
may be applicable to infrequently purchased expensive products, it is 
less relevant for low cost goods which are purchased frequently. 
A further criticism is that the definitions of attitude and motiva- 
tion are unsatisfactory. 
A second, major eclectic work is that of Engel, Kollat and Blackwell 
who have devised a decision process model similar in many ways to 
11 
that of Nicosia. specific criticism-of these researchers is that 
as with Nicosia, the search and evaluation process is portrayed as 
highly rational. Finally, Howard and Sheth has produced a comprehen- 
sive model of the consumer which includes a wide spectrum of 
variables and their inter-relationships, and attempts a detailed 
integration of theoretical positions from several behavioural :. " 
sciences. Besides focussing on the individual consumer, as in the 
other models, and seeing the decision process as the matching of 
products to the consumer's motives, and stressing the importance of 
-feedback, i. e. the effects of the purchase act and usage experience 
upon consumer predispositions towards particular products, they also 
consider the dynamics of the buying process by distinguishing between 
different kinds of buying problems. - extensive, limited and routine - 
that the consumer is trying to solve. 
This model has already guided research in a variety of product fields 
and some of its: propositions have been rigorously tested. These 
tests, have, on the whole, provided favourable support for the theory 
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have also certain weaknesses in the 
measuring instruments, Nicosia regards this weakness as underlining 
the need to combine concepts and methodology with more accuracy. 
At present there is no generally accepted comprehensive eclectic 
theory of buyer behaviour. 
jf[Ad Hoc Market Research 
Owing to the complexity of human behaviour, the relatively early 
stage in the development of buyer behaviour theories, and the con- 
sequent shortcomings which to date exist in these theories, firms 
which are considering marketing a new product continue to rely on ad 
hoc investigations into consumer behaviour using standard market 
; research techniques, i. e. product and taste tests, price and rromo- 
tion tests, and test marketing in order to try and ensure that the 
product. will be acceptable to consumers. During the course of such 
tests the original product concept will often be modified and adapted 
as a result of their findings. 
The following eight case histories of a selection of products, a 
service, and a retail firm illustrate how new, products are brought to 
the market, the background conditions which influence how particular 
products are marketed, the competitive situation, the relative 
employment of different types of promotions, and the relative 
importance of different aspects of marketing, 
(e. 
g. advertising, 
compared with distribution under varying market conditions. 
r:. " 
S 
CASE HISTORY 1 
Product: Macleans toothpaste 
Firm: Beechams 
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The market 
Several distinctive features characterise the toothpaste market. 
First, it has been dominated by a few firms over a long period of 
time. Three manufacturers (Beechams, Colgate and Elida Gibbs) had 
80 per cent of the total sales in 1955; by 1960 they were responsible 
" for 78 per cent of an enlarged market, and by 1972 their share had 
reached 88 per cent. - With the entry in 1975 of a new competitor for 
the first time since 1941 (Procter & Gamble with Crest) four firms 
were in 1978 rn. sponsible for 88 per cent of the market. Of the 
remaining 12 per cent, distri! -hors' own brands (DOBs) (particularly 
Boots and the Co-operative societies) accounted for 9-10 per cent, 
and firms selling specialised products such as Sensodyne (Stafford 
Miller) for the remaining 2-3 per cent share of the market., ' 
Although these market shares give the impression of a stable and 
static market, this is misleading. The entry and exit of many brands 
occurred throughout the period. This has resulted in significant 
variations in the shares of surviving brands and companies both from 
year to year, and oder the period as a whole. (See C'kar6', Long 
Term Share Trend 1941-78'overleaf for full details). For example, 
the share of the market held by Colgate, the brand leader in 1978, 
has varied from 7.6 per cent in 1941 to 30.4 per cent in 1963, to 
42.5 per cent in 1970, and to 31.4 per cent in 1978. Beechams, which 
in 1941 was the brand leader with Macleans toothpaste with 24.1 per 
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cent share of the market, had a market share of 17.3 per cent in 1963, 
and in 1978 its market share had reached 25.3 per cent with Macleans 
and Acuafresh. In 1978 with the third largest share of the toothpaste 
market Elida Gibbs share has ranged from 11.2 per cent in 1941 to 
brand leader in 1963 with 36.6 per cent market share, and to 21.7 per 
cent share of the market in 1970. 
Moreover,. the share of the market held by particular brands during 
this period has varied widely. The sales of Close-Up (Elida-Gibbs), 
Si-Ko (Danning), and Kolynos (ICC) have all declined dramatically. 
" Three firms - Procter & Gamble, Elida Gibbs and Colgate - introduced 
fluoride toothpaste in the 1960's but all were unsuccessful. 
Colgate introduced a new brand, Cherish, in 1975 but withdrew it 
from the market in 1977. 
Secondly, this market has been continuously associated with a high 
level of advertising expenditure. Although' expenditure still remains 
high (for instance, in 1977 advertising expenditure amounted to £4 min 
on a turnover of £37ý min and each manufacturer spent approximately 
£1 min), between 1973-77'the proportion of advertising revenue to 
sales declined from more than 18 to 12 per cent. 
The relative decline during this period has been caused by several 
factors: first, price controls which squeezed margins; secondly, the 
increasing emphasis on price per se which led to promotional expendi- 
ture to be directed to a'-larger extent than in the past to trade deals 
and Temporary Price Reductions (TPRs).. tTPRs take two forms; price- 
marked packs where both manufacturer. and retailers contribute to the 
discount; and 'flash' offers - 7p off - where the manufacturer offers 
r 
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a discount to shoppers from the recommended resale price. ) These 
two types of promotion constitute the major form of competition 
between toothpaste manufacturers. Since 1975 TPRs have declined 
relatively in importance to trade deals which have escalated and 
become the chief means by which manufacturers gain participation in 
retailers' promotions, additional shelf space and special die-plays. 
To some extent the relative decline of TPRs can be attributed to 
pressure from retailers for even lower prices, and the uncertainties 
surrounding the legislation introduced in 1979 on Bargain Offer 
Claims. Together with other promotions such as competitions, coupons, 
banded offers and money-back offers, some 7-10 per cent of toothpaste 
net sales revenue in 1978 was estimated to be devotcd to promotions. 
In the economic climate of the 1970's and the changed structure of 
the retail trade, toothpaste manufacturers believe that expenditure 
on promotions has been more effective in achieving sales than a 
similar expenditure on advertising. 
This change in the kind of competitive activity prevalent in the 
toothpaste market is the consequence of increased retail competition 
and the growing share of the market held by large-scale retailers. 
There has been a Fdrmanent shift in sales of toothpaste from their 
traditional outlet, the independent chemist, to the supermarket. 
The increase in the share of multiples-: relative to indepe:. dent 
chemist shops was already evident in the 1960's but this development 
accelerated during-the 1970's. The 13 largest customers of each of 
the four major manufacturers are responsible for 50 per cent of 
toothpaste sales. Boots, in 1979, accounted for 18-20 per cent and 
Co-Operative Societies for another 8 per cent. Tesco and Sainsbury 
-,. ýý_ 
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together are responsible for 15 per cent of toothpaste sales, and 
their share of the market is increasing. 
Table I 
Share of Toothpaste Market of Different Types of Retailers in'1979. 
Multiple grocers 40 
Co-Operative Societies 8 
Voluntary Groups 4 
Independent Grocers 4 
" Boots - 18 
Other chemists (multiple & independent) 5 
Discount drugstores 9 
Woolworth 5 
Other. outlets -6 
source-: Trade-estimates 
This competitive siuation has led to a decline in margins, and 
lower manufacturer and retailer selling prices. The traditional 
retail margin on toothpaste was 33 and a third per cent, in addition 
to a wholesaler's margin of 10-15 per cent. Because of the change 
in the type of retail outlets selling toothpaste, sales through 
wholesalers have contintually declined. Moreover, the increased 
promotional activity by manufacturers, wholesalers and large 
multiple retailers has reduced gross margins for small retailers to 
some 20-28 per cent during promotions - and the number of promotions 
has increased in recent years. Retail gross margins on all branded 
toothpaste, including brands with a small. market share, varies :. "- -" . -" 
between 7 to 28 per cent. Not surprisingly, the gross margins of 
smaller retailers who carry a wider range of toothpastes are at the 
upper end of the range, while multiples with far higher turnovers, 
and selling a more limited range of brands and sizes take lower 
margins of between 7 and 12 per cent. 
Since 1973 manufacturers have reduced their selling prices in real 
terms by 7 per cent; at the same time retailers have accepted lower 
margins through the various special promotions designed Lo attract 
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the consumer's attention which has reduced retail prices still 
further. 
Thirdly, compared with some other countries the demand for toothpaste 
is relatively low. Between 1948 and 1961 the total annual production 
of toothpaste more than doubled, but despite this expansion consump- 
tion was estimated to be only half the amount bought per head in the 
U. S. A. and sufficient to provide only one-quarter of the amount the 
British public might be expected to require for regular use through- 
out the year. More recent international studies show that the amount 
of toothpaste purchased per family is still lower in the U. K. than in 
the U. S. A. or West Germany, viz 36 standard packs -TU. S. A., 26 
standard packs - West Germany, 19 standard packs - U. K. 
Fourthly, the toothpaste marxet continues to expand albeit at-a 
slow rate, some 1-3 per cent per annum. The main reasons for 
continuing-growth--are: (a) more people are retaining their own teeth 
(about 29 per cent of the population of England and Wales had no 
natural teeth in'1978 compared with 37 per cent in 1968, Office 
of Population Censuses & Surveys) (b) people brush their teeth 
slightly more frequently; and (c) people are trading up to a larger 
/ 
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size pack which leads them to use more toothpaste. 
Fifthly, the intense controversy and public debate in the early 1970s 
concerning the addition of fluoride to drinking water to prevent tooth 
decay stimulated interest-in the inclusion of fluoride in toothpaste 
to fulfil the same purpose. The subsequent acceptance of fluoride 
toothpaste by consumers was very rapid. In 1971 some 15 per cent of 
toothpaste contained fluori:: e; by 1978 it was almost universally 
included in toothpaste. This development had two major effects on 
the toothpaste market: (a) it stimulated the entry of a new compet='-- 
itor. In 1975 Procter & Gamble launched its Fluoride toothpaste, 
Crest, and this is now the fourth largest brand in the U. K. - (b) it 
changed the theme of manufacturers' advertising from emphasis on the 
function of toothpaste to keep teeth white and clean and freshen 
breath, to the therapeutic advertising theme of helping to prevent 
tooth decay, particularly among children 
There are other distinctive features of the toothpaste market, viz; 
although the total demand for toothpaste is relatively inelastic, the 
demand for individual brands is very elastic. Furthermore, the major 
companies spend large sums of money on research and development 
amounting to an aver-fie for ". K. manufacturing industry of 2ý per cent 
cent of säles, compared with an average for U. K. manufacturing 
industry of lh per cent. In addition, the Price Commission Report on 
Toothpaste (HC 125,1978 p 47) suggested that manufacturing costs per 
ton were considerably smaller for the major brands compared with the 
minor brands, pointing to noticeable economies of scale. 
Finally, specialised toothpastes which appeal to particular segments of 
"" 
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consumers have been introduced and established successfully and 
profitably alongside the brands of the four major manufacturers: The 
market share of Sensodyne, for instance, which caters for a semi- 
clinical condition of sensitive teeth is increasing; it is widely 
recommended by the dental profession. Other specialist toothpastes 
cater for children and smokers. 
With regard to DOBs, their share of the market appears to have stabil1- 
ised around 10 rQr cent with one multiple retailer, Boots, responsible 
for 6 per cent of the toothpaste market. Two factors would seem to 
account for the relatively small market share held by DOBs compared 
with some other product fields: (1) the relative decline in the price 
of manufacturer branded toothpaste has increased its value to con- 
sumers and inhicited the entry of additional DOBs; (2) the constant 
and aggressive advertising and sales promotion schemes of the major 
manufacturers provide consumers with a s, --ries of attractive offers 
and price reductions at the point of sale. 
The product 
Macleans toothpaste was introduced in 1928. Before that, the firm 
supplied toothpaste to chemists with the name of the chemist printed 
on the tube and carton. Although there was no fiv'd retail price,, 
Macleans toothpaste sold at 6d for the small size (originally 
designed for sale at Woolworth's) and is for the larger size. These 
prices were similar to those of other proprietary brands but yielded 
retail margins between 33 and 5o per cent which were higher than was 
general. Small scale point-of-sale advertising accompanied the 
introduction. The first advertising campaign started in 1930 with 
.`jý. 
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posters and display cards on the London Underground. 
When in 1938 Macleans was acquired by the Beecham Group, retail 
prices were reduced: the large tube was 10ýd and the extra large is 
6d. The effect was to narrow trade margins to between 24 and 27 per 
cent but retailers could increase their earnings by sharing in the 
larger volume of sales that had followed advertising of the national 
brand. Thus a virtuous circle had been created; growing out-put 
encouraged the company to invest in production methods that reduced 
costs; the higher rate of sales stimulated by advertising enabled 
retail margins to be reduced; and lower prices in turn stimulated 
sales. In the immediate post war period sales of Macleans toothpaste 
doubled whilst advertising expenditure trebled; but after that 
increased competition including the establishment of new brands 
caused advertising expenditure to'rise more steeply than sales. 
Table Q 
Macleans Toothpaste -': -_Index 'of -Sales and Advertisi; g" -" 1931-79. 
Year ':: r'Index of' Sales :ý Inde,: öf--Advertising 
1931 100 100 
1938 600 450 
1946 1150 . 300 1952 1850 1150 
1959 2800 2350 
1961 3350 2650 
1965 3852 4213 
1970 . 3785 2941 
1973 5259 6068 
1975 7068 3392 
1978 11825 9699 
The competition 
Between the 1930's and-1950's Macleans was- the brand leader in a 
" market dominated by three firms (see table 1). In 1954 Colgate became 
I 
the brand leader, a position it has since maintained, viz: 
Table 5 
Toothpaste Manufacturers: Share of Market 1954-78 
Fi rms 
Beechams 
Colgate 
Gibbs 
Procter & Gamble 
Others 
urce: trade estimates 
. 4, _ 
Year' % 
1954 1967 1978 
20.5 20.9 25.7 
23.5 34.5 31.4 
20.6 32.5 21.7 
- - 10.0 
35.9 12.1 11.5 
82 
The above table shows that Beechams had a market share of 20 per cent 
in 1954, and has since hovered around 20-25 per cent. This share has 
been maintained by the introduction of variants of the main brand: a 
new brand (Aquafresh); advertising, and a continuous programme of 
promotions which have pre-empted a proportion of the expenditure 
formerly spent on advertising. 
Product development 
in 1967 Beechams introduced'a second flavour of Macleans toothpaste - 
spearmint - to their originäl: mild mint flavour to appeal to the 
section of the market which preferred toothpastes with a mild flavour. 
These two variants of the main brand helped to stabilise Beechams 
share of the market around 20 per cent, but were unable to expand it. 
At the beginning of the 1970's the firm concluded from its research 
j 
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findings that further expansion of the Maclean brand would only 
be achieved by high, and probably, unprofitable expenditure. 
As a result the decision was taken to introduce a second brand as a 
more economic method of increasing the firm's share of the toothpaste 
market. In 1973 the development work which had been carried out on a 
blue and white striped gel led to the launch of Aquafresh, designed 
to appeal to mouth freshness. The introduction of this second brand 
raised the firm's total share of the market to 25 per cent by 1978 
despite the heavy promotional expenditure which accompanied the entry 
of Procter & Gamble's Crest fluoride toothpaste in 1975. 
Table Li. 
Beecham's Share of Toothpaste Market by Brand (%). 
:. 1963: ' 19677 1973 11976 1-1978 
Macleans Fresh Mint 17.6 19.7 13.0 '10.8 11.2 
Macleans Spearmint - 1.2 6.5 7.7 7.0 
Aquafresb --1.5 6.4 7.1 
Total 17.6 20.9 21.0 24.9 25.3 
Source: trade estimates 
Although the compan; has un, 'srtaken trade research to discover how 
the sales of a 
. 
new brand are built up, no consistent pattern has 
become. apparent. On the whole it appears that some sales "re drawn 
from all the existing brands, particularly the weakest. Experience 
has shown that the introduction of a third brand by a manufacturer 
has not proved a successful method of expanding market share, e. g. 
Colgate's Fluor introduced in 1962 achieved 8.6 per cent of the market 
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the following year, but thereafter its share declined drastically and 
it was withdrawn in 1975; this is probably due to the difficulty of 
differentý: atingbrands sufficiently in the mass -market, and the high 
cost of promoting a brand adequately in a competitive market. 
In 1975 both the variants of Macleans toothpaste and Aquafresh were 
re-introduced on the market with the inclusion of fluoride in response 
to the entry of Procter & uamble's Crest. Although Aquafresh had 
contained fluoride from the outset, this feature of the brand had not 
been stressed, because there was little consumer interest in fluoride 
at the time of its introduction. 
Besides meeting the competition from Crest by introducing a fluoride 
toothpaste, Beechams competed against this newcomer in four ways; 
by reducing the price; by a consumer promotion in 1976 i. e. a twin- 
pack offer which by providing a 40 per cent discount is an effective, 
if expensive promotion; by increased advertising and by increased _ 
sales effort from sales force who were provided with additional 
incentives. 
Advertising 
Two significant chances have taken place over the past decade. in 
advertising policy. First, the proportion of advertising expenditure 
has declined in relation to expenditure on promotions. Whereas the 
ratio of advertising to promotions was formerly 60: 40, it is more 
often now in the ratio of 40: 60 because of the growing emphasis on 
price competition combined with the need to attract the attention of 
the shopper at the point of sale, and provide her ý%ith an immediate 
reason for purchasing a particular brand. Despite this relative 
f 
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decline in advertising expenditure the chief medium for advertising 
Beecham's toothpastes is still on television, which means that less 
advertising is undertaken than formerly. (This decline in television 
advertising has been accentuated still further by the cost of adverti- 
sing which has risen faster than the rate of inflation). 
Secondly, during the 1970's along with most other toothpaste firms, 
the advertising theme of Beechams toothpastes was changed from the 
cosmetic to the therapeutic. Whereas the emphasis in the advertising 
of Macleans toothpaste had in the 1950's been on the benefit of 
cleaning teeth with toothpaste, leading to healthy teeth and white 
teeth, and in the 1960's the stress was almost entirely on whiteness; 
with the inclusion of fluoride in Macleans toothpaste and Aquafresh 
the emphasis -hanged to the value 'of toothpaste in preventing tooth 
decay. In 1980, however, since the value of fluoride is generally 
accepted and included in all toothpastes, Aquafresh is once more 
being promoted on a freshness claim, while Macleans toothpaste has 
been re-introduced with an improved fluoride (which has been patented) 
. that gives more protection against decay and help= to remove plaque 
which is of concern to consumers. ; 
Promotions 
As has been seen, Beechams spend relatively more on promotions than 
on advertising than in the past. This is due to the changed struct- 
ure and competitive nature of the retail trade; it is also due to '_... 
Macleans' position in the toothpaste market as the second brand. 
Wider these two conditions, the firm believes that a given expendi= 
ture on a promotion can be more effective than a similar expenditure 
on advertising. 
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On average consumers buy toothpaste twice a month. Shoppers, there- 
fore, have 26 opportunities annually to switch from one brand to 
another. Since Macleans has a smaller share of the market than the 
brand leader, Colgate, it has by definition a smaller number of ý. -'^... 
Iloyal' customers, and this fact influences the number and type of 
pr'motions it employs. Macleans, like Colgate, places heavy reliance 
on trade deals with retailers in order to ensure that it is price 
competitive, and gains participation in retailers' own promotions. 
In addition, the firm promotes more, frequently and more intensively 
than Colgate on the pack to provide shoppers with an additional 
incentive to purchase its brand in, preference to those of its rivals, 
and to sustain the loyalty of existing customers. 
Many of these on-pack offers are designed to encourage the, shoppers 
to buy more than one pack of Macleais toothpaste, e. g. two packs for 
the price of one; '7p'off' this pack, and then a coupon worth 7p off 
the next pack purchased; send in tops of 3'packs and receive 50p in 
cash. Because these particular promotions are expensive, although 
effective in increasing sales, they are interspersed with lighter 
and less costly promotions, such as the offer of a 'free' magic 
painting book. Such an offer may nevertheless be sufficient to 
achieve a display in the supermarket and thus help to att: act atten- 
tion to the product. 
These promotions are an integral part of the firm's promotional policy 
which is based on negotiating a trade deal with retailers on price 
and/or Temporary Price Reductions (TPRsl, and then supporting the deal 
by advertising and promotions so that it may make the maximum effect 
in retail outlets. Three promotions a year are run on Macleans tooth-, 1,. 
rt. 
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paste, and each of these is laternated with a promotion 6n Aquafresh; 
these six promotions annually enable the sales force to promote 
intensively one or other of the toothpaste brands throughout the 
year. However, the firm finds it less easy than in the past to 
determine the timing of a promotion, because it is increasingly 
required to fit in with the promotional calendar. of retailers. A 
recent development has been the pressure exerted on the firm for a 
price-marked pack to be made available for one retailer only. 
r 
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CASE HISTORY, 2 
The product: Jif non-scratch scourer 
The firm: Lever Bros. 
The market: 
Non-scratch scourers are part of the household cleaning market which 
includes floor cleaners., powder scourers, bleaches, liquid scourers 
r 
and washing-up liquids. There is considerable overlap in the use of 
these products by housewives who often substitute one type of cleaner 
for another because'they do not regard them-as 'serving a specific 
purpose. Thus this market is typified by low consumer discrimination 
and consumer interest. The market is also characterised by an 
arbitrary she. Lving"pl. an in supermarkets becarseit 'consists for the 
most part of many disparate products with small turnovers. 
Traditioriälly. housewives*haveused two kinds-of household cleaners to 
clean many hard surfaces in the kitchen and bathroom, i. e. powder 
scourers and bleach. Scouring powders, such as Vim and Ajax are very 
effective in cleaning'surfaces, removing stains and burnt-on food. 
However, since they clean by grinding the dirt off surfaces,. they are 
unsuitable for 'soft' surfaces such as laminates and stainless steel 
because they scratch and damage the surface. Similarly, while bleach 
is particularly effective for cleaning porcelain and stoneware sinks, 
and wooden draining boards, it is considered unsuitable for most 
modern coloured surfaces such as plastic baths. 
1. Wh ich? March 1977 pp 187-9 listed 23 cleaners (including washing- 
up liquid 
das 
one category) plus five soap-filled pads in its report 
on Getting Rid of Dirty Marks. 
I 
i 
89 
Since the 1950's a growing number of houses have been equipped with 
modern kitchens and bathrooms. Whereas in 1966, for instance, only 
15 per cent of homes had stainless steel sinks, by 1974 they had 
been installed in 50 per cent of homes. By contrast,. traditional 
porcelain sinks had declined to 9 per cent of homes. 
Table 1 
Kitchen and Bathroom Installations. 
(as percentage of total homes) 
1973. 
ritted kitchens 22 
Stainless steel sinks 50 h 
' Plastic baths 11 
Showers - separate 7 
units. ' 
- plumbed to bath 13 
Bathroom suites 89 
Lavatories (per 1.2 
household) 
Year Year - estimates 
1976 1979 1981 1983 
28 34 34 42 
64 71 73 75 
14 17 19 21 
8 10 11 12 
14 16 17 18 
90 91 91 92 
1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 
t 
Source LBL Survey. 
Because of their harsh action houscwives had gradually stopped using 
scouring powders on stainless steel sinks and baths. Thus the 
changing requirements of consumers provided an cpporunity for the 
introduction of new types of scourers which would be just as effective 
in removing dirt and stains as their predecessors but would at the, 
same time minimise the damage to the changed types of surfaces. 
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Initially, technical problems were encountered by firms who tried to 
reconcile these aims by incorporating a scourer in liquid detergent. 
The cleaning effectiveness of scouring powders is achieved by the 
inclusion of hard minerals such as quartz and felspar. When lower 
levels of abrasives than in powder scourers were included in liquid 
scourers they scratched less, but also cleaned less effectively. It 
proved difficult to ensure a stable suspension of abrasive in liquid; 
a 
the abrasive tended to separate out in time and give variable per- 
formance. Difficulty was further experienced in avoiding scratches 
on soft surfaces if liquid scourers included the traditional hard 
minerals. 
The product 
N Jif -a non-scratch .: ream scourer was launched in 1974. Tt had 
" 
been preceded by two earlier versions which had then been withdrawn. 
The first version which was test marketed in 1961 proved to be ahead 
of consumer demand; the second version was introduced specifically 
for bathroom use in 1967, but this market was not large enough to 
justify economic production. 
The formulation of Jif consists of a slightly softer mineral - 
Calcite Lthan those used in powder scourers, combined with a blend 
of cleaning agents. It is a stable, creamy product based on Cif, 
which had been marketed successfully in France by the French 
company of Unilever since 1968, and which by 1973 was being marketed 
in more than a dozen countries. 
I 
In 1972, Lever Bros. decided to investigate whether Cif, which 
i 
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appeared to be technically superior to products then available on the 
British market would meet the requirements of British housewives. 
Consumer research indicated that only slight modifications were 
required to the French product, e. g. some fluorescer was included 
to enhance the colour of the U. K. formulation. In addition, the 
British product differed slightly from Cif because Lever Bros. did 
not have access to the mineral used in the French product. 
Furthermore, consumer research revealed a difference in attitudes 
by French and British housewives towards-cream. scourers. -Whereas 
the U. K. household cleaning market had for 70 years. been dominated 
by the powder scourers so that British housewives had little exper- 
ience of liquid products, French housewives were very familiar with 
liquid cleaners for general cleaning purposes, and recognised Cif 
as being stronger and more efficient then ordinary liquid household 
cleaners. British housewives who regarded powder scourers as 
efficient and economic and which, if required, could be diluted, 
were more sceptical about the effectiveness of a cream scourer in a 
squeeze bottle. As a consequence, they believed, incorrectly, that 
it was a liquid version of a powder scourer, and therefore 'mild' 
c1 
and extravagant. This prei_"dice of potential buyers was to some 
extent mitigated by the evident value of Jif's non-scratch properties 
on modern surfaces. (Conversely, the product is seen as 'irrelevant' 
by housewives who either do not own any new surfaces, or if these 
surfaces are already scratched) Fortunately, consumer research also 
indicated that this sceptical attitude towards a cream scourer. 
evaporated once the housewives used it; in trial tests a high per- 
centage of respondents preferred it to their usual product. In 
.0 
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further consumer tests the product gained a high level of acceptance 
for its performance of the traditional powder scourer cleaning tasks, 
i. e. kitchen sink, cooker, bath, wash basin, and work surfaces. The 
main reasons housewives gave for liking Jif were: it did not damage 
surfaces; it gave a shine to surfaces; and it was suitable for a wide 
variety of household cleaning tasks. (These comments were later 
incorporated into theme advertising). The inclusion of ammonia in 
Jif also appeared to reassure traditional consumers of tts cleaning/ 
purifying qualities. 
Subsequently, in 1973 Jif was entered into a mini-van test market, 
which gave the encouraging estimate that some 4-6,000 tons per annum 
of the product could be sold in the initial years. 
w 
As a result of these tests and research, Lever Bros. decided at the 
end of 1973 to manufacture and launch trs product in the U. K. 
The competitors 
Liquid Gumption (the brand name had been well-known for several years; 
as a scourer paste product) had been established in this market since 
1969; sales had been growing steadily and had reached-more than 2,000 
tons per annum by 1973. There were also or or two smaller brands 
on the market. In 1973 it also became apparent that Colgate, Lever's 
main competitor in the scourer market, were about to launch a 
competitive and similar product that had already been introduced on 
the Continent. At this time, Colgate announced to the trade their 
Intention to sell Ajax cream in the U. K. (imported, as it happened, 
from Belgium) and in order to enter the market before Jif seemed 
I 
-See Case History on Batchelors Instant Custard for explanation of the ' 
mini-van testmarket, p 
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willing to dispense with test marketing. 
There seemed an immense risk that Colgates were about to pre-empt 
the launch of Jif unles Levers moved quickly. However, it was still 
considered necessary to test the reaction of consumers in the market 
place to Jif. Moreover, supplies would not be available from the 
plant in this country until 1975. 
It was therefore decided to minimise the cost of importing Jif (made 
to the British Formulation) by test marketing in a very small area 
of the country - Border TV. This strategy had two purposes; first to 
establish the product in the market; secondly, to identify and 
protect the advertising theme in advance of that of their competitor 
which in some Continental countries was very similar. Thus in the 
summer of 1974 the product wa:, test marketed in a larger and more 
significant area - Greater London - which contained potential 
customers of Jif. At this time it was still necessary to import 
supplies from France which proved an expensive procedure. 
I 
The major decision then had to be taken whether to delay the national. 
launch until the results of , 
the two test marketing operations were 
available, and supplies from the British plant were obtainable. This 
would mean delaying the national launch until 1975 by which time 
Ajsx cream would have been in the market place for several months 
before the introduction of Jif. The alternative strategy would be 
to forestall the launch of Ajax cream by entering the market immediat= 
ely. This would mean a heavier financial loss in the short term 
because of the need to import supplies, but with the prospect of 
obtaining a larger share of a growing market in the long run. 
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The national launch of Jif took place in 1974 one month before that of 
Ajax cream. The reason for the urgency to be first in the market was 
the knowledge that it could be difficult to achieve widespread 
distribution of a product group like cream scourers owing to their 
low frequency of purchase (on averagef twice a year). Supezyarkets 
might not be willing to stock more than one brand. 
Growth bf the market 
Over the period 1974-79, this market has quadrupled; penetration (the 
. number of households using the product) and consumption have both 
doubled. By 1979 sales of liquid scourers accounted for 37 per cent 
of all scourers sales in volume, and 54 per cent of. the total scourer 
(powder and liquid) market. By early 1980, Jif was responsible for 
40 per cent of the sterling turnoVer of the marke L. 
Table 
Non-scratch Cream Scourer Market. 
1974-79 
Year Turnover Frequency of Volume Penetration Consumption 
£OOO purchase per (Tonnes) Index (Milos) 
annum. 
1974 1750 1.9 4300 22 1.0 
1975 3500 2.2 7700 32 1.25 
1976 5150 2.2 10100 33 1.6 
1977 6150 2.2 10700 33 1.7 
1978 8600 2.5 13400 39 1.8 
1979 11900 2.5 16400 43 2.0 
Source: trade estimates. 
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Over this period Jif has been a major contributor to market growth 
chiefly as a result of above average increases in penetration. viz: 
Table '3 
Year No. 'of homes Market Jif 
'in U. K. Penetration Penetration. 
1974 18.3 min 4.03 min 1.72 min 
1978 
" 
19.1 min 7.55 min 4.59 min 
Penetration 3.52 min 2.87 min 
increase 
$ 87.167 
Source: trade estimates. 
Table 4 shows the growth of sales, penetration and consumption of 
Jif over the period 1974-78. 
Table 4. 
Growth of Sales, Penetration and 
Consumption of Jif 
" Year. Turnover Growth Penetration Consumption 
£000s % Index 
' 1974 1900 9.4 100 
1975 3635 " 91 19.1 95 
1976 4798 32 18.9 127 
1977 5397 . 12.5 19.0 135 
" 1978 7328 36.0 24.0 145 
Source: trade estimates 
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The expansion in the size of the market has encouraged the entry of 
another competing product (Cleen-O-Pine) which includes a disinfect- 
ant, the relaunching of Liquid Gumption in 1975 as a cream, and the 
introduction of Distributors' Own Brands made by well-known chemical 
companies. However, the relatively small size of this market, 
combined with the technically complex nature of the product makes 
the entry of further competitors unlikely. 
" Table . '. 
S. 
Brand Shares of Cream Scourer Market 
Brand Year 
($) 1974 1975 1%76 1977 -1978 1979', 
83 47 47 51 54 51 
Ajax Cream 17 16 20 20 15 20 
Liquid Gumption 31 29 20 22 20 
Cleen-O-Pine 6 7 6 
Others 6 "4 3 2 3 
Source: trade estimates 
Sales Promotion 
Sales promotion of Jif has comprised a combination of advertising, 
sampling, couponning, Temporary Price Reductions ( 'flash' offers and 
" price marked packs), and promotional schemes (competitions, British 
Rail ticket offers) viz: 
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Between 1975-79 the average ratio of spending between sales 
promotion (sampling, couponning, TPRs, competitions, etc. ) and 
advertising has been 50: 50, although wide variations have occurred 
from year to year because corporate promotional policy leads to 
funds being switched from one company product to another according 
to the market situation. Basically the policy of Jif as the 
dominant brand (2.5: 1) has been to invest in sampling, advertising 
and distribution - by means of'TPRs, competitions and couponning - 
in order to obtain increased share in a still rapidly growing 
market. Each of these forms of promotion have been deployed to 
encourage consumers to use and purchase a new product category, 
in particular the firm's brand, and to encourage retailers to stock, 
, 
display and promote it, viz: 
10 
A 
., 
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Sampling is the promotional activity which distinguishes if most from 
" ; fit ' 
its rivals. Unlike two major competitors, Jif has placed great 
emphasis on sampling after Continental experience had shown that once 
consumers tried Jif, they liked it and wished to use it. Between 
1974-79 8.2 min samples were distributed to help increase both 
penetration and consumption. (Sampling has not been used by Ajax 
Cream; 1 min samples of liquid (then Cream) Gumption have been 
distributed). 
When the product was introduced the firm-wished to provide a mini- 
bottle to enable housewives to try it out several times. However, 
the costs of such a bottle plus door-to-door distribution proved 
uneconomic. As an-alternative and cheaper form of distribution, a 
mini-bottle was placed inside a large pack of Persil, but its effect 
:. -as limited because at that time this pack accounted for less than 
20 per cent of Persil sales. Eventually an envelope containing-two 
sachets (one application for the bathroom, the other for the kitchen) 
was devised for doorstep distribution. This method of sampling took 
. place in one area of the country after another. After the first wave 
of sampling the increase in sales confirmed that product experience 
was the most important factor in encouraging purchase. 
Trial of the product, which a sample provides, evidently dispels much 
of the housewife's prejudice against cream scourers which is based, on 
her long usage of powders. The price of cream scourers, for instance, 
has been approximately double the price of powders, 'but the actual 
differential is less because the cream scourers are very economical. - 
. 
Furthermore., actual experience helps to allay lingering doubts that a 
liquid product is not as'versatile as powders and cannot cope with 
tough jobs. 
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More recently, sample sachets of Jif have been included in such 
domestic equipment as cookers because a sample is most appropriate 
at the time when a housewife is mcst prone to swtich scourers, i. e. 
when she purchases new equipment or appliances. Similiarly, a 
housewife can best appreciate the versatility and efficiency of .a 
cream scourer if she can experiment with it around the house; hence 
the development work on a mini-bottle sample for distribution to 
households which may now be an economic proposition. 
Since the cream scourer market is dependent for expansion on the 
speed with which housewives switch to new types of surfaces and wish 
to protect them, sampling and resampling aLe regarded as a long'-term 
continuous process to increase penetration and consumption rather 
than a shc_t-term method for launching a new product. 
Advertisinn 
Advertising, which has been employed in conjunction with sampling and 
other forms of promotion, has three major objectives: first, to 
make consumers aware of the non-scratch properties of Jif by using 
the analogy of the skater's blade scratching the ice to illustrate the 
" damaging effects of powder scourers on'new surfaces; secondly, to 
demonstrate the varied used of Jif, and thirdly, to mention the 
manufacturers of equipment who have tested Jif, and who recommend it 
as safe and effective for cleaning their products thus providing 
assurance to consumers that a cream scourer will not harm their new, 
and probably, expensive equipment. Advertising has been predominantly 
on television, as all these three objectives can best be conveyed. by, 
" demonstration. 
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Distribution 
A major factor which has contributed to Jif's share of the market has 
been its widespread distribution, viz: ' 
Table 6 
Distribution of Cream Scourers Among Multiple 
Stores and Co-Operative Societies 
"(70 per cent of total trade) 
Brand Year end 1979 
Jif 88 
Ajax Cream 69 
Gumption Cream 68 
Source: trade -stimates 
4 
This high level of distribution of a new brand with relatively low 
trade/consumer awareness has been due to a cpmbination of factors 
including early entry into this market, and the general distribution 
strength of Lever Bros. Alongside other Lever Bros. products, for 
instance, Jif has participated in joint promotions with specific 'key' 
grocery multiples. (For a competition offering a Ford Escort as the 
first prize, 3 proofs of purchase from one or a combination of 5 
Lever Bros. products were required to enter the competition). In such 
a promotion, both the retailer, who is seeking to attract customers by 
a distinctive offer, and the manufacturer who wishes to obtain a 
prominent display in the retail store and participation in the 
retailer's advertising, contribute towards a reduction in price during 
the period of the promotion. Furthermore, in such a scheme, Jif 
contributes towards the cost df joint advertising with the retailer '' 
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which is funded from the additional sales that it is hoped will be 
generated by the increased display, and interest in its brand. 
A further promotion which favourably affected the distribution of Jif 
was the joint promotion between Lever Bros. and British Rail in 1979- 
80. (In return for sending in 4 proofs of purchase from one or a 
combination of 8 Lever Bros. products;, the customer received a voucher. 
When a railway ticket-was purchased, this voucher could be exchanged 
for another ticket of the same value. ) 
This particular promotion aroused immense interest among'both retailers 
and customers. It enabled Jif for the first time'to achieve display on 
the shop floor, a space usually reserved for large volume lines, and 
the space associated'by customers for products which are being sold 
at especially low prices. By virtue of this special positioaing, 
%Aerr 
retailers mooprepared to match the price reductions offered by Jif 
during. the promotion by parallel price reductions. Participation in 
this promotion has not only increased sales; just as important at a 
time when pressure on shelf space leads retailers continually to 
consider dropping existing lines or contracting the space allocated 
to them; this promotion helped to change the status of Jif vis ä vis 
retailers. It has become acknowledged as an established and expanding 
brand, and hence one that warrants adequate shelf space. Ai a side 
effect, the promotion has also affected favourably the attitude of the 
firm's own sales force towards the product and thereby the selling 
. attention they are prepared to devote to it. 
Pricing policy 
Because of the prevailing conditions in retailing 'during the 1970's '"' :' 
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and increased consumer price consciousness, intense competition 
between retailers and intense competition between manufacturers for 
shelf space - Jif has relied on intermittent price reductions such as 
'flash' offers price marked packs, and couponning at specific times 
of the year, e. g. spring cleaning to encourage trial of the product 
and to ensure that manufacturers price reductions reach consumers. 
After bargain pack offers and trade bonuses have been taker into 
account, the average price of Jif has been slightly higher than that 
of Ajax Cream, and pricing models show that Jif can sustain a price 
differential up to 1ý-2p over its closest rival. The decline in 1978 
(see Table 5) in the market share of Ajax Cream is probably attribut- 
able to the relative increase in its price compared with that of Jif 
.,; over this period. On the other hand, although a price differential of 
up to 10p has frequently occurred in favour of Gumption Cream, this 
has had little effect on sales of Jif. (I. the non-scratch cream 
scourer market price increases have taken place less slowly than the 
rise in the rate of inflation, i. e. Whereas the Retail Price Index 
0(Food) was 193 in 197C, the cream scourer price index in 1978 was 150. ) 
At the beginning of 1980, in order to influence their relative share of 
this growing market, Ajax Cream began a dramatic price reduction 
campaign by lowering their prive some 8-lop below that of Jif. Since 
Jif was not prepared to lose part of their share of this market, they 
responded straight away and reduced their price by a similar amount 
by overprinting their price marked packs. 
With 'flash' offers (7p off) the retailer can sell at not more than the 
recommended price less the money 'off' from the manufacturer. With 
price marked packs a significant contribution to the price reduction is 
required from the retailer, the manufacturer's discount from list prices 
being perhaps only half the discount from recommended prices. 
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It is likely that this reduced price level may lead to increased 
penetration of cream scourers, although in such a complex market where 
' liquid scourers not only compete with each other, but with powder, 
scourers and many other household cleaners, the degree of elasticity 
of demand is difficult to predict. There would, nevertheless, still 
appear to be ample scope for. expansion of this market 
if Continental 
experience can be taken as a guide, e. g. by 1978 in Holland 72 per 
cent of households were using non-scratch cream scourers compared 
with 43 per cent in the U. K. in 1979. -''- _- -_ 
` 
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CASE HISTORY 3 
The Service: Golden Rail 
The industry: British Rail 
The Service 
Golden Rail (GR) began in 1971. Since then it has been adapted and 
extended in several respects, notably by the introduction of short- 
stay and self-catering holidays, and the introduction of additional 
resorts including the Channel Islands and Stratford-on-Avon. The 
number of holidays booked has grown from 27,000 in 1972, to 98,000 
in 1974, to 141,000 by 1978 and 160,000 by 1979. (See Table 1) 
Table 1 
Golden Rail Bookings 1971-79 
Year Total Holidays* Breathers** Self-Catering 
1971 30,000 "--- - 
1972 27,000 - - 
1973 60,000 _4,800 - 
1974 98,000 5,000 
1975 114,300 12,300 - 
1976 94,300 12,000 - 
1977 111,000 16,400 1,600 
1978 141,000 19,800 5,600 
1979 159,000 22,000 14,100 
* More than 5 per cent of main holidays are now outside the peak 
season. 
** Golden Rail has not so fax offered Breather holidays to London; 
these are organised by Stardus t, another sector of British Rail. 
1 w 
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However, the basic charcteristics of the scheme have remained 
virtually unchanged; an inclusive holiday comprising accomodation 
with either half or full board available from a wide choice of hotels 
and resorts; 2nd class rail travel (or 1st class on payment of a 
small supplement); all transport from traveller's local station to 
holiday address and return and, where appropriate (across London, 
Manchester and Glasgow). by pre-booked taxi; seat reservations on 
Inter-City services - individually labelled whereever possible; 
service of GR couriers at main stations and at resorts/inland centres; 
a voucher giving a 50 per cent reduction on a rail day trip within 
a radius of 100 miles; and holiday concellation and curtailment 
insurance. 
The objectives 
A major objective of British Rail is to attract additional passengers 
at off-peak periods of the week and year in order to minimise the 
spare capacity which exists even during the summer season, apart from 
a few Sat.: rdays. High fixed costs are generated by the need to meet 
the short-lived peak demand of commuters and businessmen; running 
extra trains and filling empty seats off-peak involves only marginal 
costs. Hence over the past decade BR has introduced a wide range of 
services designed to appeal to specific. subsections of potential 
customers - shoppers, senior citizens, students, families, holiday- 
makers - in order to open up additional markets which would make a 
contribution to rail passenger receipts. ., 
The introduction of GR as an inclusive holiday package in the U. K. ' 
is part of the general objective. The contribution of GR to rail 
i 
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receipts rose from under 4 per cent in 1974 to 14 per cent in 1979. 
Other objectives of GR were: 
b. To help counteract the decline in holiday travel by train which 
had fallen between the late 40's and late 60's from around 50 per 
cent to 11 per cent due to the rapid expansion of car ownership and 
foreign holidays, particularly package tours. A GR holiday would 
have the advantage of combining to some degree the convenience of 
car travel with that of a packaged holiday. 
c. The introduction of GR was regarded as a suitable means of enab-' 
ling BR to capture a sizeable proportion of the domestic packaged 
holiday market which at that time was practically non-existent. 
Although in 1070 packaged holidays only dmounted'to some 5-6 per cent 
of holidays in this country, and were dominated by coach operators, 
both coach and tour operators were beginning to promote this market 
energetically based mainly on coaches. 
d. To attract a proportion of that segment of the market who do not 
take holidays away from homel but who might be persuaded to do so by 
the reassurance and convenience offered by an inclusive holiday. 
Finally, but by* no means least, it was anticipated that the advent of 
GR could help to regengrate interest in rail travel. 
Organisation 
In the first year of operation British Rail undertook the marketing 
and funding of GR. However, in order to benefit from the expertise 
1 in 1970 the British Travel-Association had estimated that 20 min 
people did not take holidays away from home. 
107 
1 
of an experienced tour operator, administration and booking were 
contracted out, and these functions were incorporated into the tour 
operator's own business. Under this arrangement, one and two week 
holidays were offered throughout the year. 
'. Furthermore, in order to utilise the railway network to the fullest 
extent, the conventional tour operator procedure of block bookings 
at reduced rates in a limited number of hotels was not adopted; 
instead the knowledge of the Resort Officers cf the resorts which 
were to be featured in the GR brochure was enlisted. 
1' A policy 
was evolved by which these officers helped to recruit and screen a 
large number of hotels and guest houses where GR could place 
customers without any prior committment on either side. This 
arrangement helped minimise the financial coruait rent, since British 
Rail's role was confined to that of broker placing business it had_ 
created with a large number of loosely affiliated hotels. Furthermore-, 
it enabled GR to offer its customers a large, number of resorts, and 
a wide choice or prices and standards of hotels and guest houses. It 
was recognised that the major weakness of this policy could be the 
difficulty of ensuring room reservations, and could result in a slow 
booking procedure. Besides co-operating in the selection of hotels 
and guest houses, the resorts which participated in GR also agreed to 
publicise the scheme in their holiday guides. 
At the end of the first year which had been beset by a Postal strike 
as well as the not unexpected difficulties associated with a new 
venture, 30,000 holidays had been sold. Several valuable lessons 
were drawn from GR's entry into packaged holidays; 
S Hotels and guest houses had'to comply with the minimum standards 
of local authorities. 
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1. GR holidays, for the most part, had been purchased by summer 
holidaymakers. This market suffered from two major disadvantages 
for the future: (a) it had been static for several years and 
therefore offered little scope in the long run; (b) it could not 
contribute towards BR's objectives of attracting extra passengers 
during off-peak periods. 
2. Despite an additional supplementary charge for Saturday travel 
during the peak holiday season, a high percentage of GR holidaymakers 
had travelled on that day, partly as the result of the reluctance of 
hotels to change their booking days. 
3. GR had not attracted to any extent that segment of the market that 
". 
does not take holidays away from home; it hü3 become evident that it 
required a price below that which would make GR economically viable 
to attract them. 
4. Despite initial teething troubles which included a shortage of 
hotel rooms, particularly in the summer months that had resulted in 
'frustrated' sales, the potential did exist for packaged holidays by 
rail in this country, and GR had achieved a foothold in this market 
from which it could build a range of holidays that would meet 
satisfactorily its marketing objectives. (The apprehensive comments 
and verbal attacks by competitors which accompanied the launch and 
operation of GR were also regarded as confirmation that it had 
become an effective competitor in the domestic holiday market! ) 
After the outside tour operator had withdrawn from the administration 
and booking of GR, in 1972 BR took over these functions. 
I 
a 
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Since then, GR has been based on co-operation between three interests; 
BR, hotels, and resort tourist boards, The operation and administra- 
tion of GR are, however, the sole responsbility of BR. 
Short-Stay Holidays - Breathers. 
Experience had shown that the original type of holiday offered by 
GR required to be broadened if large scale sales were to be generated, 
and if off-peak travel was to be encouraged. A pilot small-scale 
scheme confirmed that this would be achieved if, in addition to its 
main scheme, GR diversified into short stay holidays during off-peak 
periods which would appeal to people seeking a second holiday outside 
. 
the traditional holiday. period. 
As a result, GR began to issue two brochures; the first offered one 
and two week holidays between April and October; the second brochure 
offered short out-of season holidays covering, with a small over-lap, 
the remainder of the year. 'Breathers', as these holidays were named, 
" were for a minimum of three nights which could be extended, if 
required, up to 5 nights, and would include all the standard elements. 
of the main holidays, apart from insurance. There were, however, 
several distinguishing features of Breathers: holidaymakers could 
travel on any day of the week: 
l (excluding Sunday) compare' with the 
Wednesday and Saturday travelling days stipulated in the main 
scheme; fewer resorts were available compared with the main scheme, 
but these included several inland holiday centres designed to appeal 
to those taking holidays outside the summer period. 
ý.. This feature distinguished it from its competitors. 
ik^l 
't ,ý 
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Pricing Structure 
Although the main programme of GR continued to offer a wide range of 
prices and selection of hotels, the pricing structure was simplified 
in two directions. First, Easter was abolished as a pricing period 
which reduced theirnumber from four to three, i. e. the low season, 
the shoulder (mid-September to end of October,; mid-May to end June), 
and summer. Secondly, whereas the original pricing structure had 
been based on zones this was replaced by a system of inclusive prices 
from 53 charging stations to groups of resorts (and subsequently 
reduced drastically still further). 
GR becomes financially more advantageous to holidaymakers 
compared with a do-it-yourself holiday the longer the distance 
travelled and the more out-of-season the holiday. Hotels also 
contribute to this financial advantage compared with a 'do-it- your- 
self' holiday by reducing prices below those otherwise charged during 
the shoulder and winter periods. On the other hand, short-stay holi- 
days offer the most financial benefit to British Rail because 
the rail element constitutes a higher precentage of total price than 
on longer holidays. Although this pricing policy means that holiday- 
makers who take high season holidays and short journeys benefit least 
financially, they nevertheless obtain the convenience of GR assuming 
responsibility for booking and travel arrangements, and they reduce 
the risk of choosing an unsatisfactory hotel/guest house. 
Sales Promotion 
In 1973 £1000, O00 was expended on a sales and advertising campaign. 
A large part of This expenditure re on printing half a million bro-''.. 
" 
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chures.. Advertising was divided between; national newspapers and 
magazines, including the Radio Times, the Reader's Digest, and 
womenls magazines, which incorporated coupons for interested readers 
to send off for the brochure; television which also encouraged viewers 
to telephone or write off for a brochure; and posters displayed at 
railway stations. The inquiries made, through advertising media were 
monitored. Other promotions included the provision of 'resort leaf- 
lets' at cost to resort authorities for distribution with local hotel 
guides. In addition, participating tourist authorities and hotels 
contributed towards the costof publicity and promotions, especially 
out-of-season short holidays. Advertising for, Breather holidays was 
limited to the press and posters. 
As a result of the changes made to. the original scheme, in 1973¢' 
GR holidays doubled to 60,000, *of which 97 per cent were for the main 
holiday schere, and 3 per centilwere Breathers4 Although _heih. S +, age 
group predominated in both schemes, constituting more than 65 per cent 
of the total, their socio-economic composition differed significantly. 
Whereas Breathers attracted ABCls 
2 the main scheme appealed princi- 
pally to Cl, C2, Ds. Similarly, the geographical background of the 
participants varied widely in the two schemes. Holidaymakers taking 
Breathers came mainly from London and the South-East; the main scheme 
appealed most to people living north of the River Trent who tend to , 
take holidays on the East and South Coast. Furthermore, a higher 
" proportion of those taking Breathers owned cars compared with people 
taking holidays in the main scheme. Many people who take a Breather 
holiday welc me it as a change from driving. 
1 The number of Breather Holidays is detailed on Table 1- 
2 Soc: o=econoAo(; c. -4eosys A5 aje lnecl Can°., <a IPA Readerships ' 
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Further research into the operation of GR showed that two-thirds of 
the business had been taken away from other means of transport, 
principally coach and car, and that the proportion of repeat business 
was higher than that achieved by other inclusive tour operators. 
This was taken as a measure of customer satisfaction and 'loyalty'. 
In addition research into customer's attitudes showed that 95 per cent 
of respondents enjoyed their holiday. 'Convenience' was considered 
the most valuable attribute of GR in association with the yrovision 
of a personalised service. The elements in the scheme which 
contributed towards these attitudes. were: the personal booking proce=. 
dure; the comprehensive information provided in the travel wallet; 
reserved seats; the services of GR representatives in transit; 
provision of taxis to connect major railway stations, 'and to trans- 
port holidaymakers to and from the hotel to the railway station. Thus 
" the impression of GR emerged from this research as a caring-operator, 
offering quality holidays, which seemed tu be confirmed by the high 
proportion of passengers who paid a small supplement in order to travel . 
first class. Research also suggested th. t it was misleading to describe 
GR as a packaged holiday because its customers appreciated the absence 
of organised travel, and therefore another description would be more 
accurate and appropriate. 
p. 
S. 
These market research findings, however, faced GR with a dilemma. 
Although the favourable attitudes of customers towards GR suggested 
that rapid expansion would be possible, it was feared that too rapid 
expansion might outstrip the availably handling capacity and'thereby 
destroy the very attitudes which had contributed to deve opment 
so far. - Consequently, for 1974, the aim was to increase bookings by 
25 per cent. Two new resorts were added to the scheme, and the 50 '" '_, 
I 
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per cent reduced rail voucher was continued in view of its popularity. 
Furthermore, it was recognised that successful expansion would depend 
more on the ability of GR to satisfy potential holidaymekers who sent 
in completed booking applications which could not be confirmed through 
the unavailability of hotel rooms, particularly in the summer season. 
The need to reduce such 'frustrated' sales led to organisational 
changes in two inter-related aspects of GR: (1) the selection of 
hotels and (2) the booking system. These changes have resulted in 
a more highly controlled operation in place of the former voluntary 
system. 
1. Hotel Selection 
"" 
Originally GR offered a wide selection of hotels in each holiday 
centre. This policy has bean reversed, although the number of 
resorts has continued to expand. The radical contraction of the 
number of hotels per resort has had two effects: first, it has raised 
the general standard of hotels in the scheme because these must 
n 
now confirm to the English Tourist Board's volu'ary standards-intro- 
duced in 1974, as well as to strict fire regulations. Since 1977, 
no hotels have been accepted without inspection. Secondly, with 
fewer hotels GR has a closer relationship with hoteliers, and has 
become a more important customer to them. A pre-reservation system 
has been introduced since 1974 in place of the former voluntary 
allocation of rooms by hotels which had not proved satisfactory. In 
the peak season in the more popular resorts a deposit reserves a 
high percentage of rooms on behalf of GR, and a penalty is incurred 
if. they are not taken up. This system will be extended to all resorts 
" 
-114 
in the main progxaume from 1981. In the off-peak season -GR reserves 
a certain number of rooms in each hotel according to anticipated 
demand. By concentrating their business in fewer hotels, GR is now 
responsible for a substantial proportion of a hotel's turnover, 
which can amount to 50 per cent. thioughout the year. The growing 
importance of GR to a hotel out-of-season has been an important cont- 
ributory factor in persuading hotels to allocate rooms to GR during 
the high season. 
d 
2. Booking System 
Until 1975 bookings could only be made by post, and although tele- 
phone inquiries were dealt with this facility was not publicised. 
The installation of a computer to undertake pricing and billing' 
speeded up the booking procedure.. More recently, the installation of 
a new computer has released sufficient staff time to undertake tele- 
phone bookings for Breather Holidays, low-season bookings for holidays 
in the main scheme, and bookings for. high season holidays after mid- 
"March, as part of an overall planned improvement in the booking 
system. (To some degree GR still operates an open-ended booking 
scheme by inquiring whether a hotel has other rooms available once 
its allocation has been taken). 
The reduction in the number of hotels per resort, combined with the 
introduction of a computerised booking scheme helped to lower the 
'frustrated' rate of sales from 35 per cent in 1974 to 13 per cent in 
1978, These changed operating methods were doubtless one factor in 
contributing in 1977 to the reversal in the fall in sales (contrary to 
the national trend) which resulted from the economic recession of 1976. 
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Sales Outlets 
Bookings for GR holidays are made through three channels; direct by 
post or telephone to York, the headquarters of GR; through 300 
selected railway stations; and through the 1700 appointed agents who 
sell British Rail tickets. Hitherto, sales strategy has been biaised 
towards direct sales, although the facility of booking through travel 
agents is mentioned in advertisements. However, bookings through 
travel agents have risen steadily, averaging around 40 per cent for 
holidays in the main scheme, and more emphasis will be given to this 
. sales outlet in future. 
Developments in sales promotion 
The relatively high proportion of repeat bookings which was a feature 
of GR holidaymakers in its early days has persisted during the 1970s 
as a measure of customer satisfaction. The despatch of the annual 
brochure automatically to former customers comprises, therefore, an 
important component of sales promotion policy. in 1978,26 per cent 
of GR holidays were sold to former customers via the'mailing list. 
The value of customer satisfaction in generating additional business 
is also evident from research which shows that personal recommendation 
is more important than the media in generating awareness, and probably 
" 
bookings. Research has shown that half of'. those who bookea GR_. holi-. ', 
days in 1978 first heard of them by work-of-mouth, whereas half of 
those who did not book a holiday had been made initially aware of GR 
by the media. A coupon is therefore provided in the brochure to ena- 
ble people to request GR to send a copy to their friends. 
In view of the high proportion of GR bookings which emanate from the 
ý ý; 
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Midlands and the North, television advertising has been discontinued 
in the London area and concentrated in those Areassof the country 
where it has been found cost-effective; conmercial radio continues to 
be widely used in the London area. The original division of total 
sales promotion expenditure in the ratio of 50 per cent on brochures, 
and 50 per cent on advertising has continued. 
The Competition 
Two factors have increased the competitiveness of the domestic holiday 
market for GR. First, the number of firms offering rail package tours 
has grown. Besides Saga (principally senior citizens), other firms 
such as Cosmos, Eder. Vale, Galleon and Co-Operative Travel have 
entered this market. The National Bus Company and other coach 
operators have introduced package coach holidays. GR also faces .. 
direct competition from the many hotel groups, (e. g Grand Metropoli- 
tan) which organise short-stay holidays and which have negotiated 
inclusive tour fares with BR, and indirect competition from other 
sectors of BR such as Sealink and Stardust, which specialises in 
short holidays to London. 
Secondly, the economic situation from 1974 onwards adversely affected 
the domestic holiday trade. Besides reducing the total number of 
those going on holiday, many holidaymakers have traded down in order 
to continue taking holidays. This has led them either to choose 
lower priced hotels, reduce the length of their annual holiday, or 
switch to self-catering holidays. 
X 
Demand for holidays is therefore very susceptible to price, and GR 
have responded to this situation in several different ways. In 
I 
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particular, in 198Q, pricing policy was made more flexible than 
formerly by the introduction of much si44l1er price changes between 
pricing periods by means of a 'mid season' between low and high sea- 
son. There are now fewer abrupt price changes, for instance, on 
either side of the peak holiday period in order to encourage an 
expansion of business between mid-September and the end of October. 
In the main scheme, too, additional reductions at many hotels were 
made available for holders of Senior Citizens Railcards during the 
very low season weeks, after the successful completion of a pilot 
scheme in 1978. 
On Breather holidays, since 1979, the minimum period has been reduced 
from three nights to two to counter the effect of inflation and the 
policies of competitors.. 
Widening the Market 
As a means of increasing turnover, the number of resorts included in 
GR has been continuously increased. Among the most recent additions 
have been the Channel Islands and Stratford-upon- Avon. Further, 
to widen its appeal to holidaymakers with children in 1977, GR 
" introduced self-catering holidays in chalets, suites or caravans, 
in co-operation with leading holiday camp operators. Families 
naturally constitute the major part of the self-catering market which 
is the fastest growing sector of a static domestic holiday market. 
It comprises some 28 per cent of the total market, and 14 per cent of 
self-catering holidays are taken in holiday camps, By 1979 GR self- 
catering holiday bookings had risen to approximately 14,000, -of whom 
approximately half were children. Because the average size of 
I 
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the self-catering party is 4-5 persons, these holidays generate 
more revenue than either holidays in the main scheme with 2.38 
passengers per booking, or Breathers with 2 people per booking. 
R 
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CASE HISTORY 4 
Product: 'Superfry' 
Firm: Van den Bergfis 
Superfry was a gelled vegetable oil suitable for shallow and deep 
frying. Its distinguishing characteristics were'its high performance 
for frying, and that it was a cooking oil with the advantages of 
cooking fat, in that it melted when heated, and reverted to a jelly- 
like solid state when cold. Furthermore, it was packed in a tub which 
acted as a storage container after the product had been used. 
Between 1972-74 a comprehensive series of market research tests were 
carrid out into every aspect of the product, viz, pricing, packaging, 
advertising, and consumer attitudes towards the concept, the product, 
and towards existing cooking oils and fats. In 1974 it was first 
marketed in a town which, although not representative of a national 
launch, enabled the firm to test the operation of their production and 
distribution facilities in the market place. - When this small-scale 
test had proved satisfactory, towards the end of 1974, the product was 
put into an area test market which duplicates in miniature the 
national marketing situation without incurring the expenditure and 
risks of a national launch. However, although sales were initially 
satisfactory, after 6-8 months they were failing to reach their 
predicted levels. After post-launch investigations to try and 
discover the causes for the lower-than-anticipated sales, and" 
further tests of a modified product, the brand was finally withdrawn 
from the market in 1976. 
-1ý, 
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Superfry would have comprised part of the White Fats/Oil market, i. e. 
lard, compounds, such as White Cap and Cookeen, and cooking oil which 
are used primarily by housewives for shallow and deep frying and 
roasting, and also, to a lesser extent, for pastry and cakes. During 
the period when Superfry'was being developed and tested, this market 
remained fairly static; sales volume declined by around 4 per cent: 
the relative share of the three prodi'. cts which constitute this 
market also remained relatively stable,, the variations which did take 
place resulted from changes which occurred L, the price of cooking 
oil, viz: 
N 
4 
Table 1 
White Fats/Oil Market 
Product Share and Price 1972-76 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
% Price % Price % Price % Price % Price 
(p/lb) (p/Th) (p/lb) (p/1b) (p/lb) 
Lard 63 8.2 60 9.9 61 16.7 -63.19.0 61 18.4 
'Compounds 15 13.9 15 14.3 15 22.3 : 16 23.1 16 23.5 
Oil 22 18.2 25 18.2 24 26.7 21 24.8 23 30.8 
Source: trade estimates 
A feature of this market is the high share of Distributors'. Own 
Brands (DOBs) of cooking oil which amounts to some 50 per cent. ' In 
the compounds market, there are three main brands, viz: 
I 
I 
121 
c. 
TABLE 2 
Compounds Brand Share (1972-6) 
White Cap 39 
Cookeen 33 
Trex 14 
DOBs 14 
Source: trade estimates 
The product 
In 1972 Van den Berqhs had developed three new cooking fats, each of 
which had certain advantages over existing products on the market. 
When each of these was tested by ä representative sample of house- 
wives, Superfry received the most favourable response. At the same 
time as these products were being tested by housewives, their cooking 
habits regarding grilling, frying and roasting were also ascertained, 
and found to be very similar, viz, the majority used oil and lard for 
deep frying, but lard, white fat, and occasionally oil for shallow 
frying; many use their own dripping or lard for roasting, and a few 
cook vegetables, omelettes, scrambled eggs, and onions in butter or 
margarine; not many added fits to grilled food, but when they did, 
it was frequently butter or margarine and occasionally oil or lard; 
although some women chc`se cooking fats on the basis of health, for 
many it was not a very important factor. It was also evident that 
while oil users may choose-oil because of its health advantages, 
those who do not use oil seldom consider the health or purity 
advantages of a cooking fat. 
ýýýl 
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Once Superfry emerged as the most favoured product tested, there 
were group discussions with the housewives to analyse the product in 
detail. A very large number of women intimated that for a variety of 
reasons they would like to buy Superfry, with the proviso that it was 
in the same price bracket as the cooking oil or fat they currently 
purchased. The main advantage of Superfry was considered to be that 
it did not spit or splash, nor did it burn. Another desirable 
feature of the product was its neutral flavour and in contrast to 
lard or oil few of the women noticed any smell; but they did notice 
that it left foo4i crisp and dry, and it was not absorbed by food. 
A further asset was seen to be its versatility; because it combined 
many of the properties of lard, white fats and oil, Superfry could 
be used as a substitute for them. Other favourable characteristics 
were considered to be its convenience compared with lard because 
it melts quickly, and compared with cooking oil because it hardens 
and does not require to be poured back into a bottle; that packaging 
in a tub was preferable to paper wrapping and provided a means of 
storage; that the product gave good cooking results even when reused 
several times, and that food cooked with the product was easy to 
digest even by people with indigestion problems. 
On the other hand, some of the features of the product were disliked 
by the group, principally its appearance and texture, and t:, e 
quality of the tub. There was a general dislike of the product 
because it looked like'hardened oil', and it did not look fresh, 
clean or new. It was generally agreed that a matt finish would be 
preferred. The texture of the product was also criticised although 
this varied according to where it was stored. Despite some disagree- 
ment over its texture, the women all maintained that Superfry 
S 
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should have a 'whipped soft texture' like soft margarine. The tubs 
were criticised because they broke easily and melted when hot fat 
was poured into them. It was suggested by the groups that the 
container should be brick-shaped instead of round so that (1) the 
housewife can 'judge an ounce'; (2) the tub would take up less room; 
and (3) the tub would be easier to store and stack. 
The anticipated price of a pound of Superfry was estimatcd to be 
somewhere between the prevailing prices for lard and oil respectively. 
Several suggestions were put forward for improving the product, viz: 
instructions should be given on the quantity required for different 
types of cooking; the colour should be a creamy off-white. The 
group members wanted reassurance that the product wasp su table for 
t S+ 
" baking as well as shallow' and, deep frying and the texture should be 
the consistency of solid margarine, that would be easy to store, 
would not spill, and would melt quickly. The product should revert. 
to this consistency after use. 
Three main conclusions emanated from these group discussions: 
first, that the chief merit of the product was that it combined the 
best qualities of lard and oil, and if it could bn used fnr deep and 
shallow frying, roasting and pasrty making, it would offer the 
housewife the opportunity of buying only one product for all these 
purposes; secondly that many housewives who use lard for deep frying 
would prefer to use oil, but do not want to struggle pouring it back 
into a bottle. This product eliminated the problem, and finally, 
that many women who buy lard and cheaper cooking fats would be 
reluctant to spend money on fats, although they admitted that Super- 
0 
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-fry had advantages over lard. 
In March 1972 while this representative sample of housewives was 
choosing between three cooking fats, and giving their detailed 
comments on them as above, another piece of research was being under- 
taken into the attitudes of housewives towards cooking fats (includ- 
ing butter and margarine) in general for frying, grilling and orasting 
in order to discover the relative strengths and weaknesses of these 
products. An analysis of the product categories, combined with the 
general attitudes of the respondents towards each product made it 
possible to build up a composite picture of the cooking fats, market. 
For instance, all the respondents used more than one fat in their 
cooking. Only some housewives used cooking oil for health reasons. 
It proved, however, difficult to give a vela*ive weight to the 
strengths and weaknesses of each pröduct because while a housewife 
may be well aware of the deficiencies of a particular cooking fat, 
she continues to buy it because the positive features out weigh the 
negative, e. g. economy or versatility. As an example, lard it 
frequently criticised for its flavour. "-or"; srell but is purchased by A 
large number of respondents. 
,, 
Then in June 1972, to supplement the research into the attitudes of 
housewives towards the concept änd their reactions to the rroduct, a 
qualitative study was-undertaken to discover, if possible, how to 
describe and name the product. This involved group discussions with 
two groups of housewives restricted to the younger age group as these 
are more likely to be willing to try new products than older house- 
wives. 
The study concluded that the word or description 'jelly' was an in- 
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adequate and incorrect description of the product, because it 
suggests a wobbly but more solid consistency than Superfry, and is 
generally associated with greater transparency. The report therefore 
concluded that it was premature to try and find an acceptable des- 
cription of the product until it could be made slightly more solid 
and far more transparent. The study furthermore suggested that while 
housewives appeared to appreciate and often welcome a product that 
can perform the function of both oils and fats, many housewives 
experience conceptual difficulties in changing their current habits 
of employing the former for frying and the latter for making pastry 
and cakes. As a result of this report, further product formulation 
work was undertaken, and concepts pursued that would make it easier 
for housewives to understand the specific assets of Superfry. 
" Testing the marketing mix 
The aims oZ the next piece of research. undertaken in May 1973 were 
three-fold: 
' First, to assess the relative acceptability of the various parts of 
the brand - the concept, the advertising, the product and the pack- 
aging - as used in the total package. Secondly, to identify ., I 
strengths and weaknesses in these four areas; and finally to establish 
kJ 
whether Superfry was acceptable e to the projected market, viz; 
purchasers of white fats and cooking oil as their present products, 
Because of the newness of the product concept and lack of consumer 
knowledge for such a product a short pilot study was undertaken in 
the north and south of the country half among those who use DOB oil, 
I 
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and half among those using white fats before the recruitment of a 
full-scale sample, who were then asked to test the product at home, 
shown TV commercials, and asked to complete a questionnaire on their 
views of the product, and their reactions to the advertising. 
Since it was only through the advertising copy that the idea behind 
the product could be communicated, it proved impossible to separate 
the housewives' assessment of the concept from that of the advert- 
ising. However, the research showed that these two elements 
generated a high initial interest in the product, a high propensity 
to purchase and a high level of expectations of the performance and 
quality of the product. Furthermore, the advertising had managed to 
communicate successfully, first, the nature of the"product, i. e., 
that it had the %jualities of cooking oil to a greater or lesser 
extent than those of cooking fat, but was equally suitable for the 
uses generally associated with both produ, 6; %s, and secondly, had 
presented it in a manner which appealed to housewives who purchase 
Distributors Own Brands of white fat and cooking oil. 
The research identified three minor, but nevertheless, important 
weaknesses in these areas: 
1. Only 43 per cent of those !: ho were shown the anertisem_nts 
spontaneously recalled the brand name which suggested that it 
required more emphasis. 
2. The initial connumication did not describe Superfry adequately 
enough since a majority. of the sample thought that the product 
was something other than a 'type' of cooking oil, and many 
thought it was a margarine. 
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3. ' There was. a definite tendency for housewives to identify con- 
venience as the product's basic claim rather than its main 
asset of 
high 
quality performance in deep and shallow frying. 
When the in-home trials had been completed, it was found, that the 
product had achieved a satisfactory level of response measured 
L 
against the 'ActioxD standards, with packaging identified as the 
only weakness. On the whole, the sample of housewives was satisfied 
with its experience of the product, and that it came up to the 
expectations created by advertising. However, after the product had 
been tried the propensity to purchase was disappointing. 
Housewives could be divided into two groups - acceptors and 
rejectors. The acceptors were prepared to rurchase after they had 
watched the TV commercials, and after they had tried the product. 
The rejectors, on the other hand, found that, although the product 
performed well in trial, it did not reach the expectations generated 
by the advertising. It appeared that, on balance, the rejectors 
think that Superfry is a good product but one which they cannot 
integrate into their traditional patterns of usage. Whether Super- 
fry was accepted or rejected bore no relation to existing product 
usage (i. e. cooking %A l or w:. tte fat) or to any other specific 
characteristic that could be identified in this research. 
The packaging 
As anticipated, the packaging did not reach the expectations of 
housewives. The company had been aware of the defects in the 
Action standards are generally set before a test commences and then 
scores must reach those levels to be acceptable. 
a 
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packaging before the test, and an investigation into tub design was 
therefore instituted. 
The other major factor that emerged from the in-home trial was that 
larger sales (pro rata) would be achieved of the product in the north 
of the country than in the south. In Lancashire, for instance, 
housewives were more favourably disposed towards the product than in 
London after trial, although this had not been evident ai; the post- 
advertising stage of the research. 
" Following the results of testing the advertising, a modified and 
shortened version of the original advertisement was devised to over- 
come some of the weaknesses which, had been-revealed. This revised 
advertisement was pre-tested in pane 1974 to establish whether 
it adequately explained the product, and whether it made viewers 
sufficiently interested in it. 
The new version of the advertisement appeared to communicate satis- 
factorily the basic features of the product, and these were under- 
stood by housewives. Unfortunately, just as in the original advert- 
isement, the main claim was still perceived as convenience rather 
than the high level of performance which could be achieved in deep 
and shallow frying. However, despite the continued tendency to judge 
the product for convenience primarily, its other attributes were also 
appreciated. In addition, the research showed that the advertisement 
generated a high level of interest in purchasing the product in the 
future, among both the purchasers of white fats, and the users of DOB 
cooking oils, i. e. the Pýoý. lowest price 
Before the company proceeded to test market the product'in October .1 
0 
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1974 in the Harlech/Westward'TV area, earlier that year, in May, two 
further tests were carried out so that any deficiencies in the 
product, production techniques and distribution which might other- 
wise emerge during the test market could be rectified as early as 
possible. First, the product was test marketed in a town - Haverford 
WestZ which was clearly on. a smaller scale than the proposed test 
area, for the purpose of verifying that Superfry could be produced 
and distributed satisfactorily under actual market conditions. 
Secondly, a further evaluation of the product was undertaken, albeit 
on a limited scale, to test production from a_pilotplant. To date, 
Superfry haä been produced in the firm's development laboratories; 
production on a pilot plant involves a trial time in the factory. 
The products from the pilot plant were used jr the town test, and 
by a small sample of the company's staff who had been recruited 
because they were deep fryers of food. This panel of 44 employees 
tried out Superfry at home for a fortnight, kept a usage diary and 
completed a questionnaire. 
Superfry was eventually launched in the test market area in October 
1974. It was available in a tub pack in two sizes - lb and 21b, 
selling at 28p and 56p respectively. The brand was advertised in 
the test market area with 45 second and 30 second television 
commercials which told consumers about the brand as follows: - 
simple awareness of its market presence; that it is a vegetable 
oil; that it has setting properties; that it is suitable for shallow 
as well as deep frying. in addition, money-off coupons were dist- 
ributed to encourage trial of the brand: 900,000 6p coupons were 
distributed in Harlech TV area*and 300,000 lop coupons in Westward 
I 
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TV area (100,000 of the former and all the latter coupons requested 
the redeemer to provide their names and addresses on the coupons so 
that they could be contacted and interviewed about the product. ) 
Post-launch research 
Two pieces of research were commissioned to examine the launch of 
Superfry into the test area. 
1. In January 1975 qualitative research on the progress of Superfry 
was undertaken. This consisted of six group discussions to 
examine consumer attitudes towards the brand. The majority of 
women in each group undertook shallow and deep frying of food. 
Many housewives had experienced difficulty in finding Superfry in 
the shops after their interest had been aroused by advertising and 
coupons. They also complained that even where it ww stocked, it 
was difficult to find because of lack of displays and promotion. 
There was the additional difficulty that whereas many housewives 
expected to find Superfry next to cooking oil, it was stocked 
alongisde cooking fats. Furthermore, some housewives had diffi- 
culty in translating the pound weights into liquid equivalents so 
that it could be romparea in quantity and price with their present 
products. In particular, oil users wanted reassurance that 
Superfry was no more expensive:.. than cooking oil; the housewife 
who used cooking fats needed-to understand : that Superfry was not 
much more expensive than her usual product. The suggestion was 
made in this qualitative research that Superfry might be better 
value if it could also be used for baking, roasting, and perhaps 
other forms of cooking. The group members also expressed a wish 
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for more information on the time interval before Superfry can 
be poured back into the container. i. e. was it necessary to wait 
" as long as suggested? Related to the last point was the suggest- 
ion that a stronger container that could withstand a higher temp- 
erature oil would be preferable. Finally, information was regw 
uested on the amount of Superfry required for shallow frying to 
avoid waste. 
2. In February 1975 another study took place among users and non- 
(A 
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users to establish the extent to which it was being used for deep 
frying and for shallow frying and therefore how far it had re- 
placed cooking oil and white fat respectively; to determine how 
far housewives in general were aware of Superfry and understood 
." its qualities; and finally to'asses how those who had tried 
Superfry understood its qualities particularly in relation to 
white fat and cooking oil. 
The main facts which emerged from this research were: most house- 
wives who purchased Superfry used it for deep and shallow frying; 
that it appealed more to housewives who used cooking oil than to 
those who used white fat, and that the product concept was also more 
favourably received by hour-wives who used cooking oil; those 
housewives who had tried the brand thought that it was superior to 
other frying agents because it could be reused, caused less mess, 
was convenient, and attractively packaged. Among all Superfry 
purchasers there was an objection to the price; the test market 
showed an encouraging level of usership of the product and also 
favourable opinions of the brand. 
R 
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Lapsed Usage Check 
During the early weeks of the launch of Superfry into the test 
market area deliveries were extremely encouraging, but by the summer 
months of 1975 they had begun to fall to a very low level which 
caused concern about the development of the brand in the market. As 
a result in August 1975 a survey was initiated to search for the 
reasons for the decline, and to re-evaluate the likely repeat 
purchase level for the brand. The results of the survey showed that 
the level of interest in the product remained high; however, problems 
relating to taste and price accounted for a substantial proportion of 
the reasons for rejecting the brand. At this time an estimate of the 
likely long-term share of the brand, admittedly subject to a consider- 
able degree of error, showed that if brand loyalty of 5o per cent was 
assumed this would result in a4 per cent share of the market. 
Previous research into Superfry had indicated that a certain pro- 
portion of purchasers had complained that the product had a 'peppery' 
Z 
taste although it ha. ' not appeared to be a major problem. Since this 
could have been caused by a setting agent in the product, it was 
thought that an alternative'hydroxystearic acid might help to elim-'. 
inate the problem. Accordingly, research was undertaken among 
samples of housewives who use lard and cheap cooking oil fir deep 
frying with the original version of Superfry, and with an alternative 
version using a different acid. In the in-home tests that took place 
there was no evidence that this alternative version of the product 
would reduce any of the adverse taste effects. On the contrary, 
there was a suggestion that housewives who use cooking oil found the 
adverse taste effect worse than the alternative version. 
See oýerlect-P 
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As a result of this research the company decided not to proceed with 
the product. 
A 
" y' 
It 
is probable that the change in taste could have been the result 
of a slight product reformulation due to raw material costs which 
took place at a very advanctdastage of development of the product, 
i. e. when the pilot plant was established and that early product 
research had therefore been investigating a slightly different 
product. 
I 
134 
CASE UIISTORY 5 
Product: Persil Automatic 
Firm: Levcr_ Bros. 
The washing powder market has several distinctive features. 
Purchases of washing powder used almost exclusively for washing 
clothes have risen over the past 20 years to 347,000 tonnes per 
annum, £224 min at 1979 retail prices. Between 1976-79, for example,, 
the market grew by an average of 5 per cent annually, reflecting the 
higher consumption of powder by the owners of automatic washing 
machines which have made washing clothes an easier task, and the 
predominance, of materials which require little or ,: o ironing. 
"" Furthermore, purchases have been somewhat higher than these figures 
suggest becruse washing powder was formerly used for dishwashing 
and household cleaning. With the development of specialidst products 
for these purposes, they no longer form part of the washing powder 
" market. 
The market is dominated by two major manufacturers plus a number of 
distributors' own brands (DOBs), none of which are manufactured by 
To3ver Bros. or Procter & Gamble. Besides these two companies and the 
'own name' brands of multiple and supermarket chains, there are 
several international organisations which have the technical 
potential to develop branded products for the U. K. market, i. e. 
Colgate-Palmolive, Henkel, B. P. (who have acquired Robert McBride 
(Middleton) Limited) and Teneco (who have bought up Allbright & 
Wilson, the manufact.: urers of distributors own brands). 
A 
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Furthermore, this market has been characterised by product innovation 
(synthetic dtergents, powders with enzyme addittives, solvent based 
detergents, and low suds washing powders), and by frequent reformul- 
ations of existing products to keep pace with developments in washing 
machine technology, in types of fabrics, and in the washing powder 
market. 
Two major factors have affected consumers' preferences for different 
types of washing powder, viz: (a) the growing ownership of washing 
machines, in particular the purchase of front-loading automatic 
washing machines, and (b) changes in types of fabrics. Furthermore, 
the temperature at which clothes are washed has declined because of 
the predominance of man-made fabrics and the tendency to mix loads of 
different types of washing. 
Table 1 
aý Ownership of Washing Machines. 
1962 197 1978 
Total home ownership J7 74 76 
TYp 
Single tub 34 18 ILj- 
Twin tub 12 3ý 3d 
Automatic* 1 ýS 32. 
* Of the 1.06 min automatic washing machines sold in 1978 over 90 per 
cent were front-loading. 
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b. Shirt materials 
Type '1962 '1975 1977 
Man-made fibres 7 31 10 
Cotton 90 23 28 
Mixture 3 56 60 
C. lour 
Coloured 20 80 88 
White 80 20 12 
Source: Lever pros 
Washing powders can be divided into two broad categories - heavy and 
light duty. The heavy duty sector predominates: the light duty sector 
consists of such products as Stergene, Derft and Lux Flakes, specifi- 
cally designed for washing delicate clothes and fabrics. The share of 
the heavy duty market held by each manufacturer has changed over the 
past decade: 
Table 2 
-Share of Heavy Duty Washing Powder Market. 
1969 1973 1979 
Lever Bros. 45 47 51 
Procter & Gamble 52 44 40 
DOBS and Others .7 9 .9 
Source : Trade Bstinates 
The most significant change in the heavy duty market over the past 
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decade has been the introduction of low-suds washing powders (Persil 
t, '. tomatic and Surf Automatic by Lever Bros ,r and Bold and Daz Auto- 
matic by Procter & Gamble) for-use in front-loading automatic washing 
machines at the expense of other types of washing powders, viz: 
Table 3 
Share of Market of Different' Types of Heavy Duty Washing Powder 1969-79 
Lever 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Bros. 
Persil 21 20 20 20 18 19 18 19 18 16 15 
Radiant 9 11 976642221 
Omo 89765542111 
Surf 5689 10 10 98887 
Drive 12 6- 7644 
Low Suds 
Persil 123468 10 12 14 19 23 
Auto 
Surf 11. 
Auto 
Procter 
Gamble 
Daz 12 . 13 . 13 14 12 .. 10 9 9 
9 7. 6 
Fairy 
Snow 10 999 8 6 6 7 7 6 6 
Ariel. 22 18 18 17 15 14 14 15 14 13 12 
Tide 6666 6 6. 6 6 5 5 4 
Low Suds 
Bold 4 5 6 
,6 
6 6. 
.9 
Daz Auto 1 1 
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The tonnage of low-suds washing powder dDubled between 1975-9; by 
1979 sales of low suds washing powder comprised 34 per cent of the 
heavy duty washing powder market. i. e. £75 min. 
ý3- -Pow t"' -;, .- -r le 3 siýöws. 
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Lever Bros. larger share of this market is thts major factor accounting 
for their higher share of the total washing powder market in 1979, 
compared with 1969, i. e. 44 per cent in 1969, and 52 per cent in 1979. 
(See Table 2). 
The product 
Persil Automatic was the first washing powder in this country especia- 
lly formulated. to have a low-lather performance to make it suitable 
for front-loading washing machines. Conventional high-suds washing 
powders are unsuitable for these machines because the rotation of the. 
drum causes excessive foaming which may lead either to clothes being 
washed inadequately or the machine becoming clogged and/or foam 
spilling onto to the kitchen floor. If, in order to avoid the risk 
of foaming, only a small amount of high suds washing powdei is used 
then clothes do not get washed properly. 
Low-suds washing powder differs significantly from other washing 
powders and has different performance characteristics: the powder 
must be able to dispense and disperse automatically, and when combined 
with the smaller amount of water used in a front loading automatic 
washing machine it must not clog up the pipes of the machine. As 
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a result o1 these requirements, low-suds washing powder is technically 
a more complex product, 
Persil Automatic was introduced in 1968. At that time (see Table 1 a) 
the U. K. market comprised a minority of houswives who owned front- 
loading washing machines but who were unable to purchase a product made 
either of the major detergent manufacturers specifically to fulfil 
their needs. The only suitable product then available, Pat, was 
poorly distributed and little advertised; as a result it was neither 
well-known nor readily obtainable. 
A new opportunity clearly existed in the washing powder market for the 
introduction of a new product. Although this would not be economic- 
ally viable straightaway because of the restricted market, if it was 
successful,,. ' sales could be expected to rise as the ownership of front- 
loading machines expanded. However, one particular disadvantage of 
entering the market so early was the difficulty of forecasting the 
rate at wh ch the ownership of these machines would grow. Although 
on the Continent front-loading machines had quickly become established 
as the predominant type, it was not certain that this would necessar- 
ily occur in this country because the ownership of twin-tub machines 
had become firmly estcblishec (see Table 1 a), a development which 
had not occurred on-the same. scale elsewhere. Furthermore, because 
of the specific product characteristics of a low-suds washing powder, 
it was not found possible to modify. the formulation of Lever Bros. 
major brand, Persil. In order to avoid the major expenditure of 
technical, marketing and financial resources that would be necessary 
to develop a new brand it was decided to adapt to British requirements 
work already carried out by other Unilever companies in Europe into 
4 
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the technical formulation, packaging and advertising policy of a low- 
suds washing powder. Then the major decision had to be made whether 
to market the new product with a new name and pack which would 
distinguish it from other Lever Bros. washing powders, or whether to 
market it as a variant of an existing brand. Both these courses had 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The advantages of an indep_ndent brand would be a greater degree of 
flexibility in designing all aspects of that brand to meet established 
consumer needs. No aspect of the brand would have to be compromised 
to avoid conflict with the parent brand. However, experience indi- 
cated that this course of action might well pröve unsuccessful 
because the initial small size of the market and the limited 
promotional resources consequently available would make it difficult 
to build up adequate levels of awareness and understanding of the 
brand. In addition, it might prove difficult to achieve adequate 
distribution of a new brand with limited promotional resources. 
The alternative case for launching the variant of an existing brand 
were that, if successful, there would be major economies in 
advertising and presentation. For example, the use of an existing 
brand name with some modification would help to create an image 
for the product without heavy investment advertising. However, this 
course of action had two important disadvantages. First, consumers 
might be confused by two brands with similar names which ran the 
risk that most of the sales of the new product might be at the 
expense of the established brand. Secondly, some degree of flex- 
ibility would be lost as the existing consumer attitude to the basic 
brand would need to be taken into account in deciding the presenta- S 
-- ý. 
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tion approach for the new variant. 
A decision between these two alternatives (an independent brand or 
A. variant of an existing brand) was clearly difficult to make without 
the accumulation of further evidence. It was therefore decided that 
both approaches would have to be developed and tested. Since manage- 
ment resources were limited, the approach which offered the chance of 
the'greater return if successful, and with fewer long-term difficul- 
ties was sal,, ected to be examined first - the independent brand. 
Under the name'Skip the product was test marketed in the Yorkshire 
area which constitutes about 10 per cent of the U. K. population. 
Since the number of potential customers was very small, advertising 
was confined to a few publications with comparatively low circul- 
ations which were however read by'a substantial proportion of 
the 
target group. Unfortunately, no similar coherent pattern about the 
target group's shopping habits could be deduced. Since little inve- 
stment was available to secure widespread distribution through the 
grocery trade, it was only possible*to aim for a low level of distri- 
bution and anticipate that the brand's success would stimulate a slow 
growth in distribution in the area. 
The preliminary results of Last marketing Skip in 1966 were dis- 
appointing. The 'low key' approach was clearly unsuccessful; 
awareness of the product among its target group was lower than exp- 
ected and distribution through the grocery trade failed to -attain 
the predicted level. Before abandoning the test market altogether 
it was decided to discover whether higher levels of investment in 
advertising would take the brand through some sort of threshold of 
consumer awareness and thereby raise sales to an acceptable level. 
/ 
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This entailed advertising on. television for the first time, and 
introducing special trade activities in order to stimulate distri- 
bution. Both these measures improved awareness and availability 
the product, and subsequently the level of sales; but the degree of 
improvement did not justify the extra investment cost. 
As a consequence, the firm withdrew from the test market, and 
decided to test a variant of an existing brand, Persil Automatic. 
Persil was chosen in preference to other Lever Bros. lines for 
several reasons; it was a long established brand with an equally 
long-established reputation for washing clothes at all temperatures. 
Its association with washing machines was very strong, dating from 
the early 1950's when washing machine manufacturers found it parti- 
cularly suitable for use in washing machines and recommended it 
for this purpose. Because it was soap-based, Persil could also be 
used in front-loading washing machines, although it was a high-suds 
powder. Frequent reformulations to incorporate technical develop- 
ments had enablec, Persil to keep pace with changes in washing machine 
technology and in washing powders, with the result that despite 
the widespread penetration of synthetic detergents in the middle of 
the 1960's it still accounted for over 25 per cent of the total 
washing powder market. It was this direct relationship with 
washing machines which made Persil a suitable vehicle for the 
'introduction of a variant specifically aimed at fulfilling the market 
need for a low lather powder which gave a better performance than 
existing products in these front-loading machines. 
The major concern about the new brand was its possible detrimental 
effect cn the image and sales of Persil. Furthermore, as the 
I' 
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performance characteristics of Persil Automatic were different, this 
confusion could result in dissatisfaction and even withdrawal by 
Persil users. On the other hand, if the new brand was successful, 
it would help improve Persil's image by demonstrating that the parent 
brand had become more modern and up-to-date. The Persil name could 
also continue to be recommended by washing machine manufacturers for 
all types of machines. 
The choice of test market was 3etermined by two considerations. 
First, the risk to Persil had to be minimised, therefore the test 
market had to be fairly small, and preferably in an area in which 
Persil was relatively weak. Secondly, since Persil Automatic had 
in the short term a, very limited potential market because of the 
relatively few lather-intolerant. machines in use, it was important 
that o%Tnership of these machines in the area chosen should be as 
high as, if not higher tLan, the national average. Southern 
Television area best met these criteria. 
Before test marketing Persil Automatic, market reserach had been 
carried out on the package design, since packaging would. be an 
important factor in emphasising the differnece between the two 
products. However, how far consumers were likely to be confused 
by the two brands, and their attitude towards the, new brand - 
`these questions could only be resolved in the market place and not 
in an artificial test situation. 
The price to be asked for Persil Automatic was higher than for 
standard Persil for two reasons. First, the formulation for a 
low lather product was more expensive, and secondly, the small size 
0 
144 
of the market. would.. not allow the benefits of the economies of scale 
which were enjoyed by the higher tonnage powders. 
The brand was advertised on television with a straightforward 
educational approach. The difference between Persil and Persil 
Automatic was clearly. explained; it was also stressed that Persil was 
keeping up-to-date with new washing mächine developments, and that 
leading manufacturers now recommended Persil for both front-loading 
washing machines as well as for other types. 
Distribution was obtained very quid4y indeed, an important advantage 
of using the Persil name.. Sales built up rapidly, and the previous 
concern about the brand's possible adverse effects on Persil was 
dispelled by Cie results of a market research investigation carried 
our after the launch. Although the brand was taking sales away from 
Persil, this was not due to the similarity of name, but because 
Persil had been the brand most used in frontloaders because of its 
relatively low lather and its association with washing machines. It 
was found that there was little confusion between dersil and Persil 
Automatic; non-owners of front-loading washing machines were mostly 
unaware of the existence of Persil Automatic. 
These favourable results stimulated the firm to extend Persil Auto- 
matic quickly into national distribution. It was anxious that Persil 
Automatic should be accepted in the market as the brand of washing 
powder suitable for front-loading washing machines before the antici- 
pated introduction of a competitive product by its major rival. It 
was also keen that Persil Automatic should become firmly established 
before the rapid growth of suds-intolerant washing machines weakened 
1 
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the close link that had been built up over several years that Persil 
was suitable for washing machines. In addition, it was considered 
important to obtain the endorsement of washing machine manufacturers 
that Persil Automatic was more compatible for front-loading automatic 
washing machines than any other washing powder. 
Once Persil Automatic had been launched nationally the emphasis in 
the advertising continued to be educational explaining why it was 
the brand of washing powder most'Luif-, 61r for front-loading machines,. 
and the pack also continued to be used for educational purposes. At 
the same time, in order to safeguard the future position of Persil 
Automatic to some degree, a contract was negotiated with washing 
machine manufacturers to supply a smaple with every front-loading 
machine. This was to ensure that-it would be the first brand tried 
by the housewife in her newly acquired machine as the market expanded 
and encouraged the entry of competitive ; roducts. By the end of 1970 
Persil Automatic had become established as the brand recommended by 
manufacturers and electrical dealers. It had also from the outset 
been a commercial prrposition because until 1971 it was sold with 
very little expenditure on advertising. 
Competition 1970-79 
As Lever had anticipated, it was not long before their major 
competitor, Procter & Gamble, entered the low-suds washing powder 
market. In 1970, Procter & Gamble's brand, Bold, was test marketed 
in the Southern Television area. Unlike Persil Automatic, it had 
been formulated for all types of washing machines (suds intolerant 
and tolerant) doubtless because the front-loading washing machine 
market was still considered too small to justify a specific washing 
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powder. This version of Bold was withdrawn once it became apparent 
that housewives were uncertain for which type of washing machine it 
.I was intended. By the time Bold was relaunched nationally In 1973 
specifically for suds-intolerant washing machines, Persil Automatic 
was selling 24,000 tons annually, amounting to some 6/7 per cent of 
the heavy duty washing powder market. The major difference in the 
formulation of the two brands was the addition to enzymes to Bold. 
Since the introduction of a second major brand, competition in the 
low-suds washing powder market has been intense, as each firm has 
sought to secure a larger share of an expanding market. Furthermore, 
in 1974-75 DOBs of low-suds washing powders were introduced and 
quickly achieved 12 per cent share of the market. Then, in 1978 and 
1979 respectively, euch firm established a nca brand, viz: Daz 
Automatic (Procter & Gamble) and Surf Automatic (Lever Bros. ) 
A combination of competitive devices such as advertising, samples, 
competitions, free offers, trade discounts and principally Temporary 
Price Reductions have been deployed to build up the sales volume of 
Persil Automatic as quickly as possible to achieve economies of sale, 
. 
lower unit costs, and profit from increasing share of the market. In 
1979 ownership of front-loading washing machines was still increasing 
at the rate of 10 per cent annually. 
Advertising is seen primarily as a means of stimulating demand over 
the long term by informing the consumer what the brand offers, and how 
it can be used most effectively. The advertising theme has 6e-# mt 
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. In addition, Persil Automatic haS 
increasingly participated in the advertisements of washing machine 
manufacturers who recommend Persil Automatic for use initheir washing 
machines. Closely associated with the long-term purpose of advertis- 
ing, the value of samples in encouraging housewives to use Persil 
Automatic from the time they purchase a new washing machine has been 
recognised, and negotiations have continued with all washing machine 
manufacturers for full-size packs of Persil Automatic to be included 
in the drum of their front-loading washing machines. 
As a complement to advertising and to serve a different purpose, 
short-term promotions are employed to provide the consumer with an 
additional incentive to purchase Persil Automatic at the point of 
""' sale, 
ýnd 
in particular to generate interest. among retailers to 
feature the brand, provide additional display space, and gain 
participati'n in retailers' own promotions. Six or seven promotions 
are organised annually which may not change the consumer's view about 
the brand, but focus trade interest on it, e. g. competitions (which 
have sometimes featured as prizes the products of washing machine 
manufacturers to emphasise the close link between Persil Automatic 
and front-loading washing machines); a joint promotion with British 
Rail of a 'free' rail, ticket in return for four tokens collected from 
one or, more Lever Bros. products, including Persil Automatic. _Comp- 
etitions are also organised in conjunction with a specific retailer 
e. g. Tesco. In this instance, participants are required to send in 
a specified number of proofs of purchase from Lever Bros. products, 
as well as a till receipt from the retailer. This exclusive tie-up 
gains participation in the retailer's own promotional schemes, and 
in the retailer's advertising. Furthermore, trade bonuses are nego- 
I 
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tiated with retailers as a means of gaining shelf and floor space 
and being featured in retailer. advertising. 
1 
However, the major proportion of promotional expenditure on Persil 
Automatic is in the form of TPRs, either 'money off' or 'price- 
marked' packs. These have been introduced on a larger scale as the 
consumer has become more price sensitive to encourage trial and 
retrial of the product, and as competition between retailers has 
'intensified, and concentration of retail trade has accelerated, 
e. g. 50 per cent of sales of Persil Automatic are made through four 
distribution outlets. TPRs can be effective in encouraging purchasers 
of DOBs, the most price sensitive consumer, as well as the less loyal 
brand shopper, to try Persil Automatic. 
*These sales promotions, combined with the general distribution 
strength of Lever Bros. sales force have helped to ensure a widespread 
distribution penetration of Persil Automatic, viz: 
Table 4 
Distribution Penetration of Low-Suds Washing Powders, 1977-1980. 
Year Persil Automatic Bold 
Jan 1977 63 47 
July 1977 66 48 
Jan 1978 70 52 
July 1978 70 55 
Jan 1979 60 47 
July 1979 70 53 
Jan 1980 73 55 
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When Bold entered the market in 1973, sales of Persil Automatic 
were adversely affected by its advertising and sales promotion 
campaign. Between 1975-8, however, by the deployment of its 'mix' 
of sales promotion techniques and, in particular, by offering TPRs 
more frequently than Bold, and with deeper price reductions, sales 
of Persil Automatic expanded by 100 per cent, whereas those of hold 
incrased by 15 per cent. This deliberate policy of reducing margins 
to achieve volume was pursued still further in 1978-9 because it was 
discovered from research that many consumers were still using heavy 
duty washing powders although they had purchased front-loading washing 
machines. The following table shows the changes in market share which 
took place bett'een 1977-9, and also the effect of the introduction 
" 
of two further brands (Daz Automatic, Procter & Gamble; Surf Automatic, 
Lever Bros) which seem principally to have reduced the market share of 
DOBs. " 
Table 5 
Share of Low-Suds Washing Powder Market (Volume) 1977-79 
Brand 
Persil Automatic 
Bold 
Daz Automatic 
Surf Automatic 
DOBs 
Others 
Source: trade estimates 
Year 
1977 1978 1979 
58 60 59 
25 21 24 
0.2 3.1 6.0 
1.8 2.0 
15.4 13.0 8.0 
1.4 1.4 1.0 
0 
y 
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Case History 6 
Product: Quick Custard 
Firm: Batchelors Foods Ltd. 
In March 1978 two competing brands of. instant custard - Batchelor's 
and Brown and Poulson - were introduced almost simultaneously into 
the old established custard market. In April 1979, a famous name in 
this market, Bird's (General Foods) also introduced an instant 
custard powder. 
Batchelor's Quick Custard is a mixture of custard powder, sugar and 
dried milk parked in a foil sachet. When boiling water is added to 
this mixture and stirred it reconstitutes to liquid custard. The 
product is both time and labour-saving because the need for saucepans 
and washing-up is eliminated. Furthermore, unlike traditional 
custard powder, the addition of milk and sugar is not required which 
guarantees greater consistency of end result: 
The product 
Since its introduction in 1839 the custard market has been dominated 
by Bird's, an instance of a brand name which has become synonymous 
with a product. Originally, custard was served as a cold pudding. 
Its modern history dates from the inter-war period when it was taken 
increasingly as1a hot pouring sauce; 75 per cent of it is used in 
this way. Over 63 per cent of housewives serve custard, and most of 
them have stocks in their larders at most times. Custard is served up 
to three times a week. 
4 
The market 
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The custard market was in slow long-term decline from at least 1952 
until 1969 when the first convenience custard was introduced in cans. 
During this period efforts to stem this decline were made by Bird's 
with the introduction in 1958 of a number of flavoured custards which 
stimulated the market temporarily by 7 per cent and restored it to its 
1956 level. This expansion in sales was however short-lived and not 
sufficient to stabilise the market against the long-term contraction. 
During the latter period of slow contraction during the 1960's, there 
was little or no advertising in this market as there seemed little 
prospect of growth; sales nevertheless totalled some £13 min (at 1977 
. prices). 
cgveral factors had combined to intensify the competition facing 
custard powder. Among these were the wider choice of 'afters' on 
the market; the tendency for many housewives at work and with rising 
incomes to prefer convenience desserts, and the change in taste 
towards I ghter sweets. 
The introduction of canned custard (which became possible as the 
result of a technical advance; - aseptic canning) first by Ambrosia 
and Heinz and then followed several years later by Birds in 1975, 
stimulated the expansion of the total market, although the slow 
decline of custard powder persisted, viz: 
Table 1 
Value of Custard Market 1969-77 (at 1977 prices). 
Year £ min '-. -, -Powder % ! _: ~-Canned % 
1969 13 90 10 
152 
1977 16 66 34 
Source: trade estimates 
Thus in 1977 custard powder still retained the predominant share of 
the market; 'some of the expansion in canned custard sales had been 
the consequance of intensive price cutting. The relative importance 
of canned and powder custard by value, packs and servings are outlined 
below. 
Table 2 
" Custard Market 1977 by Value, Packs and Servings 
Value 
Packs/cans 
Servings (pints) 
Powder (%) 
£10.6 min (6E', 
£50.0 min (60) 
£573.0 min (96) 
Canned ($) 
£5.4 min (34) 
£33.0 min (40) 
£25.0 min . 
(4) 
Source: trade estimates 
It can therefore be seen that whereas canned custard in 1977 accounted 
for more than one third of total sales in value, the overwhelming 
proportion of servings were still from, custard powder. 
In the two sectors of the custard market in 1977, the shares of the 
various brands were: 
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Table 3 
Custard Market Brand Share (value) 1977 
Powder % 
Birds 61 
Own labels 28 
Others 11 
Source: trade estimates 
Canned % 
Ambrosia 36 
Heinz 30 
Birds 27 
It was into this market situation that Batchelor's decided to 
introduce Quick Custard which had several advantages over canned 
i_e ,4 
lo. a es ý ca 
custar , ighter packaging, the housewi e could still be involve 
in the preparation of the custard and determine the degree of 
thickness required by varying, the quantity of water added. 
Although the company was entering a market with which it was un- 
familiar, it nevertheless believed that it possessed several important 
Assets which would ensure success. First, it had the technical 
expertise in producing dried products (e. g. soups and vegetables) and 
packaging them successfully. Secondly, it had an efficient handling 
and distribution organisation geared to the grocery trade. ' Finally, 
and just as important, the company was confident that the formulation 
of this product was a technical advance which could not easily be 
imitated by competitors. It was, however, aware that at some 
subsequent, if speculative future date, other firms particularly 
Birds would develop a similar product, and that this factor would 
need to be taken into account in setting financial targets and 
strategy. Nevertheless, because of the prevailing conditions in food 
I 
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manufacturing and retailing a technical advance can often be the 
decisive factor in determining whether a firm's financial target 
can be attained. On the one hand, the intense competition in food 
manufacturing caused by excess capacity and a consequent tendency 
for marginal costing leads - when products are technially simple to 
copy - to their speedy introduction by competitors, followed by 
severe price discounting. On the other hand, the increasing 
homogeneity of supermarkets and the competitive pressures on 
distributive margins stimulates grocery multiples to seek out 
distributors own brands (DOBs). When new products can be copied 
easily retailers find it easier to introduce DOBs which are, then 
sold more cheaply than the manufacturer's brand, but at a higher retail 
margin. 
mew products emanate from a variety of souzces, not least a 
fortuitous technical development. The company's first version of a 
quick custard in 1970, for instance, was a spin off-from the 
general research being undertaken into dried foods by the firm's 
laboratories. It was not proceeded with because the custard mix 
needed to be added to hot milk, and the taste proved unacceptable 
when tested among a sample of housewives. 
In 1977 the present and significantly different version of Quick 
Custard was the result of a technical development which had been 
applied to the firm's instant soup product - 'Cup-a-Soup'. Although 
the new product had no direct link with the earlier research, the 
marketing department no doubt recalled its previous experience with a 
quick custard product, and therefore quickly recognised the significance 
of the new process. 
I 
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In 1977, therefore, before the product was marketed the company 
undertook its standard market research tests with large samples of 
housewives to discover how fur Quick Custard was acceptable for 
formulation, taste, texture and price, and to what extent these 
factors required modification. 
In the product tests the potential market for Quick Custard was 
evaluated by asking samples of housewives to compare the relative 
merits of powder, canned and quick custard for a variety of 
attributes, viz. quick and easy to prepare; no messy pans; no milk 
needed; familiar form; consistent end result; good quality; thickness 
can be varied; inexpensive. On all these attributes Quick Custard 
scored highly. For instance, after the samples of housewives had 
tested the product at home for a stipulated period, the respondents 
considered that Quick Custard was highly cowparable in taste and 
texture to the usual custard that was served; that-it was quick and 
easy to prepare; and that the respondents would be prepared to serve 
Quick Custard more frequently than they served traditional custard. 
Research also suggested that the preferred quantity of Quick Custa'-d 
per pack was three-quarters of a pint - the same, as the contents of 
canned custard. 
As part of the company's standard market research tests a comparison 
and evaluation of Quick Custard was, undertaken against two competitive 
products - Heinz Canned Custard, and Brown & Poison Instant Custard 
which since September 1977 had been on sale in a test market area. 
The results showed that Batchelors was liked equally with Heinz canned 
custard; but preferred to Brown & Polson. In addition, preparing Quick 
Custard was easier and quicker because it did not need whisking in a 
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bowl, and its notional price was lower. This routine evaluation 
led to some small changes in the colour and flavour of Quick Custard. 
Despite the knowledge that Brown & Poison (a firm already well-known 
in the dessert market for custard powder and blancmanges) were also 
preparing to launch an instant custard, Batchelors were Confident 
from this research that they had a technological lead and would be 
maintaining product superiority in the market for some time. 
Batchelors were also aware from their own development work that the* 
technical process on which Quick Custard was based had become 
considerably simplified, a factor which would stimulate the entry 
of competitors. 
The next stage in the marketing process. was to move away from the 
controlled conditions of testing, and discc, ver how the product performed 
" in the marke place where circumstances are invariably different from 
the unavoidably artificial testing methods which are used to forecast 
the acceptability of a product in the first instance .1 
Test marketing in a television area is the conventional method of 
assessing the performance of a product in a real-life situation before 
the larger expense of the national launch is incurred. As is well 
known, however, test marketing is a long laborious process which may 
last up to nine months or a year, and which has several important 
1Batchelors, however, also undertakes the Marketing Mix Test which is 
an intermediary stage of research between the individual tests under- 
taken on formulation, pack, name, price, advertising and so on, and 
testing in the market place. It has been designed to test consumer 
response to the whole marketing mix rather than the individual 
elements. See 'Marketing Mix Test', K. -Clarke (Marketing Services 
Manager, Batchelors) and M., Roe, 1977, Market Resarch Society 
Conference Proceedings for further details. 
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drawbacks. In particular, it enables competitors to find out 
about the forthcoming national launch of a product, as had occurred 
in this instance, enabling them to intensify their promotional 
activities in the particular area, and buy up the product. These 
competitive tactics often effectively invalidate the test market 
findings. In addition, it may be difficult to achieve adequate 
distribution in a test market because national multiples often 
refuse to stock a product in a selection only of their branches, 
etc. Despite these acknowledged disadvantages of test marketing, 
it persists because firms are anxious to use any method, even if 
imperfect, in order to reduce the risks of a full-scale launch. 
In place of the normal procedure of test marketing in a television 
area Batchelors employed an alternative method of making a 
preliminary judgement of Quick Custard under more realistic 
conditions - the mini-Van Test' - operated by Forecast Market 
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Research Ltd. ' Although this method diverges in many important respects 
from an area test market, nevertheless experience has shown over a 
number of years that its results provide a reliable guide to a 
national launch. Besides being comparable in predictability to a 
test market area the Mini-Van test has the advantages of speed,, 
economy, and confidentiality. These assets were particularly 
valuable to Batchelors with their knowledge that a competitor was 
about to introduce a similar product. In the Mifi-Van test, Quick 
Custard expanded the total custard market by over 10 per cent. 
-The major features of'a Mini-van test are: (1) sales are made from a 
van and not via shops; (2) a panel of 1000 housewives is utilised 
instead of the random selection, of shoppers in a test market area; 
(3) these housewives see details of a new. product for the first time 
by means of magazine advertising in The Home Shoppers Gazette, sent 
to every panel member each month; (4) test completed usually in 16 
weeks. 
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Moreover, the brand was purchased by 23 per cent. of housewives in only 
11 weeks and, most important, a high level of repeat sales was 
achieved. In view of these encouraging signs from the Mini-Van test, 
the firm decided to introduce the product nationally in order to be 
first in the shops. This took place in March 1978. Brown & Poison 
followed with their launch of Instant Custard three weeks later which 
Batchelors believed was earlier than had been planned in their 
original test marketing programme. 
6 
Firms are eager to be ahead of their rivals in the market with a new 
product because of the quicker trade distribution and consumer trial 
" this normally ensures. This factor alone, however, is unlikely 
to sustain sales unless the product itsalf has also proved 
satisfactory to consumers. 
Between March 1978 when Batchelors Quick Custard was launched 
nationally and December 1978 some £600,000 was expended on 
" promotion and marketing. Sixty per cent. of this sum was spent on 
television advertising, 20 per cent. on price reductions to the trade; 
and 20 per cent* was expended on consumer promotions. The consumer 
promotions comprised flash offers of '2p off' on the pack and 
couponsr in advertisements which enablatconsumers to buy at a 
reduced price. In addition, trade press advertising, display 
material and in-store demonstrations amounted to some E4-5000. 
To encourage smaller retailers to stock Quick Custard, a promotion 
designed specifically for voluntary groups and independent grocers 
included samples of the product, and a leaflet which gave details of 
i 
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the sales promotion campaign and incorporated a 25p. off coupon 
to encourage trial purchase. 
Once Quick Custard was launched nationally sales expanded very 
rapidly, particularly in the second half of 1978. Its major effect 
to expand the total custard market. The entry into the 
mpsket of two brands of instant custard almost simultaneously had 
little effect on the sales of custard powder; canned custard sales 
have however been adversely affectedl _ ýa 
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Table. 4 
Share of Custard Market (Value) July-December, 1978 
Custard Powder 53 
Canned Custard 22 
Quick + Instant Custard 25 
100 
Source: Trade estimates 
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In early 1979 the predicted entry of Bird's into the instant 
custard market took place, and immediately sparked off intensive 
price cutting by all the brands in the market. This situation was 
accentuated further by the introduction of some power-prized brands, 
some of slightly lower quality, as well as distributors own brands. 
This competitive situation has led to increasing emphasis by all 
the major manufacturers on promotional expenditure at the expense 
of advertising, 'particularly trade deals and consumer promotions. At 
the end of 1979, for instance, Batchelors offered a marked pack 
promotion with 2p. off with the purpose of maintaining competitive 
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prices in smaller accounts and also the independent sector of the 
grocery trade. 
By the beginning of 1980 the total custard market had declined still 
further in. volume compared with 1979 as had sales of canned and 
traditional powder custard, whereas in volume instant custard 
powder had expanded by 50 per cent. 
Table 5 
Volume Performance of Custard Market 
1st. Quarter 1980 v. 1st Quarter 1979 
Index 
1st Quarter '79 100 
Total custard powder 88 
Instant custard powder 154 
Canned custard 82 
Traditional powder 84 
Source: Trade estimates 
Over the same period the relative share of the different types of 
custard on a servings basis were: powdered custard 85 per cent; instant 
custard 12 per cent; and canned custard 3 per cent. which would seem' 
to suggest that there still exists ample scope for the expansion of 
instant custard powder. 
As at March 1980, within the instant custard market, each of the three 
leading brands - Batchelors, Bird's, and Brown & Poison - had some 
20-25 per cent. share of the market; while Bird's had an additional 
I 
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25 per cent. share. through its segmentation into flavoured instant 
custards. The remaining 10 per cent. of the market was divided 
between the smaller brands and DOBs. The relatively small, share of 
the market held by DOBs to date is hardly surprising in view of the 
severe competition which has occured between the major manufacturer 
brands, particularly in trade discounts to individual retailers. 
In this marketing situation, the low prices of manufacturer )rands 
has not provided the opportunity for multiple organisations to 
introduce their own brands with a worthwhile price differential. 
r 
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CASE HISTORY 7 
Product: Mr. Kipling Cakes 
Firm: Manor Bakeries Ltd. 
The Background 
The development and concept of Mr. Kipling cakes dates back to 1960; 
the brand was launched regionally in 1967, and nationally in 1970 by 
Manor Bakeries. 
In the early 1950s the Joseph Rank business was in flour milling, 
and it faced strong competition in a slowly declining market. As a 
result, British Bakeries was formed to build up a bakery chain, partly 
to guarantee outlets for flour, and partly to gain the economies of a 
more vertically integrated business. By 1960 British Bakeries had 
acquired a large number of regional and local bakery businesses. Most 
of these bakeries were selling cakes, though the type, quality, and degree 
of packaging varied widely: some were almost wholly selling 'tray con- 
fectionery' (daily delivery unwrapped cakes), some were making high quality, 
standard packaged cakes for Marks & Spencer. During the 1960s British 
Bakeries concentrated on rationalising this very diverse operation, but 
it was a gradual and difficult process because the nature of the business 
required local control. Although two small unadvertised brands of 
packaged cakes were being marketed, these had achieved only limited 
distribution regionally. 
In view of the continued slow decline in the volume of bread sales, 
the company needed to generate new sources of turnover and profit. An 
investigation conducted into the strengths and weaknesses of the company's 
production facilities, marketing advantages, and financial position 
revealed clearly that any new product should be related closely to its 
existing products. Although the company, for instance, possessed con- 
siderable production facilities they specialised in flour, and flour- 
based products. Furthermore, the main marketing assets of the company 
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comprised: a large van sales force which is essential for the distribution 
of a short shelf life product such as cake; experience in the daily 
delivery of products; and close connections with a section of the grocery 
retail trade. All these factors were equally necessary for the marketing 
of packaged cake which has a shelf life of no more than two to three 
weeks. This basic characteristic of cake marketing requires the 
operation of a carefully controlled and expensive van selling system, and 
an efficient stock rotation system. A further marketing advantage which 
stemmed from the company's experience of short shelf life products was a 
detailed knowledge of consumers' tastes. On the other hand, because 
this operation had been on a local basis, little market research had been 
undertaken either into the cake market, or into the attitudes of 
consumers towards branded cakes. 
The financial position of the company also pointed towards the 
introduction of a product which could make use of existing production 
facilities, because although investment capital was available there were 
many competing demands in the company for investment plant. A further 
factor which emphasised the value of introducing a product which could 
utilise existing resources was that the company owned one of the food 
industries biggest basic food research facilities, and some of the 
individual bakeries which had been acquired had undertaken a certain 
amount of process development work. 
The Cake Market 
Since all the preliminary investigations indicated that a future 
product should be flour-based, a short list of potential products was 
drawn up which included cakes. 
In the early 1960s the available published data and trade sources 
revealed that cakes were a large and expanding market, i. e. at that time 
it was worth more than £100 m. per annum and had been growing in value at 
about 5 per cent annually. Packaged cakes were the fastest expanding 
f-i` 
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sector of the cake market, and grocers were becoming more important as 
distribution outlets. In general the quality of the products was low, 
although firms like Marks & Spencer had helped to raise standards. The 
market was very fragmented, and included a number of Distributors Own 
Brands. The two most well-known firms in this market were Lyons and 
Marks & Spencer. 
Several important conclusions were reached about the basic require- 
ments bf the proposed new product from the economic analysis which had 
revealed the growing importance of cake sales through grocers, particularly 
through multiple grocers and supermarkets. Since this distributive 
sector pursued a merchandise policy of limiting the number of brands 
stocked in any particular product field to avoid product duplication, 
this implied that supermarkets would be more prepared to stock a brand 
of cakes if it included a complete range of cake types. Furthermore, 
the short shelf life of cakes would make a large and efficient distri- 
bution system essential. The ability to provide both these requirements 
seemed to be factors which favoured British Bakeries more than, say, 
Cadbury, who had entered the cake market on a test basis in 1963. 
The predominant position occupied by Distributors Own Brands and 
supermarkets also suggested that the lower prices of DOBs compared with 
national brands would lead to pressure on profit margins, and this 
pressure would be further accentuated by the buying power of the super- 
market groups. This feature of the market suggested the need to build 
up a strong national brand which could rely on continuous consumer demand, 
to persuade retailers to stock it. 
If the policy was adopted of establishing a national brand this 
would. be a departure from the firm's traditional daily delivery of cakes, 
both tray confectionery and packaged cakes, tied to bread distribution. 
Although the latter had certain advantages over a national brand - 
greater flexibility, shorter production runs, closer personal links with 
retailers - it suffered from the major disadvantage of higher distribution 
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costs. Besides' economies of distribution, a national brand had several 
other advantages over daily delivery of cakes, namely, a larger number 
of stockists, and economies of large-scale production which would enable 
consistent production to higher quality standards, better quality control, 
improved packaging and more advertising. Perhaps, of most importance, 
a national brand would provide the opportunity to build up profit margins 
in the long run based on consumer demand. ' 
In the early 1960s several significant developments took place in 
the packaged cake business which helped to intensify the competition in 
an already competitive, although expanding market. 
(1) DOBs were expanding their share of the market; 
(2) The Bakery Division of Lyons, the brand leader, was restructured 
and this led to the introduction of aggressive sales promotion techniques, 
and a vigorous drive for improved distribution; 
(3) After test marketing their range of cakes in 1963, Cadburys expanded 
into national distribution in 1965, and supported this launch with sub- 
stantial advertising expenditure. This range was deliberately priced 
higher than Lyons range of cakes; promotion was based on product 
quality through the claim that all the products were made with butter; 
(4) The McVities division of United'Biscuits introduced a range of cakes 
onto the market in 1965 with very little advertising, but a large expen- 
diture on merchandising at trade level. By 1967 the claimed turnover 
had reached E8 m. per annum. 
In view of these competitive developments, plus the fact that many 
other large grocery companies appeared to be considering diversifying 
into the packaged cake market attracted by its present and potential 
size, and a relative absence of brand loyalty, the decision was taken 
that the company should introduce a new brand on a worthwhile scale 
nationally as quickly as possible. 
Taking into account the analysis of the market, and of the company's 
assets, when in 1965 the decision was made to introduce a national brand 
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of higher quality packaged cakes suitable for display it seemed 
inevitable. Entry into this market offered more opportunities for 
product differentiation than bread. The company could capitalise on 
its existing skills and advantages. The data suggested, moreover, that 
this market could provide many opportunities for expansion, especially 
if economies of scale could be made in production. Entry into this 
market at this stage could enable the brand to get established, partic- 
ularly in multiple grocers, before it became dominated by a few large 
brands. 
The Product 
The consumer research findings - published and commissioned - helped 
to form a picture of the cake market, and the consumers' attitudes towards 
cakes. 
Attwood panel data revealed the breakdown of buying by product types, 
shop type and brand. Swiss rolls, for instance, constituted only a 
modest section of the market and was dominated by Lyons. . On the other 
hand, 'small cakes' were the largest as well as the most fragmented 
section of the market, with no major brand specialising in it. 
Survey data, including the National Food Survey and an Odhams Survey, 
provided some basic facts on who eats cakes and at what meals. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, it emerged that adults were' responsible for a 
larger share of this market than children, and that appreciable quantities 
are eaten as the last course of the meal. 
Large-scale research into cooking attitudes, carried out by British 
Market Research Bureau in 1961, revealed how housewives viewed cakes, and 
the kind of competition that packaged cakes would face from home-made 
cakes. The research showed that home-baking, more than other forms of 
cooking, appealed to the pride and creativity of housewives, and was 
particularly linked with prestige and hospitality. There was also 
evidence of a trend to lighter, fancier cakes, usually made from recipes, 
t 
167 
whose visual appeal was particularly important. There was a very strong 
feeling that home-made cales - baked by one's parents or grandparents - 
are the ideal! As a result, bought cakes were considered as dull, and 
there were misgivings about putting a bought cake on the table if friends 
came to tea. 
Small-scale attitude research, 'group discussions and individual 
interviews, plus observation added to this information. 
Prejudice still existed against bought cakes even from regular 
purchasers ("dry", "stale", "too'long in shops"). Cakes are appreciated 
more for their appearance and taste than for their food value. Group 
discussions also revealed strong feelings about cakes as a treat rather 
than a food, and cakes from the local baker were preferred to those from 
the large manufacturer. A distinction was also made by consumers 
between 'modern' and 'traditional' cakes. The latter referred to the 
kind of cakes that could easily be made at home and had been for many 
years, e. g. sponge cakes, fruit cakes, jam tarts. 'Modern' referred to 
fancier, more unusual cakes, especially those unlikely to be made at 
home, e. g. almond slices, mini-rolls, battenburg. Although this dis- 
tinction was not very precise, it did again denote the preference for 
home-made cakes rather than those made in a factory. 
The research further emphasised the importance of the visual senses 
in judging cakes, and that they appeared to be judged in a visual 
sequence. First, the top of the cake symbolised the home-made cake - 
it must not be too regular. Secondly, a cut is made into the cake in 
order to judge its texture and freshness. Finally, a second cut is 
made into the cake, and this produces the first piece of cake which is 
placed on the plate, ready to be picked up and eaten. If all these 
stages are negotiated satisfactorily the cake tastes good before it 
reaches the mouth. 
- When this research into consumer attitudes was combiped with the i 
initial research into the market, it was possible to outline the 
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essential features of the new brand, and the marketing policy required 
to launch it. 
Marketing Policy 
The brand should comprise a complete range of cakes available 
nationally. At that time, Lyons were selling seventy lines; and there 
were at least thirty-five lines which had a reasonable level of sales. 
Some twenty lines were considered to be the minimum feasible number for 
a full cake range. 
The cakes should be of higher than average quality. Within the 
product range, there should be concentration on small cakes for several 
reasons: they held a large share of the market; they were popular with 
'heavy' cake buyers; they offered scope for innovation, process develop- 
ment and brand specialisation; and this segment of the market had been 
neglected by its competitors and was still dominated by bakers' cakes. 
Furthermore, efforts should be made to produce 'non-standard' rather 
than the 'standard' cakes included in virtually all manufacturers' ranges, 
e. g. cherry cake, jam'and cream sponge, since this policy would avoid 
direct competition with other firm's ranges. (When they were launched 
initially Almond Slices and Manor House cake were unique to Mr. Kipling. ) 
Production should be concentrated into a small number of units to 
gain the economies of-scale. 
on pricing policy, this would, to a large extent, be determined by 
the price leader, Lyons. Although Lyons' prices were above those of 
most minor local brands, they were extremely competitive. The prices 
of Cadbury's cakes were higher than those of Lyons; the firm was selling 
a quality product, backed by the Cadbury name and heavy advertising. It 
was decided that initially Mr. Kipling's prices should be comparable to 
those of their competitors, although eventually they might justify a 
marginally higher price than Lyons on'some lines through a quality appeal. 
On distribution, the maximum use should be made of the company's 
distribution facilitation (a) by utilising the existing bread delivery 
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system, and (b) by establishing a specialised sales force based on the 
company's existing cake sales force. This would be necessary to ensure 
that the economic advantages (i. e. larger drops) of selling to larger 
stores would be achieved, because distributing through such retail outlets 
required van salesmen to merchandise the cakes. 
Finally, the economies of distribution and production, plus somewhat 
higher prices should be utilised to finance higher quality cakes, 
advertising, and improved packaging that would help to extend the shelf 
life. 
Product Quality, Packaging, Advertising 
In order to satisfy the basic conditions of the cake market (that 
it was competitive, that a range of diverse products was required, that 
it mould be difficult to demonstrate easily the difference between the 
brand and its competitors, even if new types of cakes were introduced) 
it was decided that the brand would only succeed if it could be made 
distinctive. As a result, product quality, packaging, advertising and 
display material were employed in a variety of ways, but with the one 
objective of conveying to consumers that the brand provided better value 
for money than other brands. 
Product quality was enhanced by improving the consistency of quality 
by modifying recipes and introducing new machinery; new materials and/or 
new types of sealing were used to improve the shelf-life and protection 
of cakes; and new products were introduced to fill the gap which existed 
in the market between puddings and cakes. 
Although the company believed that product quality would be the 
basic factor in ensuring consumer acceptance, the importance of the visual 
aspects of cakes required to be reflected in the name of the product, the 
design of the pack, and the advertising. The company also wished to 
convey the distinctive features of the brand, i. e. that it was made by a 
specialist cake firm as opposed to a manufacturer, that it was made by 
._ 
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traditional methods but on up-to-date machinery, and that it contained 
high quality ingredients. 
The name of the product was also required to be suitable for a range 
of cakes partly because there is a rapid rate of change in cake types 
since people like variety, and partly because no single line would justify 
sufficient advertising expenditure to establish it. The name finally 
chosen - Mr. Kipling - apparently 'came in the bath' because it suggested 
a specialist company, somewhat traditional, giving personal attention. 
Research confirmed that housewives were ready to believe that a man 
could make cakes better than they did, as long as he was doing it as a 
full-time job, and they thought the name intriguing and different. 
Besides the basic requirement of packaging""that it should protect 
and preserve the product, the pack was designed with lettering and with 
an appearance that would distinguish the brand from its competitors; an 
unusual feature was the handle intended to convey the idea of cake as a 
treat or a gift rather than food; a large picture on the pack showed a 
cake with sections cut from it already for picking up and eating, and 
showing the inside of the cake to demonstrate its texture and moisture; 
and tear strips for ease of opening. 
Finally, the major aim of advertising was to re-inforce the theme 
of the name and pack. As a result television was selected. as the most 
appropriate medium because it could best express the characteristics of 
the brand, and especially the visual appeal of cake, e. g. the advertising 
film showed close-up pictures of cakes being cut into sections ready for 
eating, and a voice-over talking about 'Mr. Kipling' made the point 
that he was a specialist cake-maker. Thus all the aspects of the 
presentation of the brand including pack design, display material letter 
headings, van livery, salesmen's uniforms were integrated in order to 
create a consistent and cumulative symbol. The vans, for instance, 
provide a valuable moving poster advertisement. 
/ 
171 
The Regional Launch 
In 1967 the regional launch took place with the setting-up of a new 
company, Manor Bakeries, a new brand, Mr. Kipling, and a new range of 
twenty-one cakes. This was a compromise between a national launch which 
would have required fundamental changes in the organisation and operation 
of the company, and a small test market which was an unrealistic alter- 
native in view of the company's commitment to market entry as soon as 
possible. As a result, London and the South-East was chosen as the 
starting point for a national rolling launch which would establish the 
brand and forestall potential competitors. After a short period in 
London it should be possible to correct any major faults that cane to 
light and utilise the London experience in other areas. 
The regional launch of Mr. Kipling was accompanied by television, 
press and poster advertising, and trade promotional activity. It 
stimulated vigorous competitive opposition from its competitors, , 
particularly in the form of price cutting; opposition was very intense 
from McVities which was now the second brand in the market. 
Although sales started to grow quite rapidly as distribution was 
achieved, it was evident from an early stage that things were not going 
according to plan. Sales volume per van were below target, and the 
company was not meeting its financial objectives. In view of the elaborate 
logistical exercise which had been involved in making the launch, perhaps 
this was not altogether surprising. An immediate reappraisal of the 
situation took place, and it became clear that the difficulties that were 
being experienced in making the most efficient use of capital investment 
in plant, equipment and vehicles had been under-estimated, as well as 
some of the start-up costs. In addition, ingredient costs were higher 
than had been forecast. 
Steps were taken to remedy these weaknesses: several lines that 
were completely uneconomic were withdrawn; improved production techniques 
were introduced; packaging costs were reduced by simplifying packaging 
i 
and packaging material, e. g. handles on packs were eliminated from some 
products, and film introduced in place of board on others in order to 
remain competitive; and formulae were modified on some cakes to reduce 
ingredient costs. 
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Retain audit data on distribution had been bought at intervals since 
the launch and showed an unsatisfactory state of affairs. In an area 
of the country dominated by multiple grocers, the distribution of Mr. 
Kipling cakes showed a relatively marked bias towards independent outlets. 
This was due to the refusal of some retail grocery chains to stock the 
brand because they found regional operations an inconvenience; other 
chains showed little interest in stocking cakes. An analysis of the 
van-selling operation revealed that drops below a certain level were 
uneconomic, and in the regional launch area a high proportion of drops 
were unacceptable. 
Two. key factors needed to be corrected: the relatively low level 
of sales due to the above factors meant that plant was working well 
below capacity with consequent disproportionately high overheads. To 
overcame this problem sales were increased by extending the launch area 
in 1968 to Lancashire, and a limited area of the north Midlands. This 
was done with minimal advertising support, and resulted in a valuable 
addition to sales. The second key factor was distribution. Journeys 
were realigned, field supervision tightened and numbers of salesmen 
increased. Intensive efforts were made to obtain better distribution 
in multiple stores in order to increase the size of the average drop. 
Perhaps, most important, it became clear that ,a more pragmatic 
approach was needed in the relative deployment of the specialised delivery 
system and the firm's bread vans. Bread vans, for example, were success- 
fully used for distributing Mr. Kipling when the launch was extended in 
January 1969 to the South West, a region notoriously difficult for van 
sales of many products owing to the few major population centres and 
extended communications. As a result, local bakeries bread vans began 
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to account for a substantial share of sales once administrative and inter- 
company problems had been solved. 
Finally, significant improvements in manufacturing techniques 
occurred when Mr. Kipling moved from its original factory which had proved 
uneconomic to three highly automated factories. 
Early in 1970 distribution was extended by stages into the. rest of 
the country. As the competitive situation in the cake market intensified 
and multiple grocers appeared increasingly reluctant to stock additional 
brands of cakes, it was considered essential to extend distribution as 
quickly as possible in order to gain entry into those major multiples who 
had refused to handle the brand as long as it was only distributed regionally. 
The planned expansion of Mr. -Kipling was slower than had been anti- 
cipated due to the changes and modifications, already noted, which it had 
been compelled to make in the operation of its business in response to 
tight retail margins and intense competitive activity. However, by 1972 
five years after entering the market - Mr. Kipling had become the second 
brand behind Lyons but ahead of McVities and Cadburys (the cake sections 
of which had merged in 1970).. During this period Mr. Kipling had become 
the brand leader in the small cakes section, and had also expanded its 
number of lines from twenty to around forty, with more in various stages 
of development. More important, its financial objectives were being 
achieved. 
During the 1970s the marketing situation in the cake market changed 
in several respects: 
1. An increasing percentage of cake sales were being sold through 
grocers., and particularly through large grocers. 
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TABLE 1 Cake Market 
Changing Pattern of Distribution, 1961-76 
fO T l 
Year 
ype o ut et 
1961 1966 1976 
Grocers 33 39 47 
Bakeries 54 46 35 
Marks & Spencer 6 6 7 
All other outlets 7 9 11 
Source: Trade estimates 
2. While the cake market was relatively static during the 1960s, 
during the 1970s cake consumption declined by some 38 per cent. The 
decline from 4.58 oz. per head in 1969 to 2.85 oz. per head in 1976 has 
been due to a combination'of factors including the growing emphasis on 
slimness; the changing social pattern of life which has eliminated to 
a large extent, the formal high tea; a revival in home baking of cakes 
due to relative increases in cake prices based on fluctuations in flour 
prices. 
3. Competition in the cake market has intensified from two main 
sources, i. e. the introduction of frozen cream cakes which by 1978, held 
6 per cent of the total cake market; and the stabilisation in sales of 
bakers' sales. The latter had declined by some 10 per cent between 1966 
and 1971, but their share stabilised by the mid-1970s through the active 
promotion of the sale of fresh cream cakes in conjunction with the Milk 
Marketing Board. (On the other hand, the share of the market held by 
DOBs has declined chiefly through the fall in sales of Co-operative 
Societies' own brands, and the tendency of several other multiples to 
give more emphasis to branded cakes. 
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_ TABLE 2 Share of Cake Market of Different Kinds of Cakes 
1978 
Frozen cakes 6 
Fresh catering packs 2 
Loose cake '(bakers' own) 32 
Own label cakes 15 
Branded cakes 45 
Source: Mintel 
Within this declining and competitive market the sales of packaged cakes 
have continued to grow, and the sector of that market - small cakes - in 
which Mr. Kipling has specialised has also continued to expand (contrary 
to the experience of cut cake and sponges) as they are often eaten as 
snacks or desserts. 
In 1976 Mr. Kipling became brand leader. By 1979 it had one-third 
of the branded packaged cake market, viz. 
TABLE 3 Brand Shares in Packaged Cake Market 
1972 1978 
z z 
Lyons 26 24 
Mr. Kipling 12 30 
McVities 13 6 
Cadbury 11 6 
Hales 7 7 
Memory Lane - 4 
All others 31 24 
NB: These percentages exclude Distributors Own Brands 
Source: Trade Estimates 
The leading position established by hr. Kipling cakes appears to have 
been due to the successful implementation of the marketing policies it has 
pursued, viz. concentration in the expanding small cakes sector of the 
packaged cake market; emphasis on distribution to larger grocery outlets 
where turnover is usually faster which helps to minimise the ever-increasing 
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cost of van selling; combining, where appropriate, bread and van sales, 
again in order to make distribution more economic; and basing the 
operation of the business on the original consumer research which had 
revealed the physical and psychological qualities consumers associate 
with cakes, and presenting these in an integrated and consistent form. 
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CASE HISTORY 8 
The Product: Catalogue showroom shopping 
The Firm: Argos Distributors Ltd. 
The Background 
Argos introduced catalogue showroom shopping in seventeen showrooms 
in 1973, a method of retailing new to this country but already well- 
established in the United States and Canada where jewellery accounts for 
some 30 per cent of the turnover. The raison d'etre of this system of 
distribution is to offer a wide range of branded merchandise at competitive 
prices by effecting economies in distribution costs. 
The idea of catalogue showroom shopping had-been brought back from 
across the Atlantic by Richard Tompkins (the founder of Argos' then 
associated company, the Green Shield Trading Stamp Co. Ltd. ) who was 
seeking ways of expanding the original business. This method of shopping 
appeared to have two major assets: it would be attractive to consumers 
in the price competitive environment which had become a dominant feature 
of retail distribution in the 1970s. At the same time, it would permit 
the company to utilise and build on its existing strengths, i. e. the 
expertise it possesses in producing catalogues; the skills it had devel- 
oped in acquiring retail property, in buying, and in operating warehouses 
and retail establisbments. 
The time of launching the company was both propitious and unpropitious. 
Since the Resale Prices Act 1964 had abolished the individual enforcement 
of resale price-maintenance (RPM), price competition had been introduced 
in one type of merchandise after another. In the early 1970s there were 
however still a number of trades in which price competition remained weak 
or non-existent, e. g. toys, gardening equipment, jewellery, some sports 
equipment, because such merchandise was being sold mainly through trad- 
itional retail outlets. The opportunity existed therefore not only to 
sell products in which price competition was already widely prevalent, 
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and to compete with well-entrenched well-known retail firms, but also to 
enter product fields where price competition had hitherto been negligible. 
Less fortunately the launching of the company coincided with the oil 
crisis of 1973. The company was gratified that initial sales were higher 
than had been anticipated which indicated that the new shopping concept 
was appreciated by the public; but it was less than happy that the 
prevailing economic conditions resulted in stock shortages and led to 
rancour with the public and the press. 
Two significant changes have occurred since the company began. 
First, in 1978, the resources of Argos were combined with those of its 
then associated company. This had two consequences: eighteen of Green 
Shield's showrooms were converted to Argos showrooms in sixteen weeks 
which increased the firm's outlets by 40 per cent; Green Shield stamps 
could be exchanged at any of the Argos showrooms, with each filled saver 
book qualifying for an additional discount of 50p off the Argos discount 
price. " 
Secondly, in 1979 Argos was acquired by B. A. T. Industries Ltd., and 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of B. A. T. Stores Holdings. By the end 
of 1979 the number of showrooms situated throughout the country had grown 
to ninety-one, and turnover had reached £105 m. per annum. 
The Operation 
The major economies in this method of distribution are four-fold: 
first, the shopping system occupies less space than traditional retailing 
with a consequent saving in rent and rates. Secondly, computerised stock 
control reduces the number of staff required. Thirdly, large-scale sales 
enable bulk orders to be placed with manufacturers, which ensures that 
maximum discounts are obtained, and lastly, displaying products in showcases 
reduces pilferage. In addition, staff costs are lower than in traditional 
retailing because the catalogue replaces assistants to some extent, and 
merchandise does not require to be wrapped. Storage costs are also 
J 
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lower because many items are flat-packed, e. g. wheelbarrows and furniture 
to enable customers to transport them home easily. 
The basis of the operation is that the customer obtains a catalogue 
which can be taken home and studied at leisure from the showroom, or 
browses through one, of the catalogues available on the special counters 
in the showroom. When the customer has decided on an item a selection 
form is completed by giving details of the product, number and quantity 
required. The customer then proceeds to one of the service points where 
staff check that the order form has been completed accurately, and that 
the requested item is in stock. Then at the cash register the purchase 
is paid for by cash, cheque, or credit card. The customer finally moves 
to the despatch counter, where the item purchased is ready to be taken 
home. 
The four-sequence procedure can be completed in as little as three 
minutes because the purchasing system in the showroom is computerised, 
and in"the latest showrooms when the customer's order form is checked at 
the service point a Comet electronic stock-verification system confirms 
that the entered price is accurate, that the item on order is in stock, 
and indicates how many of that item is in stock in case the customer 
requires more than one. The facility of providing an instant stock 
balance simplifies the re-ordering of stock. The service operator's 
mini-television screen also indicates whether any items ordered are 
supplied with batteries. When the sale is confirmed a ticket is auto- 
matically produced from equipment in the stock room and a member of the 
stock room staff immediately picks the item from the stocking shelves 
and sends it to the despatch counter by conveyor belt. Depending on 
the age, or size of the showroom, other systems for stock verification 
are based on the Plessey lightpen system or a manual stock board. 
The Catalogue 
The catalogue is the major communication vehicle of this method of 
I 
retailing. The 1,800 -2,000 'lines available in the showrooms are 
illustrated in the catalogue in colour, fully described, and include 
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the code number for ordering. In addition, the shopping procedure is 
described as well as the methods of payment, and emphasis is given to 
the money-back guarantee which enables the customer to return a purchase 
within fourteen days if it is not exactly suitable. (This guarantee 
is over and above the customer's statutory rights). 
Double-pricing - the chief promotional tool of catalogue showroom 
selling - is also explained in the catalogue. Where a manufacturer has 
a recommended retail price (RRP) the lower Argos price is quoted along- 
side. In those instances where no RRP exists then Argos' suppliers 
are asked to supply a suggested national-retail-selling price which is 
based on the traditional retail margins of that product, and the retail 
price at which the product is generally being sold. Similarly, the 
lower Argos price is quoted against the comparative retail price. 
The catalogue is published twice a year in February and August. 
The print run is more than two million copies an issue, of some 230-plus 
pages. It is distributed free to customers through the showrooms. 
That a new catalogue has become available is pu1licised by window 
display and by advertising in the national press. 
The Showroom 
The average size of a showroom is 10 -12,000 sq. ft. which is 
divided in the ratio of 2: 1 between stockroom and the selling area, 
providing a smaller public area than in traditional retailing. In 
the early showrooms very few products were placed on display; k 
reliance was placed on the illustrations in the catalogue. However, 
it was soon discovered that many customers wanted to see the merchandise 
before deciding to buy. In addition, many people living near a show- 
room, as well as passers-by, visit the showroom on impulse and choose 
from the displays. As a consequence, all Argos showrooms now display 
181 
merchandise in their windows, and in glass cabinets, while large items 
are displayed on island sites. Up to 75 per cent of merchandise can 
now be viewed on display. (It is estimated that 10 per cent of 
purchases are made as a result of consulting displays. ) 
Originally, too, it was believed that showrooms could be sited off 
main shopping centres because shoppers would have selected their pur- 
chases before they visited the showroom. In view of the importance 
of passing trade, however, showrooms are now sited wherever possible in 
prime shopping sites alongside major multiples. Other important 
factors which determine showroom location are convenient parking 
facilities, and that shopping centres should serve catchment areas of 
more than 130,000 people. 
Merchandise 
The Argos catalogue offers a wide range of merchandise; textiles, 
including bedding; toys and cycles; electrical products; auto equip- 
went; furniture, including garden and office; sports goods; hardware; 
cameras and photographic equipment; do-it-yourself equipment; jewellery 
and gifts. 
Since the first catalogue in 1973 changes have taken place in the 
number and type of products stocked. Whereas initially 4,000 lines 
were stocked, these now number some 1,800 -2,000, a reduction which has 
been facilitated by the introduction of two catalogues a year compared 
with the original annual catalogue. 
The following are the main factors which determine the inclusion of 
a product in the catalogue: the rate at which it sells, and the gross 
profit generated; the amount of space that it occupies; whether it 
can be handled easily, e. g. white goods, see also below; whether 
sufficient supplies can be obtained to last the six months' life of the 
catalogue; whether it is a well-known manufacturer brand; and whether 
manufacturers are willing to supply. 
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After the first two years of operation the number of lines was 
revised drastically in four product groups, i. e. jewellery, audio 
equipment, photographic equipment, and white goods, e. g. refrigerators, 
freezers and washing machines. 
With audio and photographic equipment experience had shown that at 
the higher price level of these products consumers preferred a specialist 
shop with trained and knowledgeable staff, and where demonstrations 
could be provided. With expensive jewellery, it was evident that con- 
sumers preferred to compare a selection-of rings, and to purchase in 
more traditional surroundings! As a consequence, the firm reduced the 
number of lines stocked bf these products, and traded down to a lower 
price range. This change in stock assortment has proved -successful, 
e. g. jewellery and fancy goods now account for one-quarter of total 
sales turnover. However, once a study of the psychology of customers 
buying jewellery has been completed Argos may once more begin selling 
more expensive jewellery by separating this product from the remainder 
of the sales area, and providing service and carpeting. The basic 
difficulty of selling jewellery at reduced prices is that customers 
cannot easily judge the value of such lines. 
In 1977 the decision was taken to withdraw white goods (washing 
machines, refrigerators, freezers) from the catalogue because sale's 
were not reaching their anticipated levels on account of delivery and 
servicing problems. In 1980 a selection of white goods was once more 
introduced solely from Hotpoint, and with the delivery being made direct 
by the manufacturer, instead of via the showroom. Credit facilities 
were also re-introduced in 1980 on all purchases above £55. Other 
products which have been dropped from the product range include such 
products as rotovators which Argos customers regard as the province of 
the specialist retailer only. 
At the same time as certain lines have been dropped from the cat- 
I 
alogue for various reasons, other lines have been excluded because of 
r 
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the refusal of certain manufacturers to supply a discount operation by 
claiming that they are entitled to do this under the Resale Prices Act 
because Argos would not be prepared to stock their full range, or that 
it would not be able to provide the necessary after-sales service. As 
a result, the company has been unable to obtain supplies of certain 
sports goods, audio lines and watches from certain firms, and have 
never been able to purchase well-known brands of cosmetics. On the 
other hand, although Argos sells Citizen, Omega, Seiko and Tissot watches 
supplies are obtained from indirect sources, and not direct from the 
manufacturers. 
Promotional Policy 
The main promotional expenditure is devoted to the catalogue, 
supplemented by advertising in the press to announce the opening of a 
new showroom, and the publication of a new catalogue. 
Since the company is anxious that customers should be alerted as- 
quickly as possible to the publication of the new catalogue, advertise- 
ments take two forms. First, illustrations of a number of products 
compare the recommended price with the lower Argos price. Secondly, 
combined with the announcement of a new cagalogue, the advertisements 
include vouchers of certain values, e. g. £3 off an item costing more 
than £45. - Some of these vouchers are valid for the first six weeks 
of the catalogue; the remaining vouchers are valid for the following 
six weeks. These vouchers are therefore intended to encourage potential 
customers to visit their nearest showroom and obtain the new catalogue. 
Local press and radio are also used to announce the opening of a new 
showroom. 
The major drawback of catalogue selling is its inflexibility. 
Prices must be decided three months before the catalogue is issued to 
allow for printing and binding. Then when the catalogue has appeared, 
competitors are in a position to adjust their own prices accordingly 
I 
.- 
whereas the catalogue prices are fixed for the next six months. (To 
some extent this drawback has been overcome by marking those products 
which have been reduced in price for a limited period, or constitute a 
special offer, with a red 'Star Value' badge in the showroom, and 
advising customers to look out for these products in the catalogue. ) 
However, under rapidly-changing market conditions, e. g. VAT 
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increases, the drawback of inflexibility has been exacerbated still 
further. Since 1979, therefore, in order to demonstrate to competitors 
that Argos can respond quickly to changing conditions and reduce prices 
in order to stimulate volume, the firm has issued supplements during the 
life of a catalogue giving details of products which are available at 
reduced prices for a limited period. 
Supplements are issued midway and towards the end of the life of 
the catalogue in the same way that a traditional retailer holds a sale 
at the end of the Summer and Winter seasons. Three million copies of 
these supplements are made available in the showrooms and sometimes pub- 
licised in the daily press. The first supplement in May 1979 was also 
designed as a market research exercise to discover the potential pop- 
ularity of electronic toys before the decision was taken to include them 
in the Autumn Catalogue. An additional supplement at Christmas 1979 
substantially reduced prices of 130 out of 250 toy lines which were 
selling slowly following the ITV strike that autumn. The mini-catalogue 
issued in June 1980 had two distinctive features: almost two million 
copies were delivered to homes in the neighbourhood of Argos showrooms, 
and a further 300,000 were available at the showrooms; unlike previous 
supplements which have reduced prices for a limited period the merchan- 
dise will be sold cheaply until stocks are cleared. 
Pricing Policy and Competition 
The practice of discounting from the manufacturer's recommended 
price has been the major factor in the rapid expansion of Argos. By 
1 
9 
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1978, for instance, Retail Business (June 1979, No. 256,23) estimated 
that discount houses, principally Argos and Comet, held almost 20 per 
cent share of the trade in electrical appliances. Although it is not 
always easy to define a market, and some product fields Argos may only 
sell two or three lines, nevertheless in electrical appliances the firm 
has achieved a relatively high penetration in many products, e. g. 
electric knives, 13 per cent; food mixers 13 per cent; deep fat fryers 
12.0 per cent; coffee makers 11.0 per cent; slow cookers 10.0 per cent. 
The success of Argos and other discount-firms naturally provoked a 
price response from their major competitors, multiple electrical appliance 
retailers, and this has led to a general lowering of retail margins. In 
the Price Commission's Report (1976, No. 18,. 10) the gross margins on 
electrical appliances in different types of retail outlets were 
TABLE 1 Gross Margins on Domestic Electrical Appliances, 1975 
Small 
Appliances 
Large 
Appliances 
Mail order houses 36.4 32.0 
Electricity Boards 28.8 . 26.9 
Multiple electrical retailers 24.4 21.7 
Independent electrical retailers 
retail margins 24.0 19.8 
wholesale margins 15.0 11.1 
Department stores 19.4 14.8 
Retail co-operatives 21.1 16.8 
Discount houses and catalogue 
showrooms 18.2 15.4 
Source: Price Commission 
. 
As a result of the increase in price competition, Retail Business 
(1979,256,23) estimated that by 1979 the gross margins of multiple 
electrical retailers had declined to the level of those of department 
and discount stores. The expansion of sales through Argos and other 
discount stores has been mainly at the expense of independent electrical 
retailers whose market share has consequently been eroded. 
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Discounting from the manufacturer's recommended price has been 
instrumental in expanding Argos sales of domestic electrical appliances. 
It has probably proved an even more valuable marketing technique in 
making consumers aware of the introduction of price competition in 
product fields where it had previously been very weak or absent, e. g. 
toys, some sports equipment, watches. The comparison with a recommended 
price has provided an effective and shorthand way of publicising price 
reductions, and stimulating traditional retailers to respond to this 
competition more quickly than they might otherwise have done. 
f 
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PART 3 
A COMPARISON OF ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY WITH CASE HISTORIES OF THE OPERATION 
OF FIRMS IN THE MARKET-PLACE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Introduction 
In Part 1 the literature in economic theory concerned with adver- 
tising and- competition (theory of value, concept of consumer sovereignty, 
theory of the firm, and the theories and empirical studies on the effects 
of advertising and competition) was outlined and discussed, together 
with the literature of critics of the theory of the firm. 
In Part 3 the major findings of conventional theory on advertising 
and competition are compared with examples from the Case Histories (CH) 
in Part 2 of the operation of advertising and competition in the market- 
place, and the findings of the empirical research also outlined in Part 
2. In addition, examples will be included from the publications of 
official bodies, notably the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), 
Price Commission (PC), and Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to illustrate 
the attitude of public policy towards advertising and. competition. 
The following major aspects of advertising and competition will be 
considered: 
I The effect of advertising in practice on 
(a) barriers to entry and price; 
(b) product differentiation, and brand loyalty; 
(c) information; 
(d) retailers' brands and competition. 
II Competition under Oligopoly 
(a) oligopoly and prices; 
(b) non-price competition and oligopoly. 
With regard to the Case Histories in Part 2, it is not suggested 
that this very small selection represents a'balanced cross-section of 
products and services. Nevertheless, they do include examples of the 
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main forms of competition prevalent-in industry ranging frbm'a statutory 
monopoly (British Rail), and a duopoly (Persil Automatic) to oligopoly 
(Macleans Toothpaste, Batchelors Quick Custard, Jif Household Cleaner), 
and monopolistic competition (Mr. Kipling Cakes, and Argos Distributors). 
Some of these case histories include product areas where branding, 
advertising1 and product differentiation are most prevalent, i. e. they 
are widely distributed convenience goods which consumers purchase at 
frequent intervals, e. g. once a fortnight. Another case history 
described a product (Superfry) typical of many others, which after being 
carefully researched and rigorously tested at every stage of its develop- 
ment, failed to get established in the market place (CH 4). 
Furthermore, despite their limited number the case histories 
include many of the factors and conditions in the market which affect 
competition, the type and amount of advertising and other promotional 
expenditure employed by firms, and the different forms of competition 
besides price which help firms to compete, e. g. 
- the characteristics of a product such as short shelf life (Mr. 
Kipling Cakes); joint demand (Persil Automatic, Jif; spare capacity 
(Golden Rail); low cost limited service (Argos Catalogue Discount 
Showrooms) determine the proportions in which different sales promotions 
are combined. 
- the structure of retailing (intense competitive pressures from 
large-scale retailers as buyers and as suppliers of DOBE) affects 
pricing policies (Macleans Toothpaste), product policy (Mr. Kipling 
Cakes), types of promotions (Jif), and exerts influence over the decision 
to enter a market (Batchelors Quick Custard). 
- the changing habits, tastes and life-styles of consumers reduce 
the demand for some products, and provide opportunities for introducing 
1. Packaged food, drink, household stores, toiletries and 
cosmetics comprised approximately half of manufacturers' 
consumer advertising in the 1970s. 
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new lines (Persil Automatic, Jif, Batchelors Quick Custard), alter the 
competitive environment and encourage the entry of new firms into a 
market; 
-', changing market conditions, -e. g. the shift in the balance of 
power between manufacturers and retailers determine the price and prom- 
otional policies of firms, e. g. Temporary Price reductions, trade 
discounts, competitions (Macleans Toothpaste, Jif). 
- the threat of potential entry by other firms influences the timing 
of-entry into a market (Jif, Persil Automatic) even when there is un- 
certainty regarding the potential size, and rate of development of that 
market; 
- the specific functions performed by non-price competition (free 
rail tickets, competitions, samples) which help firms to compete more 
effectively! (Macleans Toothpaste, Jif, Persil Automatic); 
- the difficulty of delineating a market (Jif, Mr. Kipling Cakes, 
Batchelors Instant Custard, Golden Rail) which widens automatically the 
area of competition and thereby the number of competing firms; 
- rival innovations which stem from a combination of technical 
developments and the changed social and economic requirements of 
consumers (Persil Automatic, Golden Rail, Jif, Quick Custard, Argos 
Distributors) and which contribute significantly to competition between 
firms. 
I The Effect of Advertising in Practice 
(a) Barriers to Entry and Prices 
Economic theory maintains that advertising is at least as important 
as technology as a barrier to entry. Advertising is then considered as 
an additional and unnecessary factor in deterring entry, re-inforcing' 
concentration, and enabling firms to set high prices and reap high 
rewards without fear of the competitive effects. (Part 1, Bain, Cave). 
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Advertising may therefore curtail competition by putting up the cost of 
entry, and limit price competition by making demand curves more inelastic 
and lowering cross-elasticities of demand as a result. 
Macleans Toothpaste (CH 1) is a leading brand in a typical oligo- 
polistic 'industry. Four manufacturers in 1978 were responsible for 88 
per cent of turnover. Whereas in 1941 three manufacturers were respon- 
sible for 43 per cent of the market by 1973 their share had risen to 88 
per cent. For more than 30 years no new firm entered this market on a 
large scale. Advertising expenditure is high: 12 per cent of sales, 
although this proportion has declined from 18 per cent over five years, 
from 1973-77. 
As toothpaste is technically easy to manufacture, complex 
technology is unimportant as a barrier to entry. How far has adver- 
tising been effective in deterring newcomers, and in contributing 
towards increased concentration? Several characteristics of the 
toothpaste market impinge on this question. 
Although the market appears to have remained stable and static 
over several decades, many changes have occurred within it. The 
share of the market held by each of the three major firms has changed 
radically; new brands have been introduced, some of which have been 
short-lived. (CH 1, Chart on Long-Term Brand Shares). High advertising 
expenditure has apparently been ineffective in securing either stable 
brand or market shares. Furthermore, although only one major competitor, 
Procter & Gamble, has entered the mass toothpaste market, firms (large 
and smalli, have experienced little difficulty in entering the specialised 
sectors of this market, and existing successfully and profitably alongside 
the three/four giants. 
A further feature of this market has been that despite heavy and 
consistent advertising by the major firms until comparatively recently 
consumers have shown less concern for brushing their teeth with tooth- 
paste than consumers in other countries. 
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An important characteristic of this market has been the active and 
continuous commitment to research and development shown by the major 
firms. This has resulted in the incorporation of small improvements 
to existing products, and/or marketing of new brands. As a consequence 
of the high expenditure on R &'D, and intensive advertising to publicise 
product improvements, little scope has existed for a potential competitor 
to find a niche in this market. 
The determined search by existing toothpaste firms for continual 
improvements and variants to their brands, however minor, has been one 
factor in deterring newcomers. Perhaps more important has been the 
knowledge that unless a would-be entrant could introduce a major 
innovation that could not be easily copied, it would be difficult to get 
a new brand established before it was quickly imitated by competitors. 
This was the experience of Procter & Gamble. When this firm introduced 
Crest fluoride toothpaste in 1975 it had two advantages over its rivals. 
First, the introduction of the brand coincided with-a general awareness 
by the public of the beneficial effects of fluoride in preventing tooth 
decay, whereas in the 1960s when established firms introduced a similar 
toothpaste demand was so small that the brands were subsequently withdrawn. 
Secondly, the brand had received the endorsement of the dental profession, 
and this proved an important factor in commending it to consumers. 
However, both these advantages eroded rapidly as competitors like 
Macleans responded to the new competition with the introduction of 
brands of fluoride toothpaste which were also endorsed by the dental 
profession. This retaliation was accompanied by heavy advertising, 
price cutting and trade deals. This was particularly fierce because 
the brand leader feared that the experience of the American market where 
Procter & Gamble had replaced it as the brand leader might be repeated 
in this country. Although, therefore, Crest's share of the market had 
reached 9/10 per cent by 1979, 'this had been achieved at a high cost 
because of the immediate response of its competitors. 
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Three major reasons would seem to account for the high level of 
concentration in the toothpaste market. First, the R&D programmes 
of the established manufacturers have enabled them to introduce new 
brands, as well as continual improvements and variants to established 
brands, and this has forestalled the entry of competitors. Secondly, 
to date there has been the absence of a major innovation which could 
not be imitated easily. Thirdly, in a market which is now fairly 
static potential newcomers are aware that they will need to attract 
share of trade away from established firms, and that market share will 
not be relinquished readily. 
Similarly, the level of advertising expenditure on toothpaste is 
attributable to several factors: first, there has been the need to make 
product improvements and variations known to consumers as they were 
introduced. Secondly, because consumers have some twenty-five 
opportunities annually to choose toothpaste, and the unit price is low, 
they have frequent opportunities to switch brands, and therefore frequent 
reminders of the reputation of the brand are necessary. Thirdly, tooth- 
paste is a low interest product; this characteristic requiresa minimum 
threshold of advertising expenditure on television to maintain the 
position of a mass market brand (see p. 83 for the experience of Aquafresh 
where newspaper advertising proved ineffective. ) Moreover, advertising 
has been deployed to maximise sales in order to sustain economies of 
scale. Finally, the market is dominated by oligopolistic competition 
between a small number of firms none of which has been prepared to risk 
losing sales of one of its major products that might be recovered only 
by larger expenditure. 
Although no one toothpaste firm has been prepared alone to reduce 
advertising expenditure as a percentage of turnover, such a reduction 
has occurred through changing market conditions, i. e. sales through 
supermarkets have replaced, to a large extent, sales through the trad-' 
itional`channel of' distribution, the chemist. This change in the :,,. 
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pattern of distribution outlets, the growing concentration of food 
retailing among a few large-scale firms, and the intense competition 
between food retailers has led them to exert pressure for improved 
terms and trade discounts which has resulted in lower prices. Tooth- 
paste manufacturers have also competed for special retail displays and 
participation in retailer promotions by the widespread use of Temporary 
Price Reductions and Price Marked packs which again has led to reduced 
prices. As a result, reduced expenditure on advertising has been 
transferred increasingly to expenditure on Temporary Price Reductions, 
trade discounts, and other promotions in the total promotional budget. 
In 1978 the Price Commission (PC) Report on Toothpaste (HC 125) was 
prepared, perhaps reluctantly, to accept the high level of toothpaste 
advertising because it had not deterred the entry of Procter & Gamble in 
1975; the dental profession had commended the 'therapeutic' advertising 
as being more likely to persuade consumers to brush their teeth than 
informative booklets on dental care issued by the dental profession or 
health councils; through changing retail structure advertising expen- 
diture as a percentage of turnover, had steadily declined during the 
1970s and had been replaced by at least intermittent price competition; 
toothpaste prices had risen less quickly than the general rate of 
inflation between 1974-78. 
If, however, the PC had been considering the situation several years 
earlier when these marketing factors were absent, it would perhaps have 
condemned toothpaste advertising as a barrier to entry and the cause of 
high prices, as it had concluded in its Reports on sanitary protection 
products. 
In (HC 436, 'L978) the Commission concluded: 
'Consumers in the sanitary protection market are particularly 
vulnerable to a lack of real competition. They have no 
choice but to buy the products. They purchase mainly for 
reasons other than price and the prices paid reflect high 
costs of advertising and promotions ... the main effects (of advertising) in this type of market are to apportion 
the static overall market between existing manufacturers a 
i 
and to limit competition by establishing very high levels 
of expenditure as necessary to effect entry. ' (para 5.10) 
In its earlier Reports on this market (No. 9,1975, and Supplementary 
Report, No. 26,1977) it had attributed the manufacturers' practice of 
recommending retail prices (RRPs) as the cause of 'higher prices being 
charged ... in some shops than is necessary or desirable', and thereby 
inhibiting retailer competition. 
However, the Commission seemed to have overlooked certain market 
and product characteristics of this market. The description of the 
market as 'static overall', for instance, failed to acknowledge that 
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retail sales had increased between 1970-78 by 18 per cent. Furthermore, 
as with toothpaste high levels of advertising expenditure had not pre- 
vented active competition between the established firms which had led 
to changes in market shares, and the introduction of new products. 
More than one-third of the product by type had changed between 1970-78, 
and half the products in this market had not existed a few years earlier. 
Moreover, despite the level of advertising expenditure, the 
Commission itself had pointed out that a new competitor 
'. has entered the market in recent years, another 
manufacturer has made an unsuccessful attempt to re-enter. 
A further manufacturer is currently test marketing'. 
(para 2.11) 
Then a few months after the publication of the Report a newcomer entered 
the market (Johnson & Johnson) with fl m. expenditure on promotion and 
without test marketing the new product. 
The Commission had also criticised the lack of price competition in 
this market which it maintained resulted from RRPs, and recommended that 
these should either be abandoned on these products or alternatively 
reduced by 10 per cent. There was little analysis or data in the 
Report to suggest how the Commission had reached this conclusion, apart 
from-their agreement with the view"of one manufacturer who had abandoned 
RRPs '... the practice of recommending retail prices tends to put up 
I 
shelf prices'. The Commission'added: 'We share this view'.. (34,14). 
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Evidence in the Report revealed that price competition was relatively 
new on sanitary protection products: the gross margins of multiple 
firms had declined between 1972 and 1975. At the time of the Report 
the reason for the widespread adherence of most retailers to RRPs was 
that these products were still being sold predominantly through their 
traditional distribution outlet, the chemist. Supermarkets, who were 
primarily responsible for the limited price competition, stocked only a 
narrow range of fast-selling lines and. price reductions were confined 
to these lines. 
The recommendation to abandon RRPs was accepted voluntarily by 
most manufacturers of sanitary protection products. When, therefore, 
the Commission re-investigated this trade in'1977 to discover what had 
happened to retail prices, the incidence of RRPs was considerably lower. 
The Commission found that from 1975-77 the rise in retail prices had 
been at a lower rate than the rise in wholesale prices, and that average 
gross margins had consequently declined. Although the Commission, not 
surprisingly, concluded that its original proposals regarding RRPs had 
contributed to this changed market situation, it also recognised the 
effect of other market forces as well. Supermarkets and other open 
display retailers had shown little interest in stocking these products 
when they were packed in brown paper and served from under the counter. 
It had been changing social attitudes which had made it possible for 
such products to be promoted actively on open display in brightly- 
coloured packs and which had been primarily responsible for the 
increased willingness of supermarkets to stock and sell them at reduced 
prices. Unfortunately, at the very time when 'double pricing' (where 
the actual retail price is shown next to a higher reference price 
usually suggested or recommended by the manufacturer) would have been 
valuable, as has been the experience with other types of merchandise 
(see CH 8) to alert consumers that price competition was at last 
operating in the sanitary protection field, the Commission had 
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recommended the abolition or reduction in value of RRPs. 
Furthermore, the Commission's stricture '... prices paid reflect 
high costs of advertising and promotions' (HC 436, para 5.10) seems to 
have failed to take into account that lack of retailer competition (a 
consequence of the characteristics of this product group until com- 
paratively recently) had been a major factor affecting the level of 
prices. 
In several Case Histories, advertising expenditure by firms well- 
established in a market has been insignificant compared with other 
market factors in inhibiting entry, e. g. (a) the cost and organisation 
required to achieve economic and widespread distribution (Mr. Kipling 
Cakes); (b) the difficulty of predicting the speed with which rivals 
would introduce a similar product, and DOBs would appear before the 
firm could achieve an adequate return on investment (Batchelors Quick 
Custard). 
(a) Mr. Kipling Cakes. When Manor Bakeries contemplated entering 
the cake market with a brand of packaged cakes in the 1960s, it was very 
fragmented and with relatively little expenditure on advertising. The 
two best-known firms were a manufacturer, J. Lyons, which advertised, and' 
a DOB (Marks & Spencer) with no advertising expenditure; the remaining 
market share was divided between a number of DOBs, regional brands, and 
cakes'sold by bakers' shops. 
The most formidable hurdles to entry were a series of distribution 
barriers, viz. the high cost of setting up a distribution system for .a 
short shelf-life product, and operating it economically; the need to 
market a wide range of lines from the outset as a condition of being 
accepted by retailers; the knowledge that profits in this market 
would inevitably be squeezed by the lower prices of DOBs and the buying 
power of multiple food firms. 
The chief product characteristic of packaged cakes - their short 
shelf life - means that distribution necessitates a carefully controlled 
I 
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and expensive van selling system combined with an efficient stock 
rotation system. In order to achieve an economic drop it was desirable 
to sell to multiple retailers who owned the larger stores. The mer- 
chandise policy of such retailers was to stock afew brands of cakes 
only, but to offer a wide range of a particular brand. This require- 
ment prevented the firm from building up a range slowly; it was . 
compelled to begin with a minimum of twenty lines. In addition, the 
limited shelf space allocated in supermarkets to cakes indicated a 
speedy entry into this market before other competitors became well 
established. Finally, widespread distribution was essential because 
consumers appeared to show little brand loyalty towards cakes, and sales 
would therefore, to a large extent, depend on availability in the retail 
store. 
2. When Batchelors decided to enter the custard market it was in 
long-term decline because of changing economic and. social conditions, 
e. g. a growing percentage of working housewives, wider choice of sweets, 
change in taste towards lighter sweets. 
The introduction of canned custard (by Heinz, Ambrosia, and later 
Birds) in the 1960s helped to expand the total market, and indicated 
that a demand existed for a more convenient form of custard. Quick 
Custard was more convenient still because it did not require a saucepan, 
its thickness could be varied, and it was lighter to carry home from the 
shop. Batchelors possessed two important attributes to enter the 
market: (1) an efficient handling and distribution organisation geared 
to the grocery trade; (2) in the short-run it had a technical advantage 
in the formulation of Quick Custard, and the company believed that if it 
could get established first in this market competitors would find it 
less easy to achieve distribution. 
Advertising was unimportant as a barrier to entry. Although the 
manufacturers of canned custard advertised the leading brand of 
custard powder had practically ceased advertising as sales of the product 
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began to decline. The two major barriers were the intense competition 
in food manufacturing and retailing, plus the search for distinctive 
products by retailers, viz. the intense competition in food manufacturing 
caused by excess capacity and a consequent tendency for marginal costing 
leads (when products are technically simple to copy) to their speedy 
introduction by competitors followed by severe price discounting. On 
the other hand, the increasing homogeneity of supermarkets and the com- 
petitive pressures on distributive margins stimulates grocery multiples 
to seek out DOBs to sell at a lower price than the manufacturer's brand, 
but at a higher retail margin. 
The examples from the case histories reveal that a variety of 
factors influence a firm's decision to enter a"market. These include 
its financial resources, how far the product is likely to prove profit- 
able, whether the product possesses a distinguishing feature or cost 
advantage which will appeal to consumers compared with established 
products, the extent to which the market is expanding, the degree to 
which the company possesses or can acquire easily the skills and 
expertise to operate in a market different from its own (Argos 
Distributors established a new method of retailing by utilising its 
existing strengths - expertise in producing catalogues, in acquiring 
retail property, in buying, and in operating retail establishments which 
stemmed from its position as the then associated company of the Green 
Shield Trading Stamp Company). 
Finally, and in recent years an increasingly important factor in 
determining the decision to enter a market has been the ability to gain 
acceptance by retailers. This is the reason why in several Case 
Histories (Jif, Batchelors Quick Custard, Mr. Kipling Cakes) firms 
considered early entry into the market essential before retailers became 
reluctant to stock additional brands on their limited shelf-space. It 
also explains why some firms were prepared to shorten their test 
marketing period and risk having insufficient experience of their 
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product's performance in the market before launching the product 
nationally. 
In view of the wide variety of factors which firms take into 
account when deciding whether to enter a market, undue significance 
would appear to be attributed to advertising expenditure as a barrier 
to entry in public policy publications, viz. 
'... a high level of advertising by existing sellers will 
often create a significant barrier against the entry of 
newcomers into the market. Consequently, it is possible 
that high advertising may not only raise unit costs but also 
contribute to excessive prices and profits. ' 
(Parallel Pricing, l Monopolies Commission, Cmnd. 5330, July 
1973, p. 26) 
'... various forms of entry barrier have been uncovered by 
the Monopolies & Merger Commission which found that they 
were against the public interest ... A high level of expen- 
diture on advertising or other sales promotion will also act 
to discourage new entrants. ' 
(A Review of Monopolies & Merger Policy, 2 A Consultative 
Document, Cmnd. 7198, May 1978,3.44) 
The high level of expenditure on advertising and promotion 
'not only results in wasteful expenditure but also deters 
potential competitors who might otherwise provide a safeguard 
against excessive profits. ' 
(Household Detergents, 3 Monopolies Commission, HC 105,1966, 
p. 39) 
Advertising and promotion 'help to create and maintain the 
kind of market in which it is possible ... to have sub- 
stantial freedom to determine ... prices. 
' 
(Monopolies Commission, Breakfast Cereals, HC 2,1973,88) 
Furthermore, these public policy pronouncements appear to overlook 
several important factors which reduce the extent to which firms can raise 
prices. 
... 1. In an 
increasing number of markets firms face competition from 
the private brands of multiple retailers (e. g. in the case histories - 
Mr. Kipling Cakes, Persil Automatic, Macleans Toothpaste) which act as 
a restraining influence on price. 
1. All subsequent references will be to Cmnd. 5330. 
2. All subsequent references will be to Cmnd. 7198. 
3. All subsequent references-will be to HC 105.. 
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2. In many markets competition is far wider than that emanating 
from immediate rivals, because of the existence of substitutes or near 
substitutes. Jif (CH 2), for instance, competes against the whole range 
of household cleaners, including washing-up liquid. As part of the 
dessert and sweet market Batchelors Instant Custard (CH 6) is in com- 
petition with ice-cream, yoghurts, cheese and biscuits, fresh fruit, to 
name only a few items, besides competition from other manufacturers of 
instant custard, canned custard, and custard powder. Similarly, the 
sales of manufacturers of packaged branded cakes, such as Mr. Kipling, 
are influenced not only by the competition from one another and other 
types of*cakes, e. g. fresh cream cakes, frozen cakes, bakers' cakes, 
but by the wide variety of products which can substitute for cakes. 
3. In most markets the existing firms are aware that they face 
potential competition from other large firms who possess the capital and 
management expertise, besides the financial resources for investment and 
advertising should profits and/or prices become unduly high. There are 
other potential competitors who possess not only, the above requirements 
to enter a market, but in addition possess the distribution expertise 
as well. Thus Procter & Gamble entered the toothpaste market when it 
felt the market situation was propitious. Batchelors, Brown & Poulson 
and DOBs, i. e. firms with distribution 'know how' and financial 
resources for capital investment, entered the custard market when new 
technical developments presented the appropriate opportunity. 
Similarly, Golden Rail entered the package holiday market and 
offered additional competition to the existing rail package holiday 
operators, and to packaged holidays by coach in this country. 
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(b) Advertising as a Source of Product 
Differentiation and Brand Loyalty 
That advertising is a device for making the market more imperfect 
through product differentiation and branding has been an integral part 
of the literature on advertising and competition over a period of many 
years. (Part 1- Marshall, Pigou, Chase, Braithwaite, Chamberlin, 
Robinson, Lewis, Meade, Harbury, Comanor and Wilson. ) A further 
distinction is made in the literature between informative and persuasive 
, 
advertising. It is the latter in particular which is claimed to 
stimulate product differentiation, brand loyalty, the building up of 
reputations, and manipulates demand against the interests of consumers. 
It is the ability of advertising to differentiate a_product and sustain 
brand loyalty which is then claimed to result in higher prices, monopoly 
profits and excess capacity. 
Despite the longevity of these viewpoints neither the concept of 
product differentiation nor that of brand loyalty is ever defined 
clearly (Part 1, Robinson p. 20 ; Comanor & Wilson p. 20 ). There is 
also no attempt made in conventional theory to explain why if it were 
possible in practice to separate persuasive from informative advertising 
and rely entirely on the latter product differentiation would no longer 
occur. It is also not possible to discern whether the critics of 
product differentiation believe only one type of washing powder, for 
instance, should be available, or whether there should be different 
types of washing powder, but only one brand of each. There is the 
implication, however, that the differences between brands are super- 
fluous, trivial or negligible, and therefore unnecessary. 
The disapproval of product differentiation as a cause of 
imperfection in the market appears to stem from the model of perfect 
competition which requires that there are many sellers of the identical 
product or service, in identical circumstances, so that every buyer is 
indifferent between all the sellers and has no reason (other than price 
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advantage) to choose one rather than another. In practice, in all 
markets, sellers are not identical for reasons of geography, personality 
and, above all, the different and varying needs of different buyers. 
Product differentiation, therefore, occurs because consumers are not 
homogeneous and have different preferences, requirements and incomes 
which change over time. As a result, manufacturers find it worthwhile 
to provide variations in price, size, 'quality, packaging, convenience, 
flavours, durability, service, design, and comfort to meet the require- 
ments of different groups of consumers. Similarly, retailers too cater 
for the varying needs and preferences of shoppers by competing not only 
on price, but also on the quality of their merchandise, the width and 
depth of their ranges, the degree of credit available, the extent of 
their delivery service, the amount of personal service they provide, 
their car parking facilities, the thickness of their carpet, and the 
provision of fitting roams. 
Product differentiation to the manufacturer and retailer is the 
attempt to distinguish their product or service from that of their 
competitors, typically by making changes in it that will identify it as 
different and preferable and that will appeal to sufficient customers to 
make it economically viable. 
Moreover, product differentiation occurs automatically through 
changes in technology and tastes which take place over time. Argos 
Distributors (CH 8) introduced a new form of retailing because of a 
technical development, i. e. computers, legislation, i. e. Resale Prices 
Act 1964, and the increasing price awareness of consumers. Lever Bros. 
(CH 5) developed Persil Automatic to meet the needs of consumers who 
were acquiring a new type of washing machine which required a detergent 
with a formulation different from those currently on the market. Jif 
(CH 2) was developed as a replacement for traditional household cleaners 
which were proving unsuitable for the new kinds of surfaces, i. e. 
laminates and stainless steel being installed in homes during the-1950S. ` 
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Quick Custard (CH 6) was marketed in response to changing styles of 
living and tastes which had created a demand for more convenient sweets 
and desserts. Golden Rail -a packaged holiday combining rail travel, 
taxi and hotel - was a response by British Rail to the growth in car 
travel at the expense of the train, and the expansion of the packaged 
holiday trade, particularly abroad, during the 1950s and 1960s. 
To some extent then product differentiation can be viewed as a 
competitive device. Established firms develop new products in order to 
meet changing demand, and to forestall the entry of competitors. Firms 
outside an industry are constantly looking for the opportunity to fill 
segments of the market which changes in technology or tastes have 
created, but which established firms may have overlooked. Product 
differentiation may thus provide a means of entry into a market (e. g. 
Argos Distributors, Quick Custard) which at the same time intensifies 
competitive pressures on existing firms by giving consumers additional 
choice. 
Product differentiation also serves other purposes. To many con- 
sumers an established brand with which they have become familiar offers 
security (as Robertson (1958) explained: 'There is real spiritual 
comfort in buying a pack of cocoa rather than a shovelful of brown powder 
of uncertain origin'), and saves time in selecting and decision-making 
because its quality and performance are known. 
Similarly, the time and cost of retailers and wholesalers can be, 
reduced by a brand of a known standard and performance, and the rate of 
stockturn increased. When Persil Automatic (CH 5) was originally test 
marketed under the name Skip, retailers were reluctant to stock it 
because the potential market only justified a small expenditure on 
advertising. With limited distribution consumers experienced difficulty 
in finding and trying the product. When, however, it was subsequently 
test marketed under the 
name Persil Automatic, again with little 
expenditure on advertising, retailers readily stocked it because of its 
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association with a long-established brand name with a high reputation, 
and consumers were also willing to try a product with a brand name 
similar to one with which they were familiar. 
With a retail discount firm such as Argos Distributors (CH 8, p. 177) 
one of the chief criteria which determines a line's inclusion in the 
catalogue is that it should preferably be a well-known manufacturer 
brand, since customers can then more easily identify a price reduction, 
and such lines have a faster stockturn which leads to economies in 
operating costs. 
The ease with which branded products can be identified by consumers 
serves two further purposes. It permits the consumer to avoid a product 
in the future should it have been found unsatisfactory or unsuitable 
(Part 2, CH 4). Branding also acts as an incentive for manufacturers 
to ensure constant quality of their products, since their long-term 
success depends upon satisfied customers making repeat purchases. 
The fundamental aim of branding is to assist the manufacturer to 
build up a reputation for the value and performance of his product and/ 
or name in order to secure a degree of consumer 'loyalty' which will 
enable the advantages of present-day technology to be achieved, i. e. 
economies of scale and lower unit costs. 
'Loyalty` is composed of several elements including habit, inertia, 
and irrationality which may persist for a time when the original reasons 
for them have passed. It is a measure of the rate of turnover of 
customers. It is also a way of blunting price competition by substi-. 
tuting other sales incentives for price reductions which may be imitated 
too readily. The economies of 'loyalty' are twofold (Lewis, 1949): 
(a) the economies of quantity buying; (b) the economies of regularity. 
The importance of the economies of 'loyalty' have been accentuated 
through the need of many manufacturers to secure the, potential economies 
of large-scale operation and lower unit costs. Firms cannot get an 
economic return from high capital investment unless sufficient customers 
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can be attracted with sufficient regularity. This means that shoppers 
must be able to identify a firm's products, and encouraged to make 
repeat purchases if they have been satisfied. 
Brand loyalty is a more limited concept than the implication of 
conventional theory that advertising is capable of persuading consumers 
to purchase a product blindly and permanently. It is also more limited 
than the 'management of demand' thesis of Galbraith (Part 1, p. 42 )'who, 
unlike conventional theory, accepted the prevalence of oligopoly as 
inevitable but who propounded that it was the dominance of the large 
corporation in the modern economy which had eroded the sovereignty of 
the consumer. According to this proposition advertising is employed to 
shift the decision to purchase from the consumer to the firm because 
the market has become incompatible with the operation of the large 
corporation and the high financial risks associated with modern production 
techniques which has lengthened the period from the initiation of the 
product to its purchase by consumers. Consequently, large corporations 
manipulate markets, and hence consumers, through the employment of a 
wide variety of sales promotion techniques. The large firm ensures 
the disposal of whatever products it has decided to make. 
In practice, advertising represents an effort to ensure more 
'loyalty' than might otherwise exist in a market situation where 
producers are vulnerable to the competitive inducements of rivals, and 
the widening of the number of alternative choices available to consumers. 
Furthermore, although advertising may successfully stimulate the initial 
purchase of a product, it is less capable of encouraging the consumer to 
make a repeat purchase if the first has proved unsatisfactory (CH 4). 
The changes in market shares which take place over short periods in 
apparently stable markets (CH 1), also testify that consumers continually 
switch and experiment with different brands. Nor can advertising over- 
come incorrect timing of the launch of a product, e. g. the introduction 
of fluoride toothpaste in the 1960s by three well-known firms was 
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unsuccessful, because at that time, consumers were uninterested in the 
properties of fluoride. Jif was originally introduced in the early 
1960s when few people had acquired the new surfaces for which it was 
suitable; as a result it was soon withdrawn from the market. 
In public policy pronouncements there appears little awareness that 
product differentiation is an attempt to meet the varying preferences 
of consumers. The MC (Cmnd. 5330,1973) took the view that in oligopoly: 
'Costs may be higher, firstly, because the factors that 
inhibit sellers from engaging in active price competition 
may encourage them to compete in other ways, for example 
in advertising or in minor product styling changes. ' (p. 26) 
Then in the Consultative Document (Cmnd. 7198,1978) a distinction is 
made between worthwhile and undesirable product differentiation: 
'... while the new and better products which are one of the 
objectives of innovation are usually desirable from the 
customers' point of view this will not always be the case: 
planned obsolescence and minor styling improvements can be 
wasteful and may even operate to discourage competition. t 
(para. 3.15) 
Thus, combined, with the view of conventional theory that product 
differentiation only consists of competing brands with negligible 
differences is the planned obsolescence theory that suggests that 
existing products are deliberately made out-of-date by the introduction 
of new models with minor and superfluous differences which add little 
or nothing to their intrinsic merits. In practice, it is not possible 
to make such an arbitrary judgement between different types of product 
differentiation because although changes in a product may be slight, 
they may be valued by some consumers. Improvements in products are 
constantly being made possible by the development of new materials, new 
technology, and modifications and variations in products are made to 
meet changes in the living standards and styles of living of consumers. 
There is no means of predicting in advance which products with minor 
differences will appeal to consumers. 
The desire by economic theory and by public policy statements to 
curtail product differentiation would seem to be an attempt to oblige 
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sellers to conform more closely to the theoretical model of perfect 
competition. But insofar as this would fail to cater for the unstan- 
dardised needs and requirements and preferences of consumers, it would 
be less efficient than a less 'perfect' market. 
Public policy statements also appear to overlook the difficulty in 
practice of ensuring that consumer wants can be artificially contrived 
by advertising and other sales techniques. Mrs. Shirley Williams (then 
Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer Protection) when addressing 
the Annual Conference of the Advertising Association in May 1974, 
supported the Galbraith thesis: 
'You create demands, in many cases artificially, by 
conjuring up worlds of fantasy' 
and the EEC (1976) seemed to accept the Galbraith view as the basis of 
consumer behaviour: 
'... but can anyone refute Galbraith's assertion that in 
the relationship between producers and consumers the 
balance of power is often held by the producer, in that 
the consumer's needs are, in fact, "suggested" to him? ' (2) 
The basic weakness of the 'management of demand' theory stems from 
exaggerating the degree to which the technical requirements and planning 
implicit in large-scale production have been accompanied by an increase 
in the ability of producers to gain effective control over demand. In 
particular, many of the generalisations made about the relation of the 
modern industrial concern to the market are so extreme and sweeping as 
to render them invalid, and these generalisations are also too often 
based on a static economy. 
In this hypothetical situation manufacturers are able conveniently, 
if unrealistically, to ignore the marketing policies of their rivals and 
competition from substitute products, retailer brands and overseas firms, 
although these are decisive factors in reducing the extent to which the 
large corporation can 'manage wants'. There is increasing evidence 
r 
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from painstaking and detailed studies of economistsl that the experience 
of industry both in the UK and the USA have been inconsistent with the 
Galbraithian assertions about the economy, and the theory is also con- 
tradicted by research findings on consumer behaviour and advertising 
(Part 2) particularly the high rate of product failures and the ease 
with which consumers switch brands. 
(c) Advertising as a Means of Conveying Information 
It has been generally conceded in conventional theory that although 
under perfect competition where buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge 
there is no place for advertising, nevertheless in the real world some 
selling techniques are necessary either because information is not 
perfect and/or indivisibilities in production techniques require the 
expansion of markets. 
As a means of conveying information, however, advertising has been 
criticised on two counts. First, that expenditure on advertising is 
too high and, secondly, the information provided by advertisements is 
designed by the sellers of goods and is consequently biased. These 
criticisms have led to proposals (Part 1, pp. 22-23) that independent 
information services could be an effective substitute for advertising 
expenditure because their costs are lower (whereas advertising in 1938 
cost £68 in. the information supplied by advertising could be provided 
more cheaply, according to Kaldor, by an independent information service, 
i. e. around £14 m. ), and that such bodies would disseminate widely 
'... information about the real qualities of different 
products (which) would increase the forces of the market 
mechanism to which the producers would have to submit'. 
(Meade, 1975,49-50) 
1. Among others, Professor John Jewkes, Sir Frank McFadzean, 
Professor G. C. Allen, Professor Harold Demsetz, Professor 
R. M. Solow, Professor James Meade, e. g. G. C. Allen, Economic 
Fact and Fantasy, Institute of Economic Affairs, OP 14,1969; 
F. S. McFadzean, Galbraith and the Planners, University of 
Strathclyde, 1968; Myron E. Sharpe, Galbraith and the Lower 
Economics, Macmillan, 1973. 
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These proposals take a limited view of the functions and purpose 
of advertising because they imply that its raison d'etre should only be 
to convey information to the consumer about products already on the 
market, in the same way that the primary function of a consumer 
association is to offer comparative information on products and services. 
This viewpoint seems to be derived from conventional demand theory where 
consumer preferences are given and changes in them largely ignored. 
Moreover, conventional demand theory does not enquire into how consumers' 
preferences are formed in the first place, nor, because it is a static 
theory, does it consider changes in the composition of consumers in a 
market, e. g. the half-a-million newly-marrieds who set up house annually, 
and who are'choosing many products for the-first time. 
Examples from the case histories show that advertising is used for 
a variety of purchases, apart from conveying information about existing 
products. In conjunction with other selling techniques, advertising is 
regarded as essential for the launching of a new product, e. g. Persil 
Automatic, Jif, Mr. Kipling Cakes, Golden Rail, Batchelors Quick Custard. 
In this way consumers are made aware as quickly as possible about the 
product, its properties and its purpose, e. g. that Persil Automatic had 
been specifically formulated for owners of front-loading washing machines. 
Not only did the advertising of Jif illustrate that a cream scourer did 
not damage new surfaces like traditional powder scourers, but it also 
tried to show sceptical housewives that a cream scourer could be as 
effective in cleaning dirty surfaces and as economical as traditional 
powder scourers by publicising the manufacturers who recommend Jif for 
the cleaning of their appliances. 
Similarly, with Mr. - Kipling Cakes (CH 7) advertising was used to 
try and dispel the widely-held belief that factory-baked cakes per se 
are of a lower quality than the home-made variety. With Golden Rail 
(CH 3) advertising made known to consumers that British Rail had 
diversified into a new activity, i. e. the packaged holiday market, and 
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by offering a combination of train and taxi travel, together with 
hotel accommodation, was endeavouring to recreate the convenience of 
the car. 
With many products such as Macleans Toothpaste which are well 
established information may no longer be required; but consumers do 
need to be reminded of the brand's existence when they go shopping, 
particularly of a low cost item which is bought frequently and where 
consumers may be tempted to switch brands. 
Advertising is also necessary for a product once it is established 
in order to announce improvements or variations designed to enlarge its 
market, e. g. in 1978 Golden Rail introduced self-catering holidays, and 
extended its holiday resorts to include the Channel Islands. Furthermore, 
in order to expand turnover such products as Persil Automatic and Jif 
must be advertised continuously to ensure that newcomers who enter the 
market through the acquisition of a new type of washing machine, or of 
new surfaces in the home are quickly made aware that products 
specifically designed for their use are available. 
Many firms intensify their advertising at certain periods of the 
year, e. g. Jif at Spring Cleaning time, in order to encourage purchases 
at the time when consumption is likely. to, be highest. Similarly, Argos 
Distributors advertise twice-yearly to encourage potential shoppers to 
visit their nearest catalogue discount showroom and pick up a copy of 
the latest catalogue. 
With other products like Mr. Kipling Cakes (CH 7) market research" 
had revealed that consumers did not require information; it was the 
subjective factors about a cake - that it was considered a treat - that 
interested them. 
In addition, almost all the case histories illustrate that 
increasingly under recent market conditions firms advertise not only to 
appeal to consumers, but to a large extent to stimulate retailers to 
stock their products and encourage them to provide favourable displays. 
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In this instance, advertising can be a means of achieving a faster 
stockturn and a higher distribution penetration. . 
Besides the varied nature of advertising which a consumer 
information service could hardly replicate and which would account for 
the wide discrepancy between the costs of such a service and advertising 
expenditure, the case histories clearly show advertising as only one 
of a number of selling techniques, e. g. temporary price reductions, 
samples, trade bonuses, special offers, intended to stimulate consumers 
to try and retry a product, and which are combined in particular- 
proportions which reflect the characteristics of a product and its 
changing competitive position. The efficiency and importance of these 
selling techniques increases and diminishes according to how strongly 
manufacturers think they will appeal to consumers and retailers as a 
sales stimulant. 
Over the past decade, the different factors in the 'marketing mix' 
have been changing with the result that advertising tends to represent 
a smaller proportion of sales promotion expenditure than formerly, e. g. 
Macleans Toothpaste, Persil Automatic. 
Furthermore, there is. the implicit assumption in the proposal that 
much advertising should be replaced by consumer information services 
that the consumer relies on advertising as the sole source of shopping 
information. In practice, the empirical research shows (Part 2, p. 69 ) 
that shoppers rely on a variety of sources of information including that 
of retailers, the advice of neighbours and friends, articles in newspapers 
and magazines and previous experience. It is continuous shop talk among 
housewives which, to a large extent, helps to establish the reputation. 
of a product, and to decide how far repeat sales will be made. 
Since 1957 an independent consumer advice body has become well- 
established in this country, the Consumers' Association (CA), which 
publishes comparative test reports on a wide range of products and 
services in, -,. its monthly journal Which?. During that time the member- 
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ship has reached around 700,000 (although readership is much higher in 
the region of 3-4 m. ). Its members tend to be confined to a narrow 
range of occupations and incomes with the youthful and old under- 
represented. The difficulty CA has experienced in enlarging and 
broadening the representativeness of its membership appears to signify 
that many people find too much knowledge a dangerous thing, and the 
information sometimes more technical and detailed than they understand 
or want. 
Furthermore, there are limitations in its testing procedures which 
were pointed out by the Molony Committee (Cmnd. 1781,1962). Over the 
years, CA has made strenuous efforts to overcome the earlier criticisms 
of its test reports. For instance, to overcome the problem that 
sampling may not be representative, increasing emphasis is placed on 
user panels which simulate ordinary use as closely as possible, and the 
experience of members which are collated by means of questionnaires. 
There are also inherent weaknesses in comparative test reports and 
it is not easy to remedy them, e. g. financial constraints, length of 
time required for testing, volatile market conditions which make it 
difficult to keep up-to-date with changes in prices. 
More serious still, consumer testing procedures are conditioned 
largely by the selection of questions, and the conclusions drawn from 
testing depend on interpretation and judgement. If undue emphasis is 
given to price, for instance, compared with other sources of satisfaction 
such as convenience or the cost of maintenance, many shoppers may be 
misled. There is a tendency for the durability, price and reliability 
of products to be overvalued at the expense of styling, novelty, taste, 
security, individuality or brand name. If certain questions are 
omitted, not through negligence or oversight, but from a different 
assessment of a piece of research then the results of a report will not 
accord with the needs of consumers. Thus even seriously-intentioned 
consumer research with ostensibly objective test procedures has 
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limitations because all such testing inevitably involves subjective 
interpretations and value judgements. Such subjectivity has tended to 
be obscured because Which? no longer has a competitor with which it can 
be compared. Ever since Shopper's Guide ceased publication in 1963, 
Which? has been the sole source of comparative reports, and the consumer 
has had no independent alternative with which to compare it. Both 
Which? and Shopper's Guide, for instance, reported on electrical 
kettles and contradicted each other at some points. It was also 
possible to detect other points of disagreement running through various 
reports in the two journals, which is not surprising once the 
difficulty of devising satisfactory tests is appreciated. 
The PC Report on Southalls (HC 436) condemned the type of adver- 
tising designed to build up brand loyalty compared with the benefit to 
the consumer of informative advertising: 
'Advertising has been directed mainly towards establishing 
brand-image; informative advertising which aids the con- 
sumer has played a minor role. This marketing strategy, 
based on strong brand loyalty, and reinforced by heavy 
advertising and promotional expenditure, adds to costs. 
We accept that in recent years advertising has included 
a growing element of information to consumers, but none- 
theless, the overall marketing strategy continued to be 
designed to build up brand loyalty and thus it restricts 
competition. ' (2.11) 
Apart from the fundamental difficulty of defining 'informative' adver- 
tising in this particular market, the PC seemed to have overlooked that 
social attitudes towards sanitary protection products were not conducive. 
to informative advertising until very recently. The advertising of 
these products, for instance, continues to be banned on television. 
The Commission in fact acknowledges that 
'Market research carried out by the industry has shown that 
consumers have not sought detailed information on products 
from advertisements, point of sale material or the outside 
of product packs. Accordingly detailed information is 
mainly conveyed in leaflets inside product packs... To 
supplement this consumers are actively encouraged through 
advertisements and pack leaflets, to write to manufacturers 
for advice ... ' (2.17) 
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In other words, because of the characteristics of the product, 
information is conveyed in a more discreet manner than through adver- 
tisements, including the offer of trial by samples. 
Furthermore, the PC overestimates the extent to which advertising 
has been able to raise costs, and restrict competition because brand 
mobility rather than brand loyalty has been a feature of this market, 
and prices have risen less than the rate of inflation. 
(d) Retailers' Brands and Competition 
As a means of reducing advertising and other selling costs Kaldor 
(p. 25), like Lewis (p. 20) maintained that the distributive system 
should be dominated by the retailer, and by retailer brands rather than 
those of manufacturers. The manufacturers would supply large retailers 
(chain stores, co-operative societies) who would tell them what 
consumers wanted, and thus drastically reduce or eliminate the expense 
of manufacturer advertising because, combined with only a modest 
advertising expenditure, the retailer achieves comparable publicity by 
using his shop windows and display shelves as his principal form of 
sales promotion. Furthermore, both Lewis and Kaldor envisaged that 
the pressure of retailer-domination would lead to a reduction in the 
variety of products. Finally, Lewis distinguished retailer advertising 
as 'desirable' because it was 'informative' compared with manufacturer 
advertising which was 'undesirable' because it was combative or 
persuasive. 
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These conclusions were based on an analysis of the success of 
certain large-scale retailers in promoting their own brands (notably 
Marks & Spencer) at a time when distributive trends appeared propitious 
for their widespread introduction in product fields. 
Over the past quarter-of-a-century the 'countervailing power' of 
the retailer has arrived in many product fields. The distinguishing 
features of distribution during this period have been the increase in 
retailer concentration (see CHs 1,2,5,6), the development of retailer 
brands (see Chs 4,7), and the increasing intensity of competition 
between retailers. The growing concentration in retailing has made 
the orders of large-scale retailers, or their absence, important to 
many manufacturers. This factor, combined with excess capacity 
(particularly in food manufacturing) has meant that few manufacturers 
any longer refuse to pack private brands. In this period, too, some 
large-scale retailers have become household. names, and have built up a 
reputation for quality and competitive prices with the result that 
shoppers are prepared to try DOBs without extensive advertising. The 
increasing homogeneity of retail outlets, particularly supermarkets, 
and the competitive pressures on distributive margins has stimulated 
many large-scale retailers to seek out DOBs. These are then sold more 
cheaply than the manufacturer's brand but with a higher retail margin. 
At the same time DOBs help to differentiate to some degree, a retailer 
from his rivals, and may contribute towards an increase in 'loyalty' 
among his customers - both factors which have become increasingly 
difficult to achieve in the present organisation of retail 
distribution. 
C 
i 
Moreover, the acceptance of DOBs by the shopper has been aided by 
the favourable publicity they have received from consumer bodies such 
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as the Consumers' Association, 
' 
and the Department of Prices & Consumer 
Protection, 2 although both these bodies have also acknowledged that DOBs 
are not necessarily of the same quality as the leading manufacturers' 
brands. 
Nevertheless, the development of private brands has been by no 
means uniform across retail distribution. Wide variations exist in the 
degree of their penetration in different product groups, and even within 
a particular market. In groceries, for instance, DOBs vary from 50 per 
cent in cooking oil (CH 4), 28 per cent in washing-up liquid, and 5 per 
cent in breakfast cereals. Retailers-also differ in their policy 
towards DOBs even within a particular product field. Of the four 
leading grocery multiples, Sainsbury and Tesco sell a higher proportion 
of DOBs compared with ASDA and Kwik-Save who rely predominantly on 
stocking manufacturer brands. 
A variety of factors including product characteristics, size of 
market, and price differentials determine the extent to which DOBs are 
likely to be introduced in a particular product area. Newcomers into 
retailing, for instance, usually prefer to rely on the reputation and 
goodwill of established manufacturer brands in order to build up sales 
quickly. Similarly, manufacturer brands can be a valuable sales aid 
to the discount retailer (CH 8) because they enable consumers to 
1. 'Last year, we found that by buying own-brands ... you could 
save yourself 12p in the £ on groceries. This year, the 
overall saving fell to 81p in the E. But, with some items, 
the saving was much more than this ... Our tests have shown 
that the quality, of own-brands is often as good as branded 
versions (not always, though ... )', "Grocery Prices", 
Which?, October 1976, p. 219. 
2. A pilot survey into the Department's price monitoring scheme 
claimed that savings of up to 20p in the £ could be achieved 
... by choosing the cheapest shop and using own-brands where 
these were the cheapest in price. Circular No. 4/75 however, 
also recognised that retailers 'own brands'. were not neces- 
arily of precisely the same quality as the leading manufacturers' 
brands. 
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identify price reductions easily. 
In technically complex products such as refrigerators and television 
sets, few retailers have ventured to introduce their own brands because 
they are unwilling to undertake the necessary after-sales service. 
Furthermore, with high-priced products purchased infrequently consumers 
often look for the security of a well-known name. Where widespread 
distribution is required to maximise sales, e. g. chocolate and confec- 
tionery, razor blades, DOBs have only been introduced on a small scale. 
In a market with a relatively small turnover (CH 2) retailers show 
little interest in introducing DOBs. Similarly, if the price of the 
manufacturer's brand is very low (CH 6) then this factor inhibits the 
retailer from introducing DOBs with a worthwhile price differential 
which is an essential factor in expanding sales. On the other hand, 
DOBs are relatively easy to establish where branding cannot be a 
guarantee of a uniform product, e. g. fashion. In this area styling, 
colour, price, etc. are generally more important than a manufacturer's 
brand name. 
With certain notable exceptions (e. g. CH 7), the outstanding 
characteristic'of DOBs is that they are normally introduced once man- 
ufacturer brands have become well established in a particular product. 
For the most part, retailers seem to prefer to avoid the risk, 
financial resources, product and market research, and extensive sales 
promotion necessary for successful product innovation, ' and to concen- 
trate instead on retail innovation by exploiting their skills and 
expertise in locating sites, merchandising, buying and pricing. Moreover, 
the large-scale retailer may well gain more benefit from using his 
increased bargaining power to acquire better terms, advertising 
allowances, and promotions from manufacturers rather than by introducing 
competing products. Although, therefore, when the opportunity occurs 
many retailers introduce own brands, they continue to rely predominantly 
I 
on the sale of the leading manufacturer brands which have a high degree 
of customer acceptance, and active promotional support. 
There is some evidence, for instance, that although the degree of 
concentration in food retailing quickened during the 1970s, the 
proportion of turnover comprising DOBs declined as price competition 
intensified from 1977 onwards with the. introduction of price-cutting 
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schemes by the two leading multiples, i. e. Sainsbury and Tesco. 
l 
In 
both instances the share of the packaged grocery market held by these 
retailers increased to a greater extent through the growth of their 
sales of manufacturer brands rather than through DOBs. It seems 
possible that the price promotions of these firms have been primarily 
associated with manufacturer brands since it is easier for consumers to 
identify and compare a price reduction on a uniform product. 
Where DOBs are prominent there has been a decline in the variety 
of products as envisaged in conventional theory. Whereas retailers 
may formerly have stocked four or five brands of a product, once a DOB 
is introduced they stock the two brand leaders and replace the remaining 
minor brands by their own brand. This development has stimulated 
manufacturers to introduce their product ahead of their competitors in 
order to ensure wide distribution. It has also made it increasingly 
difficult for a new brand to-achieve distribution in an established 
product field. 
When they are introduced selectively, DOBs are profitable to the 
retailers, good value to the shopper, and act as a warning to manufac- 
turers that their marketing policies must take account of potential and 
actual competition from the brands of large-scale retailers. Although 
DOBs have become an additional competitive factor in many products 
there is little evidence to date that the success of limited categories 
of DOBs can be extended ipso facto to the whole field of retailing, or 
1. TCA/AGB Report, 1979 
f 
t 
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even uniformly across one product category such as food. As a 
consequence, the prediction that 
'By the end of the century manufacturers' brands could 
be a rarity'1 
seems unlikely to be realised, because it is based on the assumption of 
conventional theory that consumers know what they want, and already know 
the facts about products. 
Retailer Advertising 
The view that advertising and selling costs would be reduced if the 
distributive system were dominated by retailers has also not been borne 
out'in practice. Since 1970 retail advertising has been the most 
rapid growth area of UK advertising expenditure. Within retail 
advertising, expenditure by non-food retailers has expanded at a more 
rapid rate than that of food retailers. This expansion of retail 
advertising from a very low level is directly related to the radical 
changes which have taken place in the organisation and structure of 
retail distribution, viz. increased consumer mobility and leisure have 
widened the geographical area of competition. The abolition of resale 
price maintenance has accentuated the trend towards the stocking of 
specialist merchandise by non-specialist retailers, and stimulated the 
emergence of new types of retail firms who offer varying combinations 
of service and price. The homogeneity of products and shops in some 
types of products has reduced the scope for some retailers to compete 
with one another on quality or individuality, so that competition has, 
become more concentrated on range, convenience and price. The trend 
towards fewer but larger outlets has widened the range of products 
stocked by retailers. Not least, the relative growth in overhead 
costs has changed the cost structure of retailing and emphasised the 
1. Caspar Brook (then Director, Consumers' Association) in 
'Fresh Deal for Shoppers', Observer, 11 February, 1962. 
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importance of operating at full capacity as a means of giving better 
value or improving profits, and has stimulated consumer promotions and 
advertising to encourage more shoppers to enter the shop and/or increase 
the value of their individual purchases. The bargaining power of large- 
scale retailers vis ä vis manufacturers has resulted to some extent in a 
transfer of advertising expenditure from manufacturers to retailers 
through advertising allowances and additional discounts in return for 
special displays of a manufacturer's brand. 
Moreover, the new types of retail outlets such as hypermarkets and 
discount stores (e. g. furniture, electrical appliances) advertise widely 
to make consumers aware of their ranges, low prices, and convenient 
parking facilities, especially when these are located away from 
traditional shopping centres. Previously, for instance, furniture 
advertising was confined largely to local advertising by retailers and 
national advertising by the branded manufacturers. Whereas manufac- 
turers' advertising in 1976 amounted to £5.2 m. that of the three major 
retailers (Williams, MFI and Queensway) amounted in 1976 to £5.6 m. 
illustrating the change in emphasis from manufacturer to retailer 
advertising. (Fulop & March, 1979). 
Finally, in response to the varied changes-which have occurred in 
distribution, many established retailers have found it necessary to 
alter their operating methods (e. g. the establishment of voluntary 
groups in food retailing and to a lesser extent in other product areas), 
and/or extend their product ranges. Such retail firms undertake more 
advertising than formerly to alert shoppers to their adapted policies, 
to create a corporate image, to promote their own brands, and to 
illustrate their price competitiveness. 
In view of the many factors which have influenced the expansion 
of retailer advertising, the supposition that a retailer-dominated 
distribution system should lead to lower advertising and selling costs 
I 
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would seem to stem from a static concept of competition which cannot 
take into account the changes in demand and supply over time which 
affect how firms compete in the market. 
k 
JF - 
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II Competition Under Oligopoly 
(a) Oligopoly and Prices 
In the theory of the firm imperfect competition is generally 
regarded as less desirable, particularly the 'imperfection' brought 
about by oligopoly, i. e. the domination of an industry by a few firms. 
The characteristic feature of oligopoly is the diminution of price 
competition (tacit or overt) among such firms as a direct result of 
their mutual interdependence due to the awareness by each firm (unlike 
the situation in perfect competition) that its pricing policies will 
affect demand. in the market; . and -the -policies of 
its competitors. Firms 
operating in such a market structure will therefore not respond to 
impersonal market forces as in perfect competition but personally and 
directly to their rivals. The inevitable outcome of oligopoly will be 
the emergence of price leadership, with a leading firm setting a price 
and other following, i. e. parallel prices. The second inherent 
feature of oligopoly which. follows from interdependence is that firms 
will prefer to compete not by price but by means of advertising, sales 
promotion and product innovation as these are less aggressive forms of' 
competition. Since an oligopolistic market structure may encourage 
both high advertising expenditure and parallel pricing behaviour the 
forces of competition will be effectively blunted and prices and/or 
profits will be higher than the competitive level. 
Although it is generally agreed by economists that independent 
price changes under oligopoly are unlikely, particularly if demand is 
relatively inelastic and except where cost conditions have changed, 
there is less agreement whether an oligopolistic industry per se will 
have higher prices, higher profits and weak competition. Thus the 
distinction that is made between disciplined price leadership where 
rigid and sluggish prices are likely to prevail and barometric price 
leadership where prices - although more or less parallel - are more 
likely to resemble those which would emerge where there are many sellers. 
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The products in several of the Case Histories operate in oligopolistic 
markets, viz. Macleans Toothpaste, Birds Quick Custard, Jif, while 
Persil Automatic operates in a duopolistic market. 
The toothpaste market,: for instance, is characterised by oligopoly. 
Four firms were responsible for 85 per cent of turnover in 1977; sales 
promotion expenditure comprised 20 per cent of sales (of which adver- 
tising accounts for 12 per cent, and promotions for 7 per cent). 
Nevertheless, the industry is highly competitive, as is evidenced by the 
achievement of an 8- 10 per cent share by Procter & Gamble following its 
entry into the market in 1975, and significant changes in the market 
share of the other companies and brands. (See Chart of Long-Term Brand 
Shares). Brands have been introduced and then withdrawn after four or 
five. years. Macleans toothpaste, at one time the brand leader, has 
become the second brand. Boots and the Co-operative Societies have 
successful own brands, and one company, Stafford-Miller, has achieved 
significant growth in the sales of its specialised product Sensodyne. 
There is indirect price competition between manufacturers, largely in 
the form of temporary price reductions, intensified by vigorous retail 
competition as a result of which the 'real' price of toothpaste fell 
between 1973 and 1977 by 7 per cent at manufacturers' selling price 
and by rather more than this at retail prices. (PC Report, HC 125,1978). 
High advertising expenditure did not deter the entry of a new firm 
when circumstances seemed propitious; and there are other major 
pharmaceutical companies with the financial resources and distribution 
expertise to enter this market should the opportunity occur to introduce. 
a product innovation. Three further factors have helped to keep prices 
and margins down. First, there has been a major change in the type of 
retail outlet through which toothpaste is sold; whereas toothpaste was 
formerly sold predominantly through chemist shops, it is now distributed 
largely through multiple retailers, and thirteen multiple organisations 
are responsible for 50 per cent of sales. As a result Macleans has` 
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been compelled to compete with its rivals to get special displays and 
participation in retailer promotions. Secondly, the intensity of 
competition between retailers themselves has accentuated price com- 
petition. Both these factors have led to price cutting at the retail 
level. Finally, there has been the influence on price of a well-known 
DOB of a multiple chemist. 
Toothpaste is a product category with no substitutes or near sub- 
stitutes. Nevertheless, in this opigopolistic industry with high 
advertising expenditure, market conditions have reduced prices in real 
terms. (In another product category with no near substitutes, sanitary 
protection products (PC Report, HC 436,1978) the manufacturers were 
reprimanded for their high advertising and sales promotion expenditure. 
However, in this market too there has been severe competition leading 
to the introduction of new products, new firms, variations in brand 
shares, and price rises less than the overall rate of inflation. ) 
Competition in many product markets is, of course, by no means 
confined to that emanating from a firm's closest rivals. In many 
product categories the existence of substitutes or near substitutes acts 
as a constraint on prices, in addition to the pressure of competitive 
factors in its immediate market, viz. Batchelors Quick Custard (CH 6) 
competes with the wide variety of products available for sweets and 
desserts. In addition, in the instant custard powder market experience 
has shown the need for a firm to optimise product quality and technology 
as quickly as possible, since any degree of success will almost auto- 
matically attract competition from other well-known food manufacturers 
who have the R&D facilities to develop a similar technical advance, 
an efficient distribution network to facilitate their distribution of 
a competitive product, the existence of excess capacity to encourage 
the supply of DOBs, and a competitive retail milieu which stimulates 
retailers to stock DOBs. In consequence, these specific marketing 
conditions have led to a competitive situation in which the manufacturers 
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have been devoting increased expenditure to trade discounts and other 
promotional activity which have resulted in the lowest prices that can 
be economically operated by manufacturers and retailers. 
1 
Jif, a non-scratch cream scourer (CH 2) is part of the much larger 
household cleaning market which includes floor cleaners, powder scourers, 
bleaches, liquid scourers and washing-up liquids. There is consider- 
able overlap in the use of these products by housewives because they do 
not regard them as serving a specific purpose. The cream scourer 
market effectively dates from 1975 when Jif and Agax Cream were intro- 
duced at approximately the same time. By 1979 the share of the market 
held by Jif was 52 per cent compared with the 20 per cent share of Ajax 
Cream. Basically, the policy of Jif the dominant brand (2.5: 1) has 
been to invest in sampling, advertising, and distribution penetration 
and hold down margins in order to obtain an increased share of a still 
rapidly growing market. In order to counter the larger share of the 
market held by Jif, in 1980 Ajax Cream instituted a dramatic price 
reduction campaign by lowering their price some 8-10p below that of Jif. 
Since Jif was not prepared to lose part of their share of the market 
they responded straightaway and reduced their price by a similar amount 
by overprinting their price marked packs. It is likely that this 
reduced price level may lead to a much enlarged market, although in 
such a complex market where cream scourers not only compete with each 
other, but with powder scourers and many other household cleaners, 
elasticity of demand is difficult to predict. 
Thus in this product category, Jif has to take into account the 
prices of products which housewives regard as acceptable substitutes; 
the major firms have not, to date, been equally successful in attaining 
1. The absence of an automatic correlation between oligopoly, 
advertising and higher prices in the food trade is illustrated 
in a study (King, 1978) which showed that the prices of the 
old-established 'heavily advertised' food brands - those on 
the market in 1964 and spending over £250,000 on advertising 
in 1977 - rose by 220 per cent between 1964 and 1978, compared 
with 309`per cent for food prices generally. ) 
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market share and therefore do not have the same interest in accepting 
their present market shares; whereas the Retail Price Index between 
1973-9 rose by 140 per cent, the price of cream scourers rose by 70 per 
cent., 
Golden Rail is an example par excellence of a service which 
operates in a very price competitive area, because of the prevalence of 
substitutes and near substitutes, e. g. car, coach independent self- 
catering holidays, packaged coach tours, etc. 
*** 
Except in the short term the stable market environment which 
disciplined price leadership requires in order to persist seems unlikely. 
Over a period of time, changes in demand are brought about by changing 
social and economic conditions, and-. in supply by technology, the entry 
of new firms, and the introduction of retailer brands. In several Case 
Histories, for instance, intense price cutting has developed at the 
retail level (including 'bargin offers' by manufacturers, as well as 
retailers' price competition), there is the growing bargaining power of 
large-scale retailers, both as buyers and, in many instances, suppliers 
of their own brands, and with some products there is the threat of 
potential entry by other international companies. These market factors 
are sufficiently strong to override some of the main characteristics 
associated with disciplined price leadership, e. g. inelastic industry 
demand, static or only slow growing market, and similar products (these 
three characteristics all apply to toothpaste). The prices that emerge 
from oligopolistic industries are likely therefore to be influenced by 
market conditions. 
Furthermore, disciplined price leadership would seem to imply a 
degree of homogeneity among the firms in an oligopolistic industry which 
in practice is unrealistic, e. g. firms are not equally efficient and 
^l. 
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aggressive in production-distribution and marketing; they are not equally 
successful at innovation; their market shares do not expand at a uniform 
rate. Under such an unstable state of affairs, one or other firm will 
be compelled or stimulated to introduce price reductions, for instance, 
or a product variant, or a more vigorous marketing policy which affects 
the relative positions and profitability of all the competing firms. 
Where firms are constantly vying to improve their position in a market 
which can be brought about by a variety of means, it will be more 
difficult to sustain higher prices. 
Finally, as examples from the Case Histories illustrate in many 
oligopolistic markets (e. g. Batchelors Instant Custard, Golden Rail, 
Jif, Mr. Kipling Cakes) firms are in competition with firms in-a wide 
variety of other markets which provide substitutes or near substitutes 
on which consumers can spend their money. 
Public policy pronouncements, however, have tended to ignore the 
effectiveness of the many factors in the market which help to constrain 
prices in an oligopolistic market structure, and particularly to over- 
look the time element which is most likely to undermine most efforts at 
disciplined price leadership. The MC's Report on Parallel Pricing 
which surveyed the effects of pricing policy under oligopoly concluded: 
'However oligopolists choose to co-ordinate their 
behaviour, the result is likely to be a level of prices 
and profits higher than would prevail with a large number 
of sellers ... 
' (Cmnd. 5530,1973,13) 
and to alleviate this situation recommended that Government control of 
prices and costs will often be the appropriate practical remedy (p. 38). 
Likewise in the MMC's Consultative Document (Cmnd. 7198,, 1978) it 
was claimed that: 
'... the market power 
permit excess profits 
result in a misalloca 
the pattern of output 
or changes therein. ' 
arising from high concentration may 
to be made. Also, market power can 
tion of resources in the sense that 
does not reflect consumer preferences 
(3.20) 
f 
228 
There is little recognition in either of these pronouncements that 
an oligopolist per se cannot be insulated either from competition from 
the other large firms in its particular industry, or the threat of 
entry from large firms engaged in other industries who see opportunities 
in markets quite different from their own, the influence of distributors 
own brands, and changing consumer demand. There is, however, the 
implied assumption that has already been noted that brand loyalty can 
be enforced permanently by advertising, although there is little 
evidence from the Case Histories to support that view. 
Finally, when the Price Commission was strengthened and given powers 
for new and more detailed investigation of individual prices, this policy 
was justified on the grounds that increased concentration, 'price 
leadership' and 'parallel pricing' with big companies taking the lead 
was increasing the danger of monopoly. (Under-Secretary of State for 
Prices and Consumer Protection, Trade and Industry, 18 March, 1977). 
However, there is no general agreement among economists whether con- 
centration has been increasing in industry (Part 1, p. 27 ). Further- 
more, no_attempt is made to distinguish disciplined from barometric 
price leadership, nor to acknowledge that price leadership and parallel 
prices are often ways in which competition under oligopoly exerts its 
effect. 
In a review of the work of the Price Commission (Three Banks 
Review, 1978) Lord Cockf ield,. its first chairman, 1973-77, postulated that 
there was a need for 
'.. a permanent facility to protect the community at large 
in the field of pricing ... We suffer in this country from market domination, price leadership, parallel pricing, 
the lack of effective competition, unwillingness to compete 
on price. ' ( p. 3 ) 
Although oligopoly typifies most industries, this proposal overlooks the 
main factors which counter the ability of markets dominated by a handful 
of firms to control prices in the long run. To give one example: a 
k 
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feature of present-day retail distribution is the widespread marketing 
of distributors' own brands by large-scale retailers. This development 
acts as a deterrent to excessive advertising, curtails monopoly 
tendencies over a growing range of merchandise, and exerts a beneficial 
influence on prices. The reputation of a retailer with a household 
name, and a prominent display in his branches, is sufficient for a 
shopper to try out a private brand without extensive advertising. 
Retailer brands, moreover, receive widespread publicity and favourable 
comment from public and private consumer bodies and the media. 
The restricted view of competition and the assumption of a static 
economy implicit in the argument that firms in an oligopoly can raise 
prices with impunity would also appear responsible for the concept that 
retaliatory advertising and marketing costs can be wholly or largely 
added to the price the consumer is asked to pay as sunned up in the MC's 
Report (C=d. 5530,1973) 
'... But advertising which merely seeks to expand one 
seller's market share at the expense of other sellers' 
shares is likely to be partly self-cancelling and the 
overall unit cost of unchanging output is then likely to 
be higher than it would be with a smaller expenditure on 
advertising. Such an increase in unit costs would rep- 
resent a waste of resources and would constitute a serious 
public interest issue. ' (para 77) 
: The. süpposition that advertising expenditure merely persuades con- 
sumers to buy one brand rather than another and hence results in higher 
unit costs is based on several fallacies, e. g. that the demand for 
particular types of merchandise is saturated and cannot be expanded; 
that all firms are equally efficient or-inefficient; that there is no 
scope for introducing cost-reducing methods, and that no firms can expand 
their turnover more than proportionately to compensate for the cost of 
the advertising. In particular, it fails to acknowledge that changes 
in market shares are the raison d'etre of competition in practice, and 
that advertising and other types of promotions are deployed to increase 
0 
market share which, if successful, can lead to better quality merchandise, 
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improved service or servicing, and act as a stimulus to firms with 
diminishing market shares. 
(b) Non-price Competition and Oligopoly 
In the theoretical model of perfect competition there is uniformity 
of products and services so that competition is concentrated on price 
which will reduce costs and profits to the minimum. In this model 
therefore the only form of competition analysed is price competition. 
Since all consumers are assumed to be perfectly informed of all competing 
offers, advertising and other forms of competitive sales promotion have 
no place. It may then be argued that the presence of other forms of 
competition is evidence of 'imperfect competition', and thereby 
inferior to price competition, viz. 
'Under oligopoly competition no longer takes place by 
means of prices, but by means of packaging, samples, 
coupons, gifts and other attractions that might be con- 
sidered secondary. ' (Kaldor, Part 1, p. 24 ) 
Although in a sense this premise is correct, it is invalid unless either 
perfect competition is a practicable alternative to imperfect competition 
or methods of non-price competition are no more than a poor substitute 
for price competition. 
It is now generally accepted that oligopoly is the prevalent form 
of industrial structure. In recent years in the areas of manufacturing 
and retailing where competition has been most intense there has been an 
increase in both price and non-price competition which suggests that 
the latter may serve some specific functions in generating competitive 
activity. 
Various types of non-price competition are employed in marketing 
products in many of the Case Histories. These include forms of 
indirect price competition such as temporary price reductions (TPRs) 
and multi-unit pricing, ' samples, competitions, 'free' offers, and rival 
innovations. 
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Temporary Price Reductions (TPRs) 
TPRs are widely used by Persil Automatic, Jif, Bird's Quick Custard 
and Macleans Toothpaste. With toothpaste, for instance, TPRs are now 
more important than media advertising and other forms of promotion (CA 1). 
Their increased use over the past decade has been due to three 
developments in retail distribution: (1) the enhanced bargaining power 
of retailers vis ä vis manufacturers; (2) the increased price 
consciousness of consumers which has led the major retail firms to 
intensify their own promotional activities; and(3) the growth of 
distributors' own brands (DOBs). 
1. The growth of large-scale retailing, and in particular of 
retailer concentration (50 per cent of Macleans Toothpaste sold through 
thirteen retailers, 50 per cent of Persil Automatic sold by four retail 
firms) has led manufacturers who sell through supermarkets to transfer 
some of their promotion through advertising to promotion through 
TPRs as a means of competing for special positions on the shelves of 
supermarkets, and gaining participation in retailers' promotional 
activity. 'In particular TPRs enable manufacturers to ensure that the 
discounts they make to retailers are actually passed through to consumers, 
whereas reducing manufacturers' list price would not necessarily have 
the same effect. With 'flash' offers the retailer can sell at no more 
than the recommended price less the 'money off' from the manufacturer. 
With price-marked packs a significant contribution to the price reduction 
is required from the retailer, the manufacturers' discount from list 
prices being perhaps only half the discount from recommended prices 
imposed on the retailer by the price marking. The retailer's permitted 
margin is correspondingly reduced. In this case both the manufacturer's 
discount and the retailer's discount are passed on. Moreover, the 
retailer often discounts the retail price even further. -As a result, 
the consumer has benefitted from lower prices. 
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2. At a time of increased price consciousness of consumers, 
manufacturers have found that reduced price packs and 'flash' offers 
have proved more effective in achieving consumer trial and retrial of 
products and thus securing extra sales than other types of promotions 
such as advertising. First, they help to influence the less brand 
loyal consumer and perhaps persuade her to switch brands, and also to 
sustain the 'loyalty' of existing customers. Secondly, in the 
impersonal environment of self-service, they are a means of attracting 
the, consumer at the point of sale in the supermarket when she is con- 
sidering her purchases. 
3. The intensification of retail competition has stimulated some 
manufacturers, e. g. Persil Automatic to use TPRs to meet the competition 
of low price DOBs. TPRs can encourage shoppers to sample the manufac- 
turers' brands at a low price while at the same time maintaining the 
quality image of the manufacturer brand. 
For manufacturers TPRs can be a flexible sales promotion device 
because the amount of the price reduction and the duration of the TPR 
can be varied, which makes them less easy for competitors to imitate. 
Furthermore, an intermittent price reduction may be more noticed by 
consumers than an overall, and consequently much smaller, price reduction. 
The extent to which a manufacturer will find it worthwhile to use 
TPRs will depend, inter alia, on its market position. Since'Macleans 
Toothpaste has a smaller share of the market than the brand leader it 
has by definition a smaller number of 'loyal' customers and consequently 
finds it necessary to promote more frequently and intensively than the 
major brand, e. g. in 1979 40 per cent of all packs on promotion were TPRs. 
Persil Automatic is the brand leader (CH 5) in the growing market 
for low-suds washing powder. In order to gain as large a market share 
as possible at the expense of its major competitor; 100 per cent of its 
packs were carrying TPRs for a short period although the amount of the 
price reduction, and the length of the promotion varied which made it 
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more difficult for its rival to retaliate exactly. 
Multi-unit Pricing 
The selling technique of 'three for the price of two' is used by 
Macleans Toothpaste. It is an example of a promotion which reduces the 
unit cost of selling by raising the value of the average transaction and 
transferring part of the cost of holding stock to the customer. In 
addition, it is an example of an effort to retain the 'loyalty' of the 
customer for a longer period than when single units of the brand are 
sold. Other promotions are also designed to encourage shoppers to 
continue buying Macleans Toothpaste, e. g. 7p off this pack which also 
includes a coupon worth, say, 7p off the next purchase: when the con- 
sumer sends in three toothpaste packs to the manufacturer she receives 
50p in cash. 
Steles 
With new products, (Jif, Persil Automatic) samples are regarded as 
an expensive but effective method of stimulating consumers' trial. By 
this means, it is anticipated that the brand will be accepted by consumers 
more quickly than would otherwise occur, and thereby expand sales and 
lower average costs of production. In addition, it is hoped that the 
issue of samples will enable a firm to gain a larger share of the 
market than its rivals. Persil Automatic, for instance, had been in 
the low suds washing powder for three years before the arrival of its 
major competitor, and samples were a means of quickly consolidating its 
position. 
With both Jif and Persil Automatic, contracts have been negotiated 
with domestic equipment manufacturers to include samples in their 
products. As a result, this ensures that consumers are enabled to try 
the brands exactly at the time they purchase the equipment which will be 
used in conjunction with them. Since many consumers may be reluctant 
to buy a product with which they are unfamiliar, a sample allows them 
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to experiment with it without payment, and make a decision whether they 
wish to buy it in the future. As a result, samples would appear to be 
the most informative type of advertising which many manufacturers would 
like to issue if the size of their market justified the expense; it 
seems inappropriate therefore to describe samples as 'a secondary 
attraction'. 
The aforementioned promotions are effective but costly. Manufac- 
turers, therefore, intersperse them with lighter and less expensive 
promotions which may, nevertheless, be sufficient to focus trade 
interest on the product, achieve a display in the supermarket, and thus 
attract the consumer's attention. Competitions, for instance, are 
employed for this purpose by Persil Automatic. In addition, they have 
two further advantages: first, the prizes cost less than their cash 
equivalent. Secondly, the competitions may feature as prizes the 
products of manufacturers of washing machines, e. g. hi-fi equipment which 
helps to emphasise the link between the brand and front-loading washing 
machines. In a competition organised by Persil Automatic and Jif with 
a specific supermarket chain, Tesco, the effects were three-fold, viz. 
the retailer was prepared to give the products special displays, feature 
the products in advertising, and to, match the manufacturers' price 
reduction during the period of the promotion. 
Free Offers 
In 1979-80 Lever Bros. and British Rail organised a joint promotion 
where, in return for four proofs of purchase from one or any combination 
of eight Lever Bros. brands including Persil Automatic and Jif, the con- 
sumer was entitled to a free rail ticket on the purchase of a rail ticket. 
For the company the promotion was designed to secure trial and a degree 
of 'loyalty' towards its brands. For Jif, the promotion stimulated 
retailers for the first time to, give the brand a special display on the 
floor of supermarkets, a valuable selling position which a low volume. 
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product finds it difficult to achieve. Another consequence of the 
promotion is that the retail trade is more prepared to accept Jif as an 
established brand which merits shelf space which is important when the 
policy of retailers is constantly to replace existing lines on their 
limited shelf space with new brands. An indirect and favourable effect 
of the promotion has been to enhance the brand's reputation with the 
sales force. 
Rival Innovations 
A continual flow of rival innovations reaches the market (of which 
only a small proportion are successful, e. g. CH 4) for one or a combin- 
ation of factors: as a result of technical developments, in response 
to the changing requirements of consumers, to diversify out of a static 
or declining product area into an expanding market, to forestall the 
entry of a potential competitor into a product field and in order to 
compete more effectively against rivals. 
Innovation can be an effective, if risky, competitive weapon because 
it may take longer to emulate than any other type of competitive activity, ' 
e. g. price reductions or promotions. This provides a firm with the 
opportunity to establish its product with the consumer and the trade 
before the arrival of second and subsequent brands. Under the existing 
organisation and structure of retailing, the first arrival in a product 
field is likely to find it easier to obtain adequate distribution than 
later competitors, and provided that customers have found the product 
satisfactory it will be more difficult to tempt them to change brands 
unless a later entrant can offer a superior product. Both these 
factors can give the first entrant into a product field a significant 
advantage over competitors. 
The changing habits and needs of consumers provide a constant 
challenge and opportunity for innovation. A technical advance enabled 
Batchelor's Quick Custard (CH 6) to meet the changed preferences of the 
I 
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consumer in the desserts market. Similarly, automation and legislation 
made it possible for Argos Distributors (CH 8) to introduce a new type 
of retail outlet in response to the changed attitudes of consumers 
towards price competition. 
At the same time that firms innovate to meet the changing habits 
and needs of consumers, such innovations provide the means of replacing 
markets which have, or are about to decline, as the result of these 
changed-. consumer requirements. Thus in view of the continued slow 
decline in the volume of bread sales British Bakeries (CH 7) needed to 
generate new sources of turnover and profit, and decided to capitalise. 
on its existing skills and advantages, particularly distribution 
facilities, by entering the packaged cake market. Two factors deter- 
mined this decision: packaged cakes were the fastest expanding sector 
of the cake market, and grocers were becoming more important as dis- 
tribution outlets. It was found essential to enter the market early 
and become established, in particular in multiple grocers, as large-scale 
food retailers only appeared willing to stock a handful of brands. Jif 
(CH 2) was introduced in response to changes in the type of surfaces 
which consumers were installing in their homes and for which the 
traditional types of scourers were unsuitable; Persil Automatic (CH 5) 
was introduced to meet the needs of a new type of washing machine. In 
each instance, however, these products replaced the firm's existing 
products (Vim, and Persil respectively), and were introduced before the 
market was economically viable as a means of pre-empting the entry of 
competitors. The entry of Persil Automatic into the low suds washing 
powder market three years ahead of its main rival has altered the share 
of the heavy duty washing powder market held in favour of Lever Bros. 
The examples from the Case Histories illustrate that promotions 
perform several functions: encourage shoppers to try a product for the 
first time (samples); detach shoppers from their customary brand, in 
the hope that, once they have been persuaded to try the particular brand 
237 
they will wish to purchase it again (TPRs); to boost turnover at certain 
period of the year (TPRs); to stimulate consumers to obtain the new 
season`s catalogue; to achieve retail displays (multi-unit pricing, 
competitions); to maintain interest of retailers in the product ('free' 
offers); to encourage more 'loyal' customers when only marginal 
differences exist between products (gift or money for sending in three 
tops). 
The basic aim of all forms of competition is to increase a firm's 
marked share, and they all lead to retaliation by competitors. Types 
of non-price competition, however, can be a more effective form of com- 
petition than price (or used in conjunction with price) because it isinore 
difficult and slower to imitate, promotions are more varied and unpre- 
dictable, vary in their value to consumers and the skill and efficiency 
with which they are implemented by manufacturers and retailers. With 
non-price competition rivals cannot retaliate directly and exactly; 
during this intervening period the initiator gains an advantage in the 
market at the expense of potential imitators. Price cutting, on the 
other hand, requires no special skill to initiate or imitate and can 
take place immediately (see CH 2). 
Non-price competition may also be preferred by manufacturers and 
retailers as a substitute for, or in addition to, price reductions 
because more value can be given as a 'gift' than as a price reduction; 
it may be more effective as a publicity weapon; a" lower price may not 
be significant or dramatic enough to be noticed; and it may help to 
secure more consumer 'loyalty'. As a result, forms of non-price 
competition (including advertising) may be more effective in building 
sales than the equivalent outlay on a price reduction. In addition, 
it is possible that many of the effects, and possibly the benefits of 
the competitive process may be obtained through non-price competition. 
Finally, the efficiency and importance of types of non-price 
competition increase and diminish according to how strongly manufacturers 
238. 
think they will appeal to retailers and consumers as a sales stimulant, 
e. g. Case Histories illustrate the increasing importance of sales 
promotions compared with advertising. 
The functions performed by different types of non-price competition 
which can increase competitive activity under varied and changing 
trading circumstances have been consistently disregarded in public policy 
pronouncements. Instead non-price competition continues to be regarded 
as inferior to price competition despite the fact that the latter cannot 
operate under oligopoly in the way that it does under perfect competition. 
Thus the Prices and Incomes Board in its Report on Detergents, 
suggested that: 
'The consumer would benefit if the area of competition on 
price could be increased at the expense, if need be, either 
of outlays on advertising and promotion or of profit. ' 
(Cmnd. 2791,1965, Para 65) 
The MC in its Report on Household Detergents did not seem aware that 
although one purpose of sales promotion is to secure trial of a"product 
this does not mean that consumers will not then decide to purchase the 
product according to its merits. 
'Lever Bros. and Procter & Gamble seem ... to assume that 
the housewife will be moved to prefer one brand to another 
less by superior washing powder than by the competing 
attractions of plastic daffodils as compared with whatever 
concomitant "gift" may be offered with another brand', 
and that sales promotions 
... distract the customer`s attention from the merits or 
demerits'of the detergent. ' (HC 105, p. 33) 
In its Consultative Document the MMC concluded that non-price com- 
petition could raise prices because they are an additional cost: 
'The various forms of non-price competition involve, to 
a greater or lesser extent, resource costs and these in 
turn can mean higher prices to the consumer. The creation 
and defence of a position of market dominance can also 
involve resource costs which do not necessarily yield a 
social gain. Thus the accretion of market power through 
greater concentration can result in a range of practices 
which are unique to markets characterised by dominant firms 
which are potentially against the public interest'. 
(Cmnd. 7198,1978,3.40) 
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There is no recognition in this statement that manufacturers add to 
their costs in various ways, e. g. advertising, bargain offers, because 
they will have found by trial and error that they will be more than com- 
pensated by the additional sales turnover that will be generated, e. g. 
plant may be utilised more fully, manufacturing unit costs may be reduced. 
Associated with the view of non-price, competition as a market 
imperfection which raises prices, there is the further argument that the 
widespread employment of such selling techniques as Temporary Price 
Reductions, free gifts and. bargain offer claims confuses consumers. They 
are claimed to obscure the relationship between price and value un- 
necessarily, thereby complicating the comparison of competing offers, 
and this confusion prevents the most satisfactory choice of merchandise 
or retailer. (Consumer Council, Price Commission, Office of Fair 
Trading, EEC), for example, the Consumer Council (statement, 28 November 
1963): 
I... any practice is undesirable which makes it more 
difficult for consumers to compare values'. (my italics) 
The Price Commission Report (HC 657,1978) on Lever Bros: 
'... we knew that consumer bodies believed that the scale 
and nature of the company's promotional activity tended to 
confuse the general consumer as to price, and to result in 
a higher price level than might otherwise prevail. ' (1) 
Furthermore, the issue of 'consumer confusion' has been included in 
legislation, i. e. under the Fair Trading Act 1973 (Section 17 (2)) where 
trade practices 'adversely affect the economic interests of consumers by 
misleading or confusing them' the Director General of Fair Trading can 
put forward proposals to prohibit or modify them. 
Over the past decade two particular sales promotions which feature 
in the case histories - Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs) and its 
corollary 'double pricing', 
' 
and Temporary Price Reductions (TPRs) - 
1. This is the practice where the actual retail price is shown 
next to a higher reference'price usually suggested or recom- 
mended''by the manufacturers. When RRPs are used in double 
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have been the subject-of considerable public controversy and official 
investigation on two main counts, viz. whether they hinder competition 
and whether they confuse or mislead consumers. 
The MC (HC 100,1969) investigated RRPs when they were still being 
generally observed in many trades. The Report found RRPs a complex 
subject matter with retailers and manufacturers divided over the extent 
to which the practice contributed towards inhibiting or stimulating 
price competition. Between 1975-78 the PC investigated the effect of 
RRPs and double pricing on several individual products including 
sanitary towels and Tampons (No. 9,1975) and Supplementary Report 
(No. 26,1977); small electrical household appliances (No. 18 1976); 
and beds (HC 650,1978), and undertook a wider factual study (No. 25, 
1977) to supplement the MC's Report. 
The Commission's fact-finding Report appeared anxious to emphasise 
that RRPs do not form a homogeneous subject that permits easy conclusions, 
but a combination of separate quite diverse phenomena. In particular, 
it noted that compared with the MC's findings in 1969 the number and 
type of products covered by RRPs had changed, which seemed to indicate 
that they were not a monolithic or static practice but a part of fluid 
and constantly changing market conditions. However, this study did not 
include research into consumer attitudes or behaviour. 
All the Commission's Reports on individual products commented 
adversely against double pricing, although often for different reasons, 
(see for one example p. 194 on sanitary protection products. ) On small 
electrical household appliances the Commission recommended the abolition 
of RRPs because these products were rarely sold at the recommended price; 
1. (cont. ) pricing they are claimed to confuse consumers in one 
of three ways: (1) where RRPs have been deliberately inflated 
by manufacturers to enable all retailers to 'cut' prices to 
some degree; (2) where the traditional mark-up used to cal- 
culate RRPs has become obsolete through changes in the 
structure of distribution; and (3) where variable RRPs have 
been introduced and calculated for a particular product at 
the request of the individual. 
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as a result RRP s were valueless as a guide to prices, encouraged 
impulse buying, confused the consumer and discouraged shopping around. 
Unfortunately, the Commission's-recommendation for prohibition was 
weakened by its price survey which was based on twenty-five brand leaders 
estimated to account for some 30 per cent of sales in each product group. 
Since brand leaders are the lines most likely to be discounted it does 
not follow that secondary brands have been discounted to the same degree. 
Furthermore, consumer confusion was simply inferred in the Report; no 
attempt was made to ascertain whether consumer behaviour in the market- 
place would support the view that double pricing effectively halts the 
shopper from shopping around-. 
Similarly, in the Commission's Report on beds1 it was recommended 
that 
'double pricing at the point of sale and in media adver- 
tising should be prohibited except for prescribed "sales" 
periods of limited duration ... and ... RRPs for beds 
should be prohibited'. (para 13). 
Despite this recommendation, the Report also revealed that consumers 
generally bought at the 'market price' which seemed to indicate that 
double pricing did not adversely affect consumers' behaviour. The 
Report also found that bed manufacturers were not earning excessive 
profits. 
The distinguishing feature of this Report was a survey into consumer 
attitudes and buying behaviour which conflicted with that depicted in 
earlier Reports. This showed, not unexpectedly, that purchasers of 
beds relied on several sources of information to help them choose what 
to buy, and where to buy it, i. e. window shopping and looking around 
were the two most important sources, followed by press and television 
advertising. Two out of three purchasers looked at beds in three or 
more shops. Although price was important in determining the shopper's 
1. Examined under the Price Commission Act 1977 which enabled 
double pricing to be investigated and, if necessary, 
prohibited on a sectoral basis. 
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selection of a retail outlet, the survey showed it was by no means the only 
factor. Discounts, 'sales' and credit facilities, and knowing or 
trusting a particular shop were also important factors for patronising 
a particular outlet. Similarly, while price was important in the choice 
of a particular bed or mattress, aspects of quality and design were'also 
significant elements in choice. 
In 1975 the OFT had widened the debate on RRPs into a discussion 
v 
on the whole area of bargain offer claims, including TPRs, and contrary 
to the PC's recommendation for the prohibition of RRI's suggested 
proposals to strengthen 'double pricing'. At the same time it made 
detailed proposals to reduce the apparent confusion caused by one type 
of TPR, 'flash offers'. It had not investigated whether such offers 
mislead consumers but placed reliance on the investigation carried out 
by the National Federation of Consimer Groups in 1974. On the other 
hand, it had not accepted the Federation's conclusion that 'flash offers' 
should be abolished. When, however, the OFT's proposals to reduce 
confusion were examined their weaknesses became apparent, and they were 
shelved. 
In 1978 the OFT issued two recommendations for action on bargain 
offer claims to the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer 
Protection. Whereas its original proposals on RRPs had been designed 
to strengthen double pricing as a competitive device by removing 
ambiguities and vagueness, the OFT now concluded that most RRPs were 
'notional' and recommended that they should be prohibited when used to 
indicate that the seller's price is less than a recommended price. 
This proposal to ban double pricing had the effect of effectively 
prohibiting TPRs and flash offers since manufacturers could no longer 
relate them to RRPs: This contradicted the Consultative Document 
which had considered flash offers as a suitable form of short term 
price cutting, and had suggested how they could be made less confusing.. 
I 
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The OFT's recommendation to abolish double pricing seemed to be 
based on the assumption that 'their intention is to dissuade the con- 
sumer from further shopping around' (para 11), although no evidence was 
provided for this statement. Neither the OFT nor the PC seemed to take 
into account that double pricing or comparison pricing has been the 
k marketing technique which has contributed towards the intensification 
of competition by acting as a 'bench mark' by providing retailers with 
an effective and shorthand way of publicising their price reductions; 
that they help to reveal the lack of competitiveness of other retailers; 
that they are useful for the little-known firm entering a noisy and 
crowded market-place; that they are particularly effective when price 
competition is being introduced into a product field; and that for 
some new types of retail outlets, such as catalogue discount selling 
(CH 8) they provide a more economical method than advertising for 
communicating price reductions to consumers. 
Furthermore, the OFT 1978 recommendations failed to make clear 
whether the effective prohibition of TPRs and flash offers had been the 
unintended side-effect of proposing the abolition of RRPs, or whether 
the proposal arose from the difficulty previously experienced of making 
such offers less confusing. In either event, the OFT had failed to take 
into account that these offers provide price reductions over and above 
those given by retailers (CHs 1,2,5) which is beneficial to consumers, 
and that since they are associated with low value items bought at frequent 
intervals the element of confusion which they generate is likely to be 
small. 
In 1978 the PC commissioned for its investigation into the price 
of soaps and detergents (HC 1) a consumer survey into the effect of 
TPRs and flash offers. The results indicated that consumers are mainly 
product and brand conscious, and seem to be satisfied that they have no. 
difficulty in assessing value for money. Nor did the survey confirm a 
picture of widespread consumer confusion which the Commission attributed 
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to 'the frequency with which this type of product is purchased' (para 
3.53). The PC Report on toothpaste (HC1 125,1978) also confirmed that 
TPRs are unlikely to cause widespread consumer confusion, and that their 
price survey indicated that TPRs result in lower prices. 
Despite these consumer and price surveys which were at variance with 
the earlier conclusions on RRPs and flash offers, a draft Order to 
implement the OFT's recommendations to prohibit, inter alia, price com- 
parisons with RRPs and flash offers was published by the Department of 
Prices and Consumer Protection at the end of 1978. However, the eventual 
Price Marking (Bargain Offers) Order 1979 permitted double pricing on 
all products, apart from four (with the proviso that other products could 
be investigated on a sectoral basis), and permitted TPRs. (In 1979 a 
voluntary agreement was signed by the relevant trade associations that 
. 
no more than 50 per cent annually of their members' packs would carry 
TPRs). 
The conclusion of the early Reports of the PC and the proposals and 
recommendations of the OFT that consumers were confused by double pricing 
seemed to be based on two assumptions, viz. that price is almost the 
sole factor taken into account by shoppers when making purchasing 
decisions; double-pricing inhibits shopping around because the shopper 
believes she is getting a bargain. 
These assumptions were not, however, confirmed by the consumer 
surveys commissioned later by the PC on detergents and beds respectively 
which showed that, for instance, with detergents the reasons for choosing 
a particular brand were more often to do with the quality of the powder 
than the price. Moreover, and not unexpectedly, of those buying for 
reasons of price, 20 per cent chose a distributor's own brand compared "It 
with only 6 per cent of all housewives who did so. With beds, the 
survey revealed that shoppers took a variety of factors into account, 
besides price, when selecting a retail outlet. In other words, with 
both these products double-pricing (including TPRs) was only one factor 
- 
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among many others which affected the buying decision of the shopper, and 
seen in this context their ability to mislead consumers would appear to 
be considerably reduced. 
Public policy appears to underestimate the knowledge possessed by 
the shopper which develops over time and which has become more perfect 
through social and economic developments, e. g. ownership of cars and 
telephones, widespread retail advertising, compound trading (the sale 
of specialist merchandise by non-specialist retailers), the consumer 
movement. As a result shoppers have better and speedier facilities for 
comparing prices than in the past. 
The shift in emphasis on the issue of RRPs over a short period of 
time (1969-79) illustrates the difficulty of legislating under changing 
trading conditions without adversely affecting competition. Originally, 
RRPs were condemned as contrary to the interests of consumers because of 
the widespread adherence to them by manufacturers. They were often 
regarded as a substitute for resale price maintenance, and as. a hindrance 
to price competition. More recently, the abolition of RRPs has been 
recommended because the difference between the actual and the 
recommended price has become so wide that consumers are misled and 
confused by them! In the intervening period, as the Price. Commission's 
fact-finding study revealed, changes have taken place in the number and 
type of products covered by RRPs which, apart from the incentive of the 
Trade Descriptions Act to introduce them, has reflected the impact of 
new forms of retailing, and the varying rate at which price competition 
has emerged in different product fields. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The discrepancies which have emerged in Part 3 between the theory 
and practice of advertising and competition stem from several omissions 
and fallacies in the theory of the firm. The basic omission is the 
element of time, the importance of which economists like Marshall were 
well aware, and which in practice limits the ability of advertising 
to determine demand, and the ability of firms to raise prices and costs. 
Furthermore, (1) premises such as advertising as a barrier to entry 
and as a creator of durable brand loyalty have been shown to have little 
validity in the market-place. (2) The neglect of the influence of the 
organisation and structure of retail distribution on advertising and 
competition has also resulted in a failure to recognise the increasing 
need for firms to attain the economies of 'loyalty' and widespread dis- 
tribution in order to maximise sales and achieve economies of scale. 
Finally, (3) the assumption that oligopolists should compete in 
the same manner as firms operating under the abstract model of perfect 
competition has led to the misleading conclusion that any other form 
of competition apart from price is an imperfection and thereby detri- 
mental to consumer welfare, whereas practice shows that under conditions 
of oligopoly non-price competition can be an effective means of 
competition. 
1. The conclusion, for instance, of conventional theory that 
advertising enables prices and/or profits to be higher than the com- 
petitive level is based on three main premises, viz. that. advertising 
acts as a barrier to entry; that advertising can create automatic and 
durable brand loyalty; and that firms operate in a static market. 
'Barriers to entry' is a more complex and varied concept in 
practice where advertising may be only one, and even an insignificant 
variable compared with all the other factors which influence a firm's 
decision to enter a market,. e. g., financial resources, the complexity of 
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technology, the ease or difficulty of achieving distribution, the 
potential size of the market, whether existing firms have already 
reached economies of scale, whether the market is expanding or con- 
tracting. All these factors act as 'barriers to entry' to some degree. 
In fact, this is the mechanism whereby firms endeavour to build up their 
reputation and goodwill with a product which is well distributed, well 
advertised, and sold at the 'right' price as a means of protecting 
themselves as long as possible from competitors. Conversely, firms 
contemplating entering a market take it for granted that it consists of 
established competitors whose brands are well known and acceptable to 
consumers, and that this is a major obstacle that they will need to 
overcome. Both groups of firms would assume that this is the essence 
of competition! 
The implicit assumption in theory that advertising can create 
automatic and durable brand loyalty is not borne out in practice where 
many products either fail to get established in the market-place, or 
remain in existence for only a short period. Although advertising may 
have been successful in stimulating the shopper to purchase a product 
in the first instance, unless she is willing to make a repeat purchase 
the brand will fail after a few months. With established brands, wide 
fluctuations occur in their market shares. This is due to the fact 
that only a proportion of purchasers are completely loyal to a partic-_ 
ular brand. The remainder, which in many product groups, constitutes 
the major part of the market share of a brand, is made up of customers 
who vary their purchases between two or more brands of the same product, 
and who on occasion, decide to purchase from a different product group. - 
The two major reasons for consumers behaving in this way is the desire 
for variety, and that one brand offers an intermittent price reduction 
or promotional offer. The latter will occur when in order to remain 
competitive the brands have become equivalent to the customer so that 
on1y"`the price or the promotion differentiates them. 
ýýý 
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Under these circumstances, a high proportion of advertising is 
devoted to encouraging those who already purchase the brand to do"so 
more frequently, or in larger quantities. This means that advertising 
is often directed towards customers who are already familiar with a 
product, and who are able to compare the promises made in the adver- 
tisement against their own experience of the product. 
The tacit assumption that advertising can create durable and 
automatic brand loyalty also implies a static market, since over time 
firms are vulnerable to the impact of competition from the introduction 
of new brands and products, and changing consumer habits, demands and 
tastes. These are all factors which cause brand shares to fluctuate 
and brands to be withdrawn from the market, and which impose severe 
limitations on the power of advertising. 
Associated with the assumption that advertising can assure durable 
brand loyalty is the implicit -'and sometimes explicit - supposition 
that consumers are gullible and passive acceptors of advertising and 
sales promotions. This fallacy arises through the tendency of theory, 
first, to isolate sales promotion from the many other sources of 
information, viz. retailers, the media, friends and relations, and 
consumer bodies, available to consumers and'which, 'in practice, they 
take into account before deciding on a purchase; and, secondly, to take 
a static view of the economy which thereby ignores that consumers learn' 
from experience and reject products in the future which have proved 
unsatisfactory, and underestimates the knowledge of the consumer which 
develops over time, and which has become more perfect because of certain 
economic and social developments, e. g. ownership of cars and telephones, 
retailer advertising, etc. 
2. Conventional theory tends to overlook the effect of the 
organisation and structure of retail distribution on advertising and on 
types of sales promotions. Conventional theory considers advertising 
predominantly from the supplier's viewpoint, and seems to ignore that 
249 
advertising may be a beneficial source of information to consumers. 
Just as serious, it ignores the effect of advertising on retailers. 
Advertising and sales promotion are as essential in persuading the 
retailer to stock a product as in stimulating the consumer to buy it. 
While advertising may. successfully create awareness of a product, 'and 
encourage the consumer to try it, this will be of little avail unless 
the potential purchaser can easily find'it in her local shop. There 
is evidence that on many occasions consumers are prepared to take an 
alternative brand or substitute product if their preferred brand is 
unavailable. Many of the case histories confirm that a firm's success 
in achieving widespread distribution of its product has been an 
essential factor is obtaining a major market share. Not surprisingly, 
in the current competitive and cost conditions in distribution, retailers 
prefer to stock brands with a rapid turnover. Conversely in the com- 
petition for the limited shelf space in the store the retailer is least 
likely to eliminate the most popular selling brands. In practice, 
therefore, an important function of a manufacturer's advertising is 
designed to reassure retailers that a product will sell well. Like- 
wise, the purpose of many manufacturers' promotions is to make it 
worthwhile for the store to display the product prominently. 
The implied insistence in conventional theory that advertising and 
brand loyalty are synonymous has led it to overlook the need of manu- 
facturers and retailers for 'loyalty' which has become more necessary 
under present-day conditions of production and distribution, but which, 
many market developments have made it more difficult to achieve. 
In retail distribution, for instance, impersonal methods of 
shopping, standardised merchandise, and the mobility of shoppers have 
diminished the ability of retailers to achieve the economies of 'loyalty'; 
at the same time expensive capital investment and high overheads have 
accentuated the need to attract maximum customer traffic. In their 
4 
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efforts to operate stores at full capacity, lower operating costs by 
handling fast-selling merchandise, and differentiate themselves from 
their rivals, retailers have, increased their advertising, their range 
of distributors' own brands, and the frequency of 'special offers' and 
promotions, with a further trend as competition has intensified towards 
exclusive promotions with a particular manufacturer. 
Manufacturers have likewise been affected by recent retail develop- 
ments, in particular by the increased concentration in retail' distribution. 
On the other hand, the. potential economies of large-scale production, and 
the cost savings which result from more intensive utilisation of 
expensive machinery can only be achieved if manufacturers can encourage 
sufficient customers to make regular and repeat purchases. 
The growing power of a few large-scale retailers vis ä vis 
manufacturers has led to the development of consumer promotions whose 
primary objective is to induce retailers to give a product a prominent 
display, and to provide a price reduction directly from the manufacturer 
to the consumer over the heads of retailers. Furthermore, the 
impersonal service of the supermarket and the superstore has shifted 
competition to the point of sale, and this is where the manufacturer is 
faced with the task of trying to gain the attention of the shopper, 
without the aid of a sales assistant. This has led to the expansion 
of-promotions to encourage trial of a new product; stimulate repeat 
buyings; facilitate entry into an established product field; boost 
turnover at certain times of the year, and encourage shoppers to try out 
larger sizes. Other promotions such as temporary price reductions'. 
lessen substantially the price differential between the manufacturer 
brand and the distributor's own brand in order to stimulate. trial by 
the price conscious and/or indifferent customer. 
To some extent the expansion of promotions has been at the expense 
of advertising expenditure, although advertising is widely used,, to bring 
them. to the notice of consumers. Moreover, in these examples, of non- 
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price competition manufacturers support the retailer with improved 
terms and advertising allowances because they are keen to have their 
lines chosen in preference to their competitors, and the retailer 
usually matches the manufacturer's price reduction. Non-price 
competition, therefore, often takes place in conjunction with, and not 
in place of, price competition. Under current trading conditions 
manufacturers and retailers employ particular types of non-price com- 
petition because they can perform certain identifiable selling tasks 
more efficiently than other selling techniques'including price. Sales 
promotions have increased over the past twenty years chiefly as a con- 
sequence of changes in the organisation and structure of retail 
distribution. 
The efficiency and importance of different forms of sales 
promotions increases and diminishes according to how strongly manufac- 
turers and retailers think they will appeal to consumers as a sales 
stimulant. Just as-advertising expenditure in food retailing has 
risen over the past five years, trading stamps, for instance, have 
disappeared during the same period. Similarly, manufacturer expenditure 
on advertising has relatively declined in recent years and has been 
replaced by increasing expenditure"an-promotions. 
Non-price competition is widespread under oligopoly because the 
i 
interdependence of firms leads the oligopolist to consider how his 
rivals will react before changing its prices or output. Under these 
circumstances, the oligopolist usually prefers not to compete directly 
on price for fear of setting a downward price spiral in motion which 
will lead to a price war, squeeze profit margins, and be self-defeating. 
Instead, the oligopolist tends to compete by other means such as 
advertising and sales promotion to achieve increased sales turnover. 
In conventional theory non-price competition is regarded as 
inferior to price competition because for the purpose of simplifying, 
` 
the analysis-sales promotions including samples, indirect price 
n 
0,252 
competition, free gifts, competitions, etc. are relegated to the 
category of ceteris paribus and regarded as evidence of imperfect 
competition and therefore as detrimental to consumer welfare. This 
error has led to the view that if these 'imperfections' could be 
eradicated then direct price competition would once more prevail. 
Non-price competition is, however, inherent in the nature of 
oligopoly which has become the prevailing form of organisation in 
industry. Oligopolists tacitly refrain from direct price competition 
because of the ease and speed with which it can be followed by rivals, 
particularly when cost conditions in an industry are similar. 
(Occasional outbursts of aggressive price competition will tend to be 
confined to product innovations and major technical developments). On 
the other hand, firms vary in the calibre of their marketing, advertising 
and sales promotion expertise, and particularly in their ability to 
innovate. Not only are these forms of competition more flexible and 
unpredictable, and more difficult to emulate exactly, but it is less 
easy for rivals to retaliate effectively against a promotion or an 
advertising campaign since these do not have an identical appeal for 
retailers or consumers, and manufacturers vary in the efficiency and 
aggressiveness with which they implement them. 'Even more important, 
it takes time to retaliate and during this period the initiator gains 
an advantage at the expense of his competitors. 
The conclusion of conventional theory that non-price competition 
adds to costs and raises prices is a misconception based on a static 
view of the market. If non-price competition helps to encourage 
consumer 'loyalty' to the retailer and to the brand, reduces costs in 
the shop and the factory, and innovation has a competitive value, then 
it may be an effective means of competition in increasing sales turnover 
and in keeping prices down. The argument that the cost of sales 
promotions must ipso facto be transferred to consumers in the form of 
higher prices 'is based on the supposition that all manufacturers/, 
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retailers are equually efficient or inefficient, that there is no scope 
for introducing cost-reducing methods, and that no manufacturers/ 
retailers can expand their turnover more than proportionately to com- 
pensate for the cost of the sales promotion. 
Since there are obvious practical limits on the degree to which 
the abstract theoretical assumptions of 'perfect competition' can be 
reproduced in modern industry, non-price competition which varies 
according to trading developments may be more applicable than direct 
price competition where oligopoly prevails. Legislation, therefore, 
which curbs or eliminates particular types of non-price competition 
without understanding its function in the market-place, or that it is 
likely to expand and then recede, and perhaps be replaced by'other sales 
techniques under changing market conditions is likely to be detrimental 
to consumer welfare. 
Finally, in Part 1 it was shown that the weaknesses and fallacies 
in the theory of the firm which make it inappropriate as a basis for 
competition policy have been demonstrated by amny eminent economists. 
Nevertheless, in my examination of public policy pronouncements in 
Part 3 it is evident that public policy is prediminantly based on the 
theory of the firm and the need to curb or eliminate imperfections in 
the market such as oligopoly, product differentiation, advertising, and 
non-price competition. I 
I 
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